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Once in his life a man out to concentrate his mind upon the remembered  
earth, I believe. He ought to give himself up to a particular landscape in his 
experience, to look upon it from as many angles as he can, to wonder about it, 
to dwell upon it. He ought to imagine that he touches it with his hands at 
every season and listens to the sounds that are made upon it. He ought 
to imagine the creatures there and all the faintest motions of the wind. He 
ought to recollect the glare of non and all the colors of dusk and dawn. 
-M. Scott Momaday, The Way to Rainy Mountain 
 
 
 
 
I dream of a hard and brutal mysticism in which the naked self merges with  
a non-human world and yet somehow survives still intact, individual, separate. 
Paradox and bedrock. 
-Edward Abbey, Desert Solitaire 
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Abstract 
 
In this study, I examine and theorize AMD&ART, an artwork devoted to 
treating polluted water in Vintondale, PA. AMD&ART is much more than simply a 
water treatment facility, however. Each chapter of this document examines 
AMD&ART through the lens of a different body of scholarly literature: the literature 
associated with land art, Systems Theory, Network Theory, Companion Specieshood 
and others. The theoretical focus of this paper is the emergent importance of the 
concept of performativity—“that reiterative power of discourse to produce the 
phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler, Bodies 2)—in the 
deconstruction of the binary division of “nature” and “culture.” I offer AMD&ART as 
an example of a site wherein the fraught, complex webs of affect muddle the easy 
division of nature from culture. To this end, my paper argues that Bruno Latour’s 
compound-term “natureculture” can afford scholars of performance points of access 
to other, disparate fields: philosophy, natural history, geography and art, to name a 
few. Beyond this, readers are asked to consider their role in the unfolding of the 
world around them—both mundane and spectacular.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
There are certain places where one expects to encounter contemporary art. It 
seems comfortable in places with which it is familiar: art galleries and museums in 
metropolitan areas, the books and publications of scholarly interest, isolated art-
outposts (like Marfa, Texas, with its three museums, nine galleries, and forty year 
association with minimalist Donald Judd), and—if of sufficient age and penetration 
into common culture—on posters tacked up in the dorm rooms and apartments of 
college kids. For an entity that has claimed to push the boundaries of aesthetic 
theory and artistic merit, the bulk of twentieth-century avant-garde art is awfully 
parochial. In other words, it just doesn’t get out much.  
I did not grow up in a place where I might bump into something that could 
conceivably be dubbed “contemporary art.” The rolling, weathered hills of the 
Allegheny Mountains in Pennsylvania are a rural, isolated environment with other 
delights to offer their residents. I spent my childhood in pursuit of butterflies, birds, 
abandoned houses, chokecherries, bracket fungus and fossils and thought very little 
about the aesthetic quality of any of it. In retrospect, I suppose I didn’t get out much 
either.   
Strangely, in the intervening years after I left western Pennsylvania to begin 
my winding career through academia, unequivocally contemporary art flared up in a 
tiny, ramshackle town near my home called Vintondale—a lonely, defunct 
coalmining community in an isolated valley, with a steadily aging population and 
not so much as a grocery store. The town, barely more than a main street, a 
collection of houses and a VFW club, is the site of a moderately well-known piece of 
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environmental art, called AMD&ART. Dedicated to the treatment of polluted water 
leaking from an abandoned coalmine in the town (AMD = Acid Mine Drainage), the 
site combines elements of minimalist sculpture, land art, systems art and relational 
aesthetic theory into a functional and evocative beneficial art gesture.  
To say that the unlikely development of contemporary art shocked me is an 
understatement. Next to nothing involving contemporary aesthetics happens in the 
mountains of western Pennsylvania, and especially not in a place so dilapidated and 
isolated as Vintondale. Yet there AMD&ART sits, completed in 2005, slowly purifying 
the water that courses through the town, offering up to passersby an intriguing and 
novel vision of one sort of relationship between humankind and the natural world.     
Incredulity, then, is the impetus for this study. I begin from both a place of 
familiarity—my childhood home, the laurel-strewn mountains of southwestern 
Pennsylvania—and one of profound uncertainty: how did this site get to Vintondale, 
and what is it doing there? The first of these questions will be answered relatively 
easily: it is the tale of T. Allen Comp, a historical preservationist, who came into an 
area with a history of profound abuse at the hands of extraction industries and who 
was dismayed by the environmental conditions that he found. AMD&ART is a 
functional response to these conditions, aimed at improving them. The second 
question—what AMD&ART is doing in Vintondale—is a much more involved puzzle, 
and the primary substance of this study.  
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The Project 
This study is my attempt to offer readers a hybrid lens for viewing 
contemporary ecological art, using AMD&ART as a guiding example. Specifically, I 
engineer over the course of this document a perspective on ecological art that 
privileges agential co-performance between art-object and viewer. Rather than 
assume that ecological art is designed to elicit in its audience some prefabricated 
response regarding the environment, I make the case that ecological art depends 
upon a contingency of both meaning and affect brought about by many participant 
performers—the site, the artist, the local context, and the viewer, to name a few. 
Thus, while I am committed to documenting the environmental benefit of the 
AMD&ART site, I am equally committed to documenting the complex web of material 
and semiotic negotiation that lies at the heart of the aesthetic endeavor.  I achieve 
this goal in two ways: by offering a critical reading of AMD&ART from a number of 
different, but related, perspectives, and by contributing to the growing body of 
literature pertaining to the so-called performance of Nature.  
A critical reading of AMD&ART is important because little has been written 
about the site that exceeds a passing acknowledgement of the environmental good 
of cleaning up pollution. No sustained critical analysis of the site exists, particularly 
outside of the realm of art criticism. T. Allan Comp, the lead voice of the AMD&ART 
team, is the most prolific writer about the site, with a number of essays detailing the 
historical context of the AMD problem in mining communities, the process of 
acquiring funding for the location, as well as designing the treatment system (see 
Comp, “AMD&ART,” and Comp, “Science, Art and Environmental Reclamation”).  The 
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site receives passing mention in an anthology dedicated to large-scale land art 
(Beardsley 217), is identified as a site of collage-practice (Garoian and Gaudelius 
104), and is acknowledged (albeit in an extremely limited capacity) in a landscape 
architecture text (Tilder and Blostein 168). These acknowledgements follow a set 
pattern: there is an allusion to the site, in the course of discussing a more broadly 
conceived tendency—within environmental art, landscape architecture or industrial 
remediation—to design interesting or aesthetically pleasing treatment systems. To 
date, AMD&ART is primarily represented by paragraph-length summaries of the site 
that invariably tout its community-oriented environmental recuperation.  This is the 
capacity in which AMD&ART appears in a brief section of a 2011 Master’s thesis 
written by a graduate student in Urban Studies and Planning, wherein it is the 
subject of a short-write up regarding the “pluralistic planning processes” (Fain 77) 
utilized by the AMD&ART team in their negotiations with the townsfolk of 
Vintondale.   
One of the few voices in the conversation asking pointed questions regarding 
aesthetics and the AMD&ART project is Erik Reece. Reece has written an article 
about AMD&ART that is part of the “Democratic Vistas” series, a collection of essays 
exploring the dimensions of art and democracy in contemporary America, as well as 
published a popular-press version of essay in Orion magazine. In his “Democratic 
Vistas” essay, Reece takes up what he dubs the “cynic’s question”: is AMD&ART art? 
“Not in any traditional, representational sense,” Reece concludes, adding that “the 
origins of a landscape such as the AMD&ART Park are in the conceptual art 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s—a movement that took art off the canvas and 
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often out of the museum, so that it became an experience in place and time, rather 
than simply a painting on a wall” (“Art That Works” 7). By linking AMD&ART to the 
conceptual art movement—whose exploration of ways to exceed the gallery-based 
system of artistic display led the earliest land artists outdoors and to the 
construction of objects on a grand scale—Reece sums up the most widely-held line 
of reasoning used to demonstrate AMD&ART’s status as “art that works.”  
  In other publications that take up the “cynic’s question,” critics typically 
mention AMD&ART as a fine example of remediative land art—that is, an art site 
whose existence goes beyond aesthetic expression and actively seeks to ameliorate 
some environmental harm or condition. To remedy this monolithic critical 
treatment of AMD&ART, I engage not only the literature surrounding land art, but 
also other aesthetic movements whose philosophies serve to illuminate the complex 
and compelling realities of AMD&ART. By examining this site through a variety of 
lenses—land art, Systems/Network Theory and Companion Specieshood—I have 
concluded that AMD&ART is a significant, and overlooked, piece of contemporary 
art, and moreover, one that should interest performance scholars. AMD&ART offers 
opportunities to challenge commonplace assumptions regarding the limits of 
performance research, especially those that would maintain binary relationships 
between the spheres of nature/culture, animate/inanimate, human/non-human and 
art/life.     
 With a consideration of performance research in mind, AMD&ART provides 
scholars with an explicit challenge to the relationship between the concepts 
“performance” and “nature.” The literature regarding the “performance of Nature,” 
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while currently greater in quantity and impact than at any other time, is still 
beholden to a primary and troubling assumption. Wallace Heim, whose curating of 
performance events and written work have made her an authority on the 
relationship between performance and nature, writes, “contemporary views about 
performance and performativity emphasize ephemerality, contingency, 
improvisation, adaptation—whether in the ‘doing’ of an everyday action or in the 
creation of an aesthetic event. It is a relational process through-and-through. Those 
qualities can be seen to inhere in the processes of nature, the continual change of 
environments and in the actions of the beings and entities which are more-than-
human” (Heim, “ENTERCHANGE” n.p.). While clearly Heim sees a resonance 
between the human sphere and the non-human sphere, her tendency to see them as 
separate entities that reflect one another’s image is indicative of her belief in a 
fundamental aporia that resides in the performance of Nature: the unnaturalness of 
man’s nature. Thus she maintains—as do many critics of nature and performance—
the division between “culture” as that which is of the human sphere and “nature” as 
that which is not.  
My goal with this document is to examine the possibilities offered to the field 
of performance studies by a perspective that regards “nature” and “culture” as 
collapsed into one sphere. In contemporary philosophy, an undertaking with this 
aim can be understood as one that is proceeding from the assumed position of 
“natureculture.” The term natureculture is drawn primarily from the work of Bruno 
Latour, who coined the compound term to demonstrate the compounded state of 
nature and culture. In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour works to refute the 
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characterization of culture as a distinctly human sphere, and nature as that which is 
without the mark of man. Latour reminds us that both nature and culture are 
ideological entities. Latour writes, “the very notion of culture is an artifact created 
by bracketing Nature off. Cultures—different or universal—do not exist, any more 
than Nature does. There are only nature-cultures, and these offer the only possible 
basis for comparison” (104). Scholars have precious little solid ground upon which 
to stand in a world of naturecultures, as neatly demarcated disciplinary boundaries 
suddenly begin to waver. In a naturalcultural worldview, disciplines serve the same 
function that they have always served—carving out a manageable portion of the 
world with which scholars can realistically concern themselves—but the modes of 
inquiry that define disciplinary communities take on an added ideological dynamic. 
In particular, the mechanical, objective strategies of scientific rationalism—
impartial observation wedded to a need for repeatable outcomes—produce in their 
practictioners and adherents a sense of prescience in their understanding of the 
world. This is manifest in the desire of the social and physical sciences to pronounce 
into existence various “laws” and “tenets” of cultures and of natures—as if 
precedent is the ultimate predictor of future outcomes. The idea of natureculture 
turns this capacity for projection on its head, rendering each entity, place and 
occurrence contingent to the point of becoming utterly singular, and radically 
reducing the capacity of disciplines to totalize and normalize cultures, natures, 
places and peoples under problematic generalizations. In other words, all of the 
types of culture that we typically assume to be in effect as the world unfolds—at 
scales ranging from the broadest national and international cultures to the most 
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idiosyncratic cultures of friendship and familiarity—are inextricably wedded with 
all of the natures that constitute the world—wilderness, urban natures, biological 
and created, animate and inanimate. Neither is anything without the other, in 
endless permutations and variations.  
A scholar proceeding from the assumptions of specificity and extreme 
heterogeneity that define natureculture must account for the constant role of 
interaction in their formulations. This is the case because without a stable 
backdrop—autonomous nature—both nature and culture are negotiated.  
Performance is one means of understanding the constitutive function of interaction. 
Scholars of performance are well equipped to deal with the ontological, symbolic 
repercussions of interaction as world-making precisely because they are attentive to 
the ways in which cultural performance has been understood to be the genesis and 
maintenance of social structures. Carol Simpson Stern and Bruce Henderson, in their 
handbook Performance: Texts and Contexts, claim that “the term performance 
incorporates a whole field of human activity…In all cases a performance act, 
interactional in nature and involving symbolic forms and live bodies, provides a way 
to constitute meaning and affirm individual and cultural values” (3). My study is an 
effort to emphasize that just as performance is understood to constitute and affirm 
cultural forms and values, it might also be useful in understanding natural forms 
and values; more precisely, it is a means of bridging the ontological and 
epistemological gaps whereby nature and culture seem to be created and 
perpetuated. Understanding performance is key to understanding natureculture.   
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Natureculture has to be understood as the foregrounding of agency, in order 
for the unfolding of the world to make sense. Neither culture nor nature can be 
viewed as a passive, stagnant “thing,” as they are not separate objects or movers in 
the first. In natureculture, phenomena and individuals are able “to be flattened, read 
horizontally as a juxtaposition rather than vertically as a hierarchy of Being” (Frow 
283). Performance seems, in this formulation, to reside at the very center of the 
most foundational, important philosophical debates. These are debates about the 
nature of the world and our place in it, as active participants and agents of change. 
AMD&ART is a site where the interactional naturalcultural webs of affect—human 
and nonhuman alike—are more self-evident and less intentionally masked than in 
daily life. This makes AMD&ART an ideal case study for teasing out some of the 
contingent and heterotopian1 (Foucault, “Of Other” 23) impulses that inform a 
performative naturalcultural model.    
                                                        
1 Foucault used the term “heterotopia” as a means of discussing “special places” in 
society. Foucault writes, “we do not live in a kind of void, inside of which we could 
place individuals and things. We do not live inside a void that could be colored with 
diverse shades of light, we live inside a set of relations that delineates sites which 
are irreducible to one another and absolutely not superimposable on one another” 
(“Of Other” 23). A heterotopia emphasizes this irreducibility by reintroducing social 
construction as the genesis of spaces of everyday life: it is a sort of counter-utopia. 
Utopia is a conceptual tool whose implementation—whether for complimentary or 
critical ends—nonetheless affirms the potential for society and the world to be 
totalized as an abstraction. Heterotopias resist totalization, precisely because they 
are not meant to stand in for other spaces. However, and importantly, heterotopian 
spaces in society do effect changes on society at large. Societies generate 
heterotopias as “a kind of effectively enacted utopia in which the real sites, all the 
other real sites that can be found within the culture, are simultaneously 
represented, contested, and inverted” (Foucault, “Of Other” 24). In the case of 
AMD&ART, it is a specific site that is functioning as a conceptual rendezvous for 
discussions of about environmental ethics, the construction of “nature” in the early 
twenty-first century, and the outcomes of reimagining place not as a fixed entity, but 
as a dynamic construction. 
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An Introduction to the Subject 
This study is devoted to AMD&ART, an ecological art project located in 
Vintondale, Pennsylvania. AMD&ART names an amalgamation of aesthetic gestures 
that share a common focus: the illumination of the mining history of Vintondale, 
coupled with an attempt to remedy the pollution and cultural collapse that have 
befallen the town in its post-industrial senescence. The site is divided into roughly 
seven distinct elements: the Treatment System, the Wetlands, the Recreation Area, 
the Mine No. 6 Portal, the Great Map, the Clean Slate and the Litmus Garden (see fig. 
1). Each of these elements contributes a unique and evocative interpretation of 
Vintondale and the economic, environmental and cultural forces at work in the 
town.  
 
Fig. 1 Map of the AMD&ART site(epa.gov) 
The primary element of AMD&ART is the Treatment System. The Treatment 
System is a series of six keystone shaped pools located on the outskirts of 
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Vintondale, and arranged on a descending gradient. The pools are a passive water 
treatment system, devoted to purifying the toxic water that spews from a hillside 
near the town. This water, laden with dissolved heavy metals such as iron and 
aluminum, is the eponymous “AMD” of AMD&ART. The water is a slurry of sulfuric 
acid and metals that results from the flooding of abandoned coalmines. As coalmines 
are abandoned, the pumping stations that remove subsurface water from the mines 
are shuttered. In the cases of sub-surface mines that are dug below the level of the 
water table, groundwater proceeds to flood the mine. As the mines flood, the water 
comes into contact not only with exposed coal seams, but also with the other 
minerals exposed during the mining process. Among these, iron sulfides (pyrite 
primarily) are present at the abandoned Mine No. 3 in Vintondale. It is a 
combination of exposure to air and water that liberates the pyrite and dissolves the 
mineral into suspension. Simultaneously, a population explosion of extremophile 
bacteria (Acidithiobacillus ferooxidans) takes place in the hot, acidic water. These 
bacteria metabolize the iron and sulfur of the exposed seams and generate sulfuric 
acid. This acid erodes the rock in the flooded mine, exposing more pyrite seams, 
which in turn provide a new source of fuel for future bacteria. The outcome of this 
process is dire: as long as water flows into the abandoned mine and the vast 
reserves of submerged minerals remain, there is no end in sight to the spectre of 
acid mine drainage. The only viable solution is the treatment of the conditions that 
arise from the AMD problem. 
The Treatment System relies on a series of chemical and physical processes 
to cleanse the AMD water. The first pool—the Acid Pool—serves as a collection site 
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for the AMD, which arrives via a series of small pipes that originate within the 
flooded mine. While lined with limestone—in an effort to subtly lower the pH of the 
water—the Acid Pool is primarily a means of gathering the water and 
demonstrating to viewers the severity of the AMD problem. The second, third and 
fourth pools are wetland treatment cells. These artificial wetlands serve two 
functions. They provide a substrate upon which the suspended heavy metals may 
settle out of solution, as well as begin the process of raising the pH of the water. The 
pH of the water increases as the dead and decaying plant material from the 
wetlands sinks to the bottom and is consumed by other microorganisms. The fifth 
pool is a Sequential Alkalinity Producing System—SAPS—that utilizes a trick of 
bacterial respiration and gravity to undertake the major cleansing operation of the 
site. As the water flows into pool 5, it sinks through a layer of decaying organic 
material and encounters a limestone slab. As it passes through the organic material, 
aerobic bacteria strip the water of its oxygen content, which prevents the suspended 
metals from being deposited on the slab. The slab, which has a basic pH, neutralizes 
the pH of the acidic water. The water then flows, drawn by gravity, out of the pool 
through a series of pipes. The final, sixth pool is a settling pool, wherein the now-pH 
neutral AMD is exposed again to air, which allows the metals to finally settle out 
fully. The water that flows from the sixth pond is then safely redirected into 
Blacklick Creek, a stream that runs through Vintondale.  
While the series of pools is the functional heart of AMD&ART, other elements 
of the site are dedicated to exploring means of representing the AMD problem as a 
window into the history of Vintondale, and the fraught relationship between nature 
13 
 
and culture. The Wetlands are seven-acre artificial wetlands on the site of the old 
town dump, below the outlet of the treatment system ponds. It was historically the 
site of the old Vinton Colliery (the buildings associated with a coalmine), the 
remains of which dot the landscape in small stacks of masonry. The site is a 
testament to the regenerative power of interventionist conservation and a visceral 
reminder that complex hybrid spaces are the norm in a post-industrial landscape.  
The Recreation area, while perhaps the least aesthetically or conceptually 
interesting element of the site, is a deceptively important marker of the relationship 
between AMD&ART and the residents of Vintondale. In the earliest meetings 
between the AMD&ART planning committee and the residents of Vintondale, the 
residents made clear that one of their hopes for the site was the rebuilding of the 
local baseball field, which had been washed away in a flood years earlier.  In 
response to this request, the Recreation area of AMD&ART was built on a four-acre 
patch of ground, and is capable of hosting baseball games, soccer matches, and a 
host of other outdoor games. Additionally, a pavilion has been built on site, which 
serves as the home of the annual Vintondale homecoming celebration. By honoring 
the practical requests of the townspeople of Vintondale and building ballparks and 
pavilions, the AMD&ART team displays a regard for the residents of the town that is 
often conspicuously absent in large-scale contemporary art programs. The tendency 
to consult with the townspeople (and the repercussions of what can occur when 
artists do not) is examined in greater detail in chapter 4.  
A final three site-specific art installations comprise the bulk of the overtly 
aesthetic portion of AMD&ART. The first, the Mine No. 6 Portal, is a large polished 
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slab of black rock that caps the abandoned entrance to Mine No. 6 (see Fig. 2). On 
the surface of the slab is a life-size etched image of men emerging from the mine. 
This image was drawn from a film still of a 1938 home movie shot by resident Julius 
Morey. The Mine No. 6 Portal was intended to be the site of interpretive signage as 
well, giving visitors a window into the hardscrabble lives of subsurface miners; as of 
my most recent visit to the site in July 2011, the signage was absent and the 
retaining wall surrounding the structure was incomplete.  
       
Fig. 2. The etched stone entrance to the Mine No. 6 Portal (AMD&ART Collection) 
The Great Map is an enormous (9’x15’) mosaic map of the Vinton Colliery as 
it appeared on the 1923 Sanborn Insurance Map (see Fig. 3). Around the replica of 
this map are laid black granite tiles, many of which have been laser-etched with 
noteworthy historical events, records of coal production and the names of miners 
and families, as well as the word “hope” translated into each of the twenty-six 
languages that were historically spoken by the immigrant coalminers of Vintondale. 
This map stands in stark contrast to the site of the former colliery, which it now 
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overlooks; it is a record of the moment of Vintondale’s greatest boom, contrasted 
with its subsequent bust. 
   
Fig. 3. The Great Map (Holly Lees) 
The Clean Slate is arguably the element of the site most indebted to the 
lineages of conceptual and contemporary art. It’s composed of two large slabs of 
Pennsylvania Slate and is located beneath the final pool of the treatment system (see 
Fig. 4). The clean water flows out of the final treatment pool into a trough and across 
a slab of slate before it is channeled into Blacklick Creek. The other slab serves as a 
viewing platform, perched on a small rise above the trough. In the words of the 
designers of the Clean Slate, the site is “a literal and physical clean slate on which 
visitors can gather and reflect on the processes they witness in the park” 
(AMD&ART.org). With its clean, angular form and muted monochromatic palette, 
the Clean Slate’s sculptural elements are reminiscent of the mid-century minimalist 
aesthetic that would later go on to inform land art, a connection that is detailed later 
in this study.  
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Fig. 4. The Clean Slate (AMD&ART.org) 
The final element of the site (and arguably my favorite) is the Litmus Garden. 
The Litmus Garden is a large, sequential planting of native Pennsylvanian tree 
species that stretches the length of the Treatment System, along the southern shore 
of the pools. This selection of trees is planted not only to represent a sampling of the 
species present in the original old-growth forests that once surrounded Vintondale 
(until the first extraction-boom swept the valley: lumber), but also as a seasonal 
aesthetic gesture. As the days shorten in autumn, the deciduous trees of the Litmus 
Garden burst into a wide array of colors, and for a short period of time each year, 
mimic the color distribution of the Yamada Universal Indicator pH scale. Beginning 
with the red/orange of the Sugar Maple representing extreme acidity, each of the 
tree species was carefully selected for its autumnal color and planted overlooking 
the portion of the treatment system whose water, if tested, would prompt a 
matching color on the pH indicator scale. While seemingly a literal color matching 
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exercise, the Litmus Garden interests me primarily for its fleeting seasonality—it 
only “works,” so to speak, for a few short days of the year when the factors of 
waning daylight, hydrological conditions and botanical whim align to shift the colors 
of the trees away from their typical green simultaneously. In this way, the Litmus 
Garden exceeds a simple color-coded representation, and embraces the contingent, 
unpredictable reality of biologically alive art.  
Method 
The task of examining and theorizing AMD&ART presents challenges to 
scholars seeking to neatly summarize the site’s many facets. In the case of my study, 
I have met the challenge of accounting for the irreducible singularity of AMD&ART—
while still attempting to produce some type of theoretical endowment for future 
scholars—by approaching the site interdisciplinarily. An interdisciplinary approach 
is necessary to my study because the discussion of broadly wrought concepts such 
as “nature” and “culture” (and natureculture) cannot be neatly reduced. To do so, 
disciplinarily, bankrupts the productive spaces of conceptual and material overlap 
that make AMD&ART a compelling artwork, environment, and agent. AMD&ART is a 
difficult site to examine in any depth—it is deceptively simply in aspect and 
operation—which is probably the reason that there has been no full-length study of 
the site to date.  The challenges facing scholars of AMD&ART include not only tracing 
a series of aesthetic genealogies for the site, but also examining and ultimately 
exceeding some of the most fundamental binary divisions around which our daily 
lives orbit. In one register, AMD&ART appears to be an examination of the 
relationship between representational and non-representational art, while in 
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another it is a challenge to the comfortable—and dangerous—divide between 
animate and inanimate matter. In both cases, there is the added dynamic of 
accounting for the communicative frameworks at work in the relationships between 
art audiences, Vintondale residents, planners and the landscape with regards to the 
representations of nature and culture afoot at AMD&ART. The task of examining 
AMD&ART has proven to be a complex undertaking, one that benefits from radical 
shifts in commonplace habits of thought. To acknowledge and flesh out these 
challenging ideas, I synthesize the works of a wide array of communication scholars, 
philosophers of science, systems theorists and a host of others under the banner of 
performance research. In particular, I contend that performance research offers a 
unique perspective on AMD&ART because it allows scholars to look to AMD&ART as 
an active participant(s) in defining and refining the conversations surrounding its 
existence. To state the claim another way, by focusing on a relational, performative 
approach to an aesthetic object such as AMD&ART, I am privileging the productive 
mode poiesis, in the sense utilized by Heidegger. Marc Johnson, paraphrasing 
Heidegger, clarifies my meaning: “The artistic artefact is the product of deep 
ontological commitment with material (physical materials, sound or language). The 
uncovering of the ontology of this material in a social context produces in the 
artefact an embodiment of highly complex mechanisms which can manage the 
variety of our personal double-binds.  In its presence, we can engage in our own acts 
of poiesis, our own making, generating new variety, which too can be managed by 
our relationship to the artefact” (5).  By seeking to acknowledge, via performance 
research, a heightened capacity for agency in site such as AMD&ART, I am 
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strengthening not only the claims as to the importance of AMD&ART, but also the 
power and prominence of performance as an ontological act.  
Initially, I began this study assuming that I would follow a different, but 
related, methodology: trandisciplinary scholarship, as opposed to interdisciplinary. 
While that is no longer the case, a brief discussion of the distinction between 
transdisciplinary and interdisciplinary scholarship will serve to further highlight my 
aims and method.  A trandisciplinary perspective engages in what Robert Frodeman 
has dubbed “topical thought.” “Topical thinking organizes knowledge differently 
from the approach that governs academia,” Frodeman asserts, an academic tradition 
wherein  
research is structured in terms of the logical space of disciplines 
(chemistry, history, and the like). Topical thinking does not, however, 
abandon the disciplinary structure that defines knowledge today. A 
disciplinary approach to knowledge is not unreasonable, but it is 
partial. It needs to be complemented by an approach that remembers 
that our problems are always extra-disciplinary in nature.[...] 
Likewise, our environmental problems resist simple division into the 
categories of environmental science, economics, and ethics. To 
confront these problems effectively we must understand how these 
categories relate and flow into one another at a particular location. 
Topical thinking is a means for tracing the ontological disruptions that 
occur when we attend closely to a problem. (Frodeman, Geo-Logic 12)  
 
While at first glance it may seem as if Frodeman is demanding an explicit object of 
practical application for any given theory, his point is a bit different. Rather than 
seeking to produce a line of reasoning or theory that may then be used to solve 
some pressing need, Frodeman’s topical thought begins at the need. This means that 
for topical thought to have merit, it must start with a commitment to particularity 
and singularity. Frodeman has dubbed this sort of philosophical approach “field 
philosophy” (“field” as in “fieldwork”) and claims that field philosophy is committed 
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to “beginning with the needs of stakeholders and drawing out philosophical insights 
after the work is completed” (Frodeman, “Experiments in Field Philosophy”).    
Frodeman is primarily concerned with the capacity of well-bounded 
disciplines to contribute particular knowledge—within the sphere of a particular 
location or event (the “need”). This approach to knowledge-work can be thought of 
as the task of illuminating some pre-existing reality, albeit one that is often hidden 
from researchers due to the partiality ingrained in their research by disciplinary 
training and perception. Transdisciplinary scholarship is thus the coming together 
of biological, ethical, aesthetic and other knowledges to provide a view of the “whole 
picture” of a research subject. An ideal metaphor for transdisciplinary scholarship is 
a fine-toothed comb: each tine a different knowledge set, their close proximity 
letting little slip past its expansive sweep.  
I perceive interdisciplinary scholarship to operate under a different set of 
assumptions regarding the creation of knowledge and the importance of 
maintaining disciplinary boundaries. Rather than documenting the multifaceted and 
pre-existing dimensions of a research subject, interdisciplinary scholarship assumes 
that new knowledge can be generated in the collision of existing bodies of 
disciplinary knowledge. Rather than a more “complete” view of the world, 
interdisciplinary scholars and practitioners are engaged in producing novel, partial, 
knowledge-constructs that are fundamentally contingent upon the relational 
dynamics at play at any given moment. Interdisciplinary studies, as Repko notes, 
seek “to produce new knowledge, but unlike [traditional disciplines]…to accomplish 
this via the process of integration” (8).  
21 
 
My examination of AMD&ART leads me to critical analysis from a number of 
aesthetic, philosophical, and historical perspectives, and is ultimately more 
interdisciplinary than transdisciplinary. Rather than claiming to reveal some 
essential and yet-overlooked aspect of AMD&ART that is fundamental to its creation 
or operation, I am attempting to draw out of AMD&ART various new perspectives on 
the relationship between nature and culture. My overarching goal with this study is 
to move the practice of performance research and the field of performance studies 
into new arenas of thought and practice concerning “nature.” That I should choose 
an integrative, interdisciplinary approach to achieve my goal is a response to the 
very nature of performance as a method and object of academic study. Judith 
Hamera, writing about the act of doing creative, generative work in performance, 
asserts that the task “requires integrating knowledge from multiple areas of 
expertise (specialized knowledge), the full scope of the senses (embodied 
knowledge), critique (politically engaged conceptual knowledge), and pragmatic 
knowledge (know-how)” (“Performance Ethnography” 318). These lived dimensions 
of scholarship far exceed the neatly packaged and nicely cooperative disciplinary 
bodies of Frodeman’s transdisciplinary perspective. I infer the fundamental refusal 
of transdisciplinary scholars to full engage in the production of newly-minted, 
emerging knowledge from Frodeman’s call for “embedded philosophers” (like 
embedded journalists in warzones) whose task it is to “ride along” with other 
scholars, observe their practices, and then report back to their constituency. The 
notion that full participation is not an unavoidable hazard of participating in the 
mental, emotional, conceptual landscape of trandisciplinary scholarship (as it is in 
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interdisciplinary scholarship) is proof enough of the intrinsic divisiveness of the 
transdisciplinary approach. I am not attempting to “discover” (summarize) the 
“whole” of which AMD&ART is already a part, and thereby render finite the 
experiences one might have with the criticism of AMD&ART. Instead, I am 
attempting to “discover” (enrich) our collective relational capacity within the sphere 
of AMD&ART, opening new avenues for criticism and subjective interpretation. I am 
interested in the very real community engendered by AMD&ART: a “natural” 
community as much as a “cultural” or semiotic community.  
While I understand “community” to be composed of embodied, manifest 
forms of relating—social customs, enacted bodily practices, material and spiritual 
cultures—community is also an ineffable, hard to delimit thing, subject to whims 
and rapid alteration. Especially in the case of membership, communities are 
amorphous entities, and an aesthetic approach to producing and maintaining 
community must proceed according to some ethical or moral program. Nicholas 
Bourriaud, whose criticism often revolves around the work of artists that cultivate 
fleeting, intentional communities among their audiences, offers a vision of the role 
of art as bolstering social dynamism. Bourriaud writes, “the role of artworks is no 
longer to form imaginary and utopian realities, but to actually be ways of living and 
models of action within the existing real, whatever the scale chosen by the artist” 
(13).  As such, I am concerned over the breadth of this study with the participants in 
AMD&ART, the environmental realities ameliorated by AMD&ART, and the often 
convoluted material webs of affect that constitute the site.  
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I would be remiss in claiming the task of naming and documenting the 
relational, naturalcultural community that is AMD&ART if I did not acknowledge the 
debt that this research owes to Bruno Latour. Beyond the formulation 
“natureculture,” Latour has been developing a perspective on wordly interaction 
that in many ways presages my efforts to document the specific case of AMD&ART. 
Dubbed “Actor-Network Theory,” ANT is a perspective that envisions the world as 
constituted by “ensembles” of human, non-human, animate and inanimate actors 
(actants). John Law articulates two foundational concepts of ANT that are 
particularly salient to my project: relational materiality and performativity. 
Relational materiality describes the way in which the actors (rather than 
subjects/objects) both “take their form and acquire their attributes as a result of 
their relations with other entities” (Law 3). Performativity, in this case, is the 
mechanism whereby those actants are “performed in, by, and through those 
relations” (Law 4). Performance is understood as the foundational ontological act, 
and it is this subject that dominates the latter-half of my study. In chapter three, I 
discuss ANT as it relates to the broader discourses of systems and network art. In 
chapter four, I utilize ANT as the stepping-off point for a discussion of other 
performative ontologies, and culminate in a discussion of the ethical demands of a 
performative ontology.   
Beyond a community of able subjects, AMD&ART is a community of what Jane 
Bennett has dubbed “vibrant matter”: a vitalist approach to regarding “things” and 
the “capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede 
or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with 
24 
 
trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own” (Bennett viii). Our 
contemporary refusal to acknowledge this matter as an actant is one of the 
underlying preventative factors keeping Western society from grappling adequately 
with the problems of pollution, resource extraction and cultural dissolution—three 
factors that AMD&ART addresses directly. By dealing explicitly with the “quasi-
agency” of heavy metals and biochemical processes, AMD&ART takes seriously the 
affective power of organic and nonorganic entities.  This “leveling” perspective is the 
subtext for the entirety of this study, and is addressed formally in the fourth chapter 
of this study, with an examination of the concept of “singularity,” drawn from the 
works of Jean-Luc Nancy and Karen Barad. Suffice it to say that Bennett is not the 
only theorist working at the edge of the philosophical divide between nature and 
culture, wherein what passes for each slips across the border to the other with 
shocking regularity. I hope that this study is able to bring an aesthetic sensibility to 
the deconstruction of this arbitrary and troubling distinction of a unified sphere of 
Being.  
Chapter Summaries 
The body of this study is divided into three major sections. The second 
chapter, “Art That Works: A Typological Analysis,” summarizes the literature 
associated with the mid-twentieth century art movements of minimalism and “land 
art” and contextualizes AMD&ART in that particular aesthetic lineage. land art is a 
mode of aesthetic production that sprang from conceptual art in the 1960s and 
1970s and that has evolved over the past forty years to include a diverse array of 
contemporary artistic forms. It has its own canonical works and associated 
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theorists, whose influence on AMD&ART is made clear in this study. As I argue 
however, AMD&ART does not fit neatly into the sculptural, ocular-centric style of 
land art prevalent in the 1970s.  Instead, AMD&ART can be most fruitfully examined 
as a site of negotiation between competing perspectives on contested concepts such 
as “art” and “nature.”  
The third chapter of the study, “Make Something Indeterminate, Which 
Always Looks Different, The Shape of Which Cannot Be Predicted Precisely: 
AMD&ART as System and Network” considers AMD&ART from the perspectives of 
Systems Theory and Network Theory, particularly as they apply to art. I offer the 
reader a means of examining the site as an environment of possibility—both 
semiotic and material—rather than as a fixed “art object.” My examination of 
AMD&ART has contributions to make to both Systems Art and Network Art, and 
draws upon one of the characteristic forms of the twentieth century avant-garde—
the “Readymade”—to examine the conflicting sense in which AMD&ART is a “natural 
environment” as well as a crafted object. The logic of the Readymade, made famous 
by the work of Marcel Duchamp, serves in this chapter as the explanatory means of 
locating AMD&ART within a lineage of earlier systems art. I track this lineage 
through an examination of the work of Hans Haacke, arguably the most famous and 
influential systems artist, and elucidate the similarities and differences between 
Haacke’s work and the work of the AMD&ART team.  
In an effort to exceed the assumptions of System’s Theory, which 
presupposes many distinct elements working together, I spend the latter half of the 
third chapter examining the literature of network art in an effort to regard 
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AMD&ART as a fully-fledged aesthetic “environment,” rather than an isolated art 
object comprised of many unique “bits.” Network art—and the theory of networks, 
more generally—suggests that rather than search for preexisting, functional 
connections between disparate elements, one ought to attempt to take stock of the 
whole of the network as a dynamic material/semiotic field of possibility. In order to 
make sense of this complexity, I suggest that it is a type of performative 
consciousness—dependent on actor-network theory—that allows us to winnow 
down the complexity and routinely co-produce an aesthetic and a worldview with 
which we are familiar.  
My study’s fourth chapter, “Relational Emergence and Community 
Unfolding,” examines the relational aspects of AMD&ART, through the consideration 
of AMD&ART as a “companion species,” a term developed by Donna Haraway to 
illustrate the exquisitely complex interrelations between humans and nonhuman 
others. Haraway has gone to great lengths to examine the notion of “species,” but 
offers her readers very little in the way of explication. In this chapter, I carefully 
detail and expound upon her understanding of “species,” revealing the nuanced and 
surprising relational aspects intrinsic to the concept. This focus on relationality 
prompts, for both Haraway and myself, a questioning of the nature of shared Being; 
I make an attempt to account for some of the contingency of our shared lives with 
human and nonhuman Others by employing the philosophies of Jean-Luc Nancy and 
Karen Barad, two theorists whose ontological perspectives depend fully on the 
interaction of multiple subjects to constitute the world. The philosophies of Nancy 
and Barad, more specifically, offer up a means of understanding the world as 
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fundamentally—and inexhaustibly—a site of performance. In this way, I utilize their 
theories to help the performance paradigm exceed a relegation to the status of 
“cultural mover” and raise it up to the status of a fundamental ontological process. 
The final element of the fourth chapter is a discussion of the overtly ethical 
demands placed upon scholars and artists working in this relational mode. In the 
wake of the radical shift in consciousness precipitated by Latour, Haraway, Barad 
and Nancy, ethics rises to the forefront of the axiological approach to everyday life 
and everyday spaces that define AMD&ART. In particular, the thought of ontological 
performance asks that very significant responsibility be taken by all participant 
entities. The work of Chris Cuomo—on an ethical stance that might be characterized 
as an “ethics of flourishing”—is paired with Derrida’s notion of a “hyperbolic” ethics 
to acknowledge the new prominence of ethics in my take on AMD&ART. The site is a 
place of great beauty and promise for humankind’s relationship with the rest of 
natureculture, and yet it is also a site of constant failure to achieve those dreams. 
The fourth chapter concludes with a discussion of these shortcomings.   
Significance 
I am interested in the long-term possibilities offered by a model of critical 
attentiveness that is predicated upon a deeply held relational program that includes 
human, non-human, and non-living agents. Most promising, in my opinion, is the 
opportunity for criticism and performance to develop the tendency toward what 
Thoreau has famously called “tawny grammar,” a “wild and dusky knowledge” (85) 
that draws its insights and images from the local features of nature. Thoreau, in his 
essay “Walking,” states, “He would be a poet who could impress the winds and 
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streams into his service, to speak for him…who derived his words as often as he 
used them—transplanted them onto his page with earth adhering to their roots, 
whose words were so true and fresh and natural that they would expand like the 
buds at the approach of spring, though they lay half smothered between two musty 
leaves in a library” (80). While no doubt more metaphorical than literal, and 
woefully short on answers about precisely how one might engage in this 
“transplantation,” Thoreau’s idea that artists could (or should) draw stylistic, formal 
or content clues from their surroundings has become de rigueur for a host of 
contemporary scholars. Communication studies, and in particular performance 
studies, has begun to develop avenues of research in response to this demand 
(Crouch; Lorimer and Lund; Gray). 
My analysis of AMD&ART takes place against the backdrop of a vibrant period 
of research in the area of environmental communication and performance research. 
The last decade has seen a blossoming of journals (Environmental Communication), 
publications, performances, and topical and annual conferences expressly devoted 
to environmental communication. A number of scholars have explored and 
deconstructed the symbolic processes that undergird the separation of nature and 
culture into two distinct spheres, a process that is fundamentally a communicative 
undertaking. Tema Milstein (“Communicating” 487; “When Whales” 189), Nigel 
Clark and Donal Carbaugh are all working in what I would consider the vein of 
natureculture, approaching it from both a standpoint of reassuring integration as 
well as challenging deconstruction. The work of Donal Carbaugh, for example, 
examines “listening” as an embodied practice of communicative relating between 
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the Blackfeet people and their environment. Listening is conceived of as an 
embodied process of bridging the gap between nature and culture (Carbaugh 252). 
Carbaugh’s work highlights how the environment—place, in his study—has the 
potential to serve not only as a milieu, but also as an experiential co-creator of 
symbolic meaning. For the Blackfeet (or at least Carbaugh’s guide, Two Bears), 
“’Listening this way can involve the listener in an intense, efficacious, and complex 
set of communicative acts in which one is not speaking, discussing, or disclosing, but 
sitting quietly, watching, and feeling-the-place, through all the senses. Presumed for 
the acts is an active co-presence with the natural and historical place in which, and 
to which one listens…Such acts are thus not so much internally focused on one’s 
meditative self, but externally focused on one’s place through an active 
attentiveness to that scene, to the highly active powers and insights it offers” (259). 
Nature “speaks” to culture, and culture “listens” to nature, and the logical extension 
of this argument is clear: bodily practices of attentiveness and reciprocity are the 
means by which barriers are transcended and a spilling-over of form and content 
can occur between the spheres.  
While Carbaugh’s work focuses on an enriching, reciprocal relationship in a 
naturalcultural world, other scholars have examined the less benign side of this 
formulation. On the one hand, scholars have examined the uneasy realities of 
flattening out the divisions between nature and culture.  Julie Kalil Schutten’s 
analysis of Werner Herzog’s film Grizzly Man—a documentary examining the life 
and gruesome death of eccentric animal rights activist Timothy Treadwell—typifies 
this category of communication scholarship. Treadwell, an adamant advocate for the 
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environment who lived among the grizzly bears of the Katmai Peninsula for thirteen 
summers, was eventually attacked, killed and consumed by a bear he had dubbed 
“Mr. Vicious.” In the moment of Treadwell’s consumption by the bear—his becoming 
“meat”—Schutten suggests that Treadwell embodies a position within an eco-ethical 
framework that is potentially uncomfortable: our relinquishing of power over the 
natural world. “Treadwell gives up his power-over position by becoming 
vulnerable,” writes Schutten, who continues, “Treadwell illustrates for audiences 
that humanity will have to become vulnerable, to give something up, in order to 
cease operating from oppressive frameworks” (208). A thoroughly integrated 
natureculture, as Schutten suggests, is a scenario in which human dis-empowerment 
is an ethical duty. The degree to which that dis-empowerment should occur is, of 
course, a matter of no small debate, as Schutten discusses (208).   
The other less benign naturalcultural dynamic that has received the bulk of 
attention from environmental communication scholars is the relationship between 
the byproducts of human culture (pollution) and its effects on natural systems. 
Many scholars including Foust & Murphy, Lakoff and Salvador have addressed large-
scale questions of the representation and framing of climate change. In more overtly 
performative terms, Phaedra Pezzullo has written extensively about the practices 
and challenges of industrial pollution to the lives of Louisiana residents. The 
similarities between her understanding of “toxic tourism” (the private touring of 
industrial sites and polluted locations to draw attention to the cultural and 
environmental duress present in these places) and the goals of the AMD&ART team 
(enticing people to visit Vintondale, in order to learn the cultural history of coal 
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mining as well as its lingering material effects) are numerous.  Pezzullo writes that 
toxic tours are “cultural performances negotiating the politics of memory, of 
presence and absence, of play and politics, and of remembering and forgetting” 
(246). In other words, the tours are embodied means of eliciting a first-hand 
awareness in their participants of the ways in which nature and culture interact 
across time to precipitate current conditions, and make possible the (re)emergence 
of community. 
My study of AMD&ART plumbs similar territory as Pezzullo’s study of “Cancer 
Alley,” and not simply because they are both concerned with places whose fates are 
inextricably wedded to pollution. Her interest and attentiveness to the mechanisms 
whereby communities come into being and maintain themselves resonates with my 
communitarian goals in writing this study. I am interested not only in documenting 
the community of Vintondale, but enlarging reader’s concept of who or what might 
be considered a community member through an ecological, performative 
worldview. Pezzullo’s understanding of community formation, however, drawn 
from the work of Barbie Zelizer, has slight differences with my examination of 
community in this document. Zelizer writes (and Pezzullo echoes), “community 
maintenance depends on a constant look backward, to the previous life of the 
community members, so as to constitute them as a collective in the present day” 
(187). While I do not contest that the previous lives of members (memory, culture, 
the components that make up various “histories”) are important, relying too heavily 
on glancing backward to precedent has the unfortunate effect of producing an 
illusory consolidation. This consolidation of heterogenous elements leads members 
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to focus on their part of pre-existing, discrete social formations as a token of 
inclusion. My study is an effort to examine AMD&ART as an emergent aesthetic 
community, wherein the community members are not solely “an existing social 
relation” but rather answer to a “call or appeal to a collective praxis” (Kwon 186).  
“Community-based art then can be approached as a projective enterprise, rather 
than a descriptive enterprise,” writes Kwon, “wherein a provisional community can 
be produced within the specific context instigated, either by an artist or a cultural 
institution” (186). Thus, while Pezzullo and I differ in our temporal focus—hers on 
the importance of memory and performances of memory, mine on a distinctly 
present-tense emergence—her work provides an important compliment to my own. 
I am contributing to the scholarship regarding environmental 
communication (particularly with a performance-bent) by way of a critical, 
philosophical approach that privileges embodiment, interaction, and the assumption 
that a performance paradigm can offer scholars new ways of thinking through the 
nature/culture dynamic. A performance paradigm allows us to examine our 
understanding of the categories of “nature” and “culture,” and suggests that these 
categories spring more from a conventionalized, socially-constructed mode of 
interaction and valuation, than our everyday experiences in the world.    
In addition to the work of characterizing AMD&ART as an important piece of 
contemporary art, my study attempts to broaden the horizons of performance 
studies. It is important that this study make available new avenues of inquiry that 
treat performance less as a metaphoric concept with which to think, and more as a 
fundamental explanatory mechanism for understanding material Being. If we 
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assume, here at the outset, one of the fundamental conclusions of my study—the 
notion that it is sensible to extend to inanimate matter a sort of agency to affect the 
world and be affected by the world—a perennial type of performance studies 
scholarship is called into question. The utilization of an object or entity as a cipher 
through which to examine the cultural construction of a society more broadly is a 
fairly common model of performance studies scholarship. An example of this 
approach is useful in demonstrating the differences between my perspective 
regarding the utility of performance as paradigm, and what I would characterize as 
a more orthodox material/performance perspective.  “Getting Messy: In the Field 
and At the Crossroads with Roadside Shrines,” by Rebecca M. Kennerly, is as good a 
representative of the orthodox type of analytical work as has been published in the 
last ten years, and will be illustrative as to the differences between my perspective 
and a perspective more typical of performance studies at large.  
In “Getting Messy,” Kennerly examines “roadside shrines,” memorial markers 
erected along roadsides to mark the spot where individuals have been killed. 
Kennerly’s work claims to be an attempt to understand how the shrines “perform”: 
“to investigate how roadside shrines perform in culture is to explore the landscape 
in which the material objects are placed and what those material objects are, what 
the ‘something’ is that is ‘happening’ there, and the dynamics of the process of 
‘making it happen.’ My performance, here on the page, seeks to demonstrate and 
engage this dynamic…” (232). Kennerly’s project, it would seem, is in alignment with 
my own: we are both concerned with the specifics of “where” the objects are, the 
“what” of their materiality, and the dynamic relationships that constitute their 
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evocative, subjective power. The phrase “perform in culture,” however, reveals 
Kennerly’s primary assumption: these sites are powerful precisely because they 
serve as a nexus of affective, cultural energies. My study asks what it is to examine 
such entities as performing in both culture and nature, so to speak. In other words, 
what of the shrines themselves?   
 While the concerns espoused by Kennerly are definitely within the purview 
of my study, the conclusions that she draws from her lengthy analysis of individuals’ 
behavior in constructing, maintaining and destroying the sites do not complete a full 
treatment of the affective power of the shrines. Instead, she draws on the 
historiographic scholarship of Joseph Roach in defining the shrines as “vortices of 
behavior” (Roach, Cities 26-29), a perspective that I understand to be about the 
behavior of constructors and visitors of the site. To be sure, this is one valid way of 
examining the formal reasoning behind the existence of the sites, as well as the 
impacts of the visitation and maintenance of these places. As Roach’s 
characterization of sites of cultural performance stresses,  “their function is to 
canalize specified needs, desires, and habits in order to reproduce them…where the 
gravitational pull of social necessity brings audiences together and produces 
performers…from their midst” (Cities 28). While the structures, histories and 
features of particular locations and ritualized arenas no doubt impact their 
audiences (hence prompting the emergence of performers), Roach’s study is 
concerned ultimately with the persistence and transformation of an autonomous 
culture. The fact that Roach claims the performances that occur in these locales—
based to varying degrees on the physical materiality of the site—exert “[such] a 
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powerful hold on collective memory that they will survive the transformation or 
relocation of the spaces in which they first flourished” (Roach, Cities 28) is proof 
enough of the autonomy of Roach’s vision of “culture.” While the performances may 
spring initially from a rooted sense of being “in the world,” their persistence speaks 
volumes regarding their eventual autonomy.  
 The materiality of the site, therefore, is not Roach’s primary concern, nor is it 
Kennerly’s concern, by extension. If the cultural performances can survive the 
transformation, dislocation or destruction of their milieu, the milieu is not exerting a 
continual constitutive force on those performances. I believe that the value of 
studies like Kennerly’s and Roach’s are one half of the equation, so to speak, in the 
examination of matter (“nature”) in performance. It is a portion of the equation that 
seeks to examine more fully the interaction between materiality and cultural 
performance. My study is the second half of this equation, an approach to examining 
materiality as a dynamic intra-action between modes of living (broadly: cultural 
performance) and their constitutive material environments.  Rather than assuming 
that cultural performances are displaying their puissance by exceeding their 
material milieu, I approach the problem of aesthetic and lived environments from 
the opposite angle, and account for the materiality of situations as absolutely 
integral to understanding their power and persistence. The maintenance of cultural 
performances, by memory and displaced physical practice (surrogation, in Roach’s 
terms), is simply not a sufficient explanatory mechanism. By granting materiality a 
type of quasi-agency— the possibility of being considered quasi-performers—I have 
come to the conclusion that a co-constitutive unfolding model of eco-performance is 
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a hopeful, inclusive, communitarian gesture. This is the type of willfully utopian 
scholarship I long to encounter more regularly, and I contribute this study in the 
hope of practicing what I preach.   
My study is a participatory, open model, befitting the dawning ecological age. 
The broadening of affective power that I undertake is also a reminder that while 
current economic and environmental models seem to be pushing the world closer 
and closer to the edge of a precipice, there are participant entities (living and non-
living) that continue to push back in the opposite direction, or at least hold their 
ground. It is also an acknowledgment that “ecological” thought is not necessarily 
“environmental” thought (though, in the case of AMD&ART, this is the most frequent 
register). Thinking ecologically is the task of mapping connections, whereas 
performing ecologically is a means of forging of new material alliances and 
relationships, while maintaining others. This study reveals the deeply embedded 
affective performance that lies at the heart of aesthetic contemplation.   
My sense is that devoting time and attention to an aesthetic event and entity, 
like AMD&ART, is finally a way of being attentive to the ethical demands of a 
performative ontology of engagement. While I discuss this at length in the fourth 
chapter of this study, it warrants a passing mention here as the very crux of my 
performance research. In the early 1990’s—a full twenty years before the majority 
of art critics and theorists were prepared to deal with the pluralist, communitarian 
tendency that has emerged in contemporary art—Suzi Gablik posed a question of 
postmodern aesthetics. Gablik asks “whether art that is based on notions of pure 
freedom and radical autonomy—without regard for the relations we have to other 
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people, the community, or any other consideration except the pursuit of art—can 
contribute to a sense of the common good” (66). In the decades that have intervened 
since Gablik’s writing, contemporary artists have wrestled with the relational 
impulses that Gablik predicted, especially those relating to the “common good.” 
Artists like Rikrit Tiravanija, who focuses primarily on organizing installations 
wherein community might flourish (cooking soup for gallery-goers, providing 
temporary libraries, establishing plots of land autonomous of individual ownership 
and free to be cultivated by whomever feels the urge), have risen to great 
prominence by cultivating partnerships between artists and audiences.   
A co-constitutive, communitarian perspective is the approach through which 
I’ve mobilized performance research to make significant headway into 
environmental scholarship and aesthetics. If, as Elin Diamond suggests, 
performance is always implicitly referencing prior performance—while introducing 
the capacity for agency into the present (Diamond 2)—a performative take on 
environmental, ecological aesthetics strikes me as the first step in the process of 
helping us find our way in the world without resorting to the “metaphysical Fallacy 
of the Whopper…[the thought that we can] ‘have it our way’” (Cafar). In a nutshell, it 
is a way of reminding us that there are antecedent processes at work, processes into 
which we might intervene. Growth—of greenery and culture alike—transcends a 
linear model of birth/growth/death, and instead is understood broadly as a 
constantly unfolding regrowth of possibility. As active participant performers, we 
are presented with a choice: lay the groundwork for further performance, or break 
the cycle and shutter the chances for further materialization. The former depends 
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heavily on an awareness of the cyclical nature of performance, and the intrinsic 
citationality of material being. The latter is indeed a short-sighted vision of the 
world with which we have “had it our way.” Agency begets accountability, and a 
performative perspective on the unfolding of the world offers an ample supply of 
agency to those who would subscribe to its tenets. My study, which spreads a sort of 
quasi-agency liberally across the face of material Being, is an attempt to reawaken 
the sense that active performers reside in the most unlikely of places: industrial 
wastelands, water treatment facilities, isolated coal towns and underground 
caverns, among others. As they—and we—go about the business of co-producing 
that thing we call “The World,” we would do well to remind ourselves of their 
presence, and thus lessen our anxiety at being “in charge” of the fate of the world. 
While we may share an inordinately large share of the burden, we are far from 
shouldering that responsibility alone. AMD&ART demonstrates this reality, not only 
as a conceptual object with which to think, but as a material place, entity and 
process.   
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Chapter Two 
Art That Works: A Typological Analysis 
 
In an early work proposal associated with AMD&ART, the multidisciplinary 
team tasked with designing the site put forth an explicit discussion of the “art” in 
AMD&ART. They write, “’Art’ is often construed as a tangible, constructed product 
such as a painting or a sculpture. AMD&ART, on the other hand, defines art in a 
broader context, where landscape is integrated into the scientific engineering of 
passive treatment” (AMD&ART 2). The breadth of this “broader context” of art is 
precisely the territory cased by this document. In particular, the tendency of the 
AMD&ART team to appeal to an art that is not simply a “tangible, constructed 
product” informs this chapter.  
The aforementioned quotation—drawn from one of the foundational texts 
associated with the site—raises a series of puzzling questions for me, regarding 
both AMD&ART specifically, as well as “environmental” art more generally. The most 
obvious question is simultaneously the most ontologically loaded: if art is not 
construed as a tangible product with spectatorial value, what exactly is it? Is it a 
“thing” in an environment, or an environment of its own accord? While the word 
choice of the authors of this quotation suggests that the artwork likely has some 
type of presence—construed, as in “the interpretation of existing phenomena in a 
particular way”—they immediately muddy the waters of easy interpretation by 
invoking complex, multifaceted concepts such as “landscape” to bolster their claims 
that AMD&ART is something more than a sculpture park. Are the conceptual 
frameworks of art galleries replaced by the post-industrial landscape of Vintondale, 
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while scientists, engineers and a humdrum flow of casual passerby replace the art 
public? If this is the case, and AMD&ART is more than simply an autonomous object, 
are the interpretive lenses brought by these art-outsiders changing widespread 
interpretations of the site?  There is something of a turf war at stake in the manner 
in which AMD&ART is represented, both by its creators and the viewing public. This 
chapter offers an alternative to the argumentative, definitional process of jockeying 
for validity by arguing that AMD&ART is a site that benefits from the conceptual 
ambiguities of “art,” “nature,” “landscape” and “culture.” The morphology of the 
site—its physical characteristics—plays an important role in this formulation, 
though not as a self-evident means of appraising the site for inclusion into a 
sculptural cannon. Instead, the site’s features become representative guides for a 
way of approaching the intrinsic examination of relational aesthetics I see at work in 
AMD&ART. In order to effectively context AMD&ART, it is important to examine 
works whose ties to land art are no longer content to trouble the boundaries of 
sculpture alone, and refocus the discussion of land art on relationships, rather than 
morphology.  
A relational approach allows me to accomplish two related goals. The first of 
these goals is to remain attentive to the formal characteristics of art, while carefully 
avoiding a prescriptive declaration of the validity of a piece by virtue of a 
constitutive adherence to tradition.  In other words, it has allowed me to enlarge my 
perspective on what may reasonably be called “land art,” thereby expanding 
Rosalind Krauss’s “expanded field.” I have refined this perspective by the application 
and expansion of Mark Rosenthal’s notion of “attitude,” a typology developed in the 
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early 1980s to examine primarily sculptural land art. Rosenthal’s method seeks to 
read the morphological characteristics of an artwork like a sort of rosetta stone, a 
means of deciphering the author’s perspective toward the natural environment by 
virtue of the formal choices present in their art.  
Rosenthal’s attitudinal perspective on land art has demonstrated an amazing 
level of relevance for this study, given that it was written nearly three decades ago. 
While this is not to say that the notion of “attitude” has not suffered the slings and 
arrows of critical Deconstruction—much like any other approach to art criticism 
that seeks to infer authorial intent—it does seem to have presaged an interpretive 
framework that asks complex, context-specific questions of the sites and their 
authors. If Robert Frodeman’s charge to move “vertically” between the highly 
regimented and disciplinary academy, and the culture at large, is to be taken 
seriously, an interrogative mode must be cultivated in spectatorial relationships 
with pieces of art. Frodeman’s method asks that critics, spectators and authors alike 
make avenues toward probing the specifics of place, and the mixed bag of elements 
that contribute to that concept. As Smaldone notes, summing up the majority of the 
research on the concept of place over the last twenty years, “places are based on 
three broad interrelated components that give places meaning: (1) the physical 
setting, (2) the person (an individual's internal psychological and social processes 
and attributes, which are also tied to social and cultural factors), and (3) the 
activities or rituals done at the place” (398).  By approaching land art from 
Rosenthal’s distinctly subjective attitudinal assessment, and updating his approach 
to reflect contemporary practice, I have attempted to approach the task of making 
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critical inquiries into viewing AMD&ART as a “place-based artwork,” rather than 
simply a “land-based artwork.”  
As this chapter proceeds from an embrace of specificity, wherein place is 
understood to be the result of historical and ongoing trends in behavior, 
interspersed with anecdotal and idiosyncratic features, a shortcoming of 
Rosenthal’s approach is revealed. While his approach to artist-intent is willing to 
entertain the concept that their relationship to the land is negotiable and contingent, 
Rosenthal’s understanding of that artist’s other—Nature—is shockingly fixed. It is 
always assumed to be an outside and ultimately ungraspable context wherein the 
artist makes overtures of aesthetic creation. Even in cases wherein the artist pays 
obeisance to nature, such as the work of Hamish Fulton, Rosenthal’s approach 
leaves the notion that “nature” is a coherent, self-evident Other untroubled.      
Employing Rosenthal’s typology without accounting for the status of nature 
is his formulation would be a gross oversight, and to this end, I have used this 
chapter to toss my hat into the ring, so to speak, of the debates revolving around the 
concept of “capital N” Nature.  In the vein of the luminaries theorizing the 
“deconstruction of nature”—those in attendance at the symposium on “Reinventing 
Nature” held at the University of California-Irvine in 1994, as well as 
contemporaneous philosophers such as Timothy Morton—this aspect of the 
document speaks the notion of nature as “contested terrain” (Cronon 52).  Morton’s 
skepticism about Nature—as an autonomous thing, apart from interpretation—
makes apparent the active mental and physical engagement necessary for this 
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contestation to occur: “Ecology equals living minus Nature, plus consciousness” 
(19).  
“Nature,” conceived of as an interpretive and historical artifact, is utilized 
variously to the benefit to the material biological world, but also to its degradation 
at the hands of those who would espouse the “naturalness” of rampant development 
and uncontrolled growth. As I explicate the contests being played out by parties 
interested in mobilizing the concept of “nature” to their particular end, I make 
apparent that Rosenthal’s focus on the attitudinal aspects of aesthetics reflects 
profoundly different interpretations of Nature itself. Far from a self-evident and 
accessible exterior space, assessed in the negative as “that which is not culture,” 
nature becomes in this formulation a site of radical otherness. William Cronon, 
summarizing the work of Robert Harrison, writes “ the fact that it [nature] lies 
forever beyond the borders of the linguistic universe—that it does not talk back to 
us in a language we can easily understand—permits us to pretend that we know 
what it really is and to imagine that we can capture its meaning with this very 
problematic word ‘nature’” (52).  By troubling the self-evident “nature” with which 
the land artists are sometimes associated, this chapter offers a view of multiple 
aesthetic approaches to defining and interacting with the radical otherness that is 
the rest of existence. AMD&ART, as an extremely complex form of environmental 
art—one that consciously exceeds mere formal or sculptural concerns—is an 
emblematic example of the examination of this conceptual terrain.  
This chapter begins with a brief discussion of “land art,” the mid-century 
aesthetic movement with which AMD&ART is most frequently aligned by critics. The 
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criticism surrounding the work of the original land artists is useful to this study in 
that it both lays out a framework for considering unusual configurations of natural 
materials as art, as well as provides an example of the shortcomings of formal 
criticism (the logic of which is typified in this study as the writings of Michael Fried). 
The second section is a review of Mark Rosenthal’s attitudinal typology of land art, 
particularly as it applies to AMD&ART. Rosenthal’s typology, while lengthy, is a 
thorough means of examining many facets of the AMD&ART site. The final section 
locates AMD&ART on Rosenthal’s typological list, arguing that by using AMD&ART as 
a means of thinking about the concept “nature,” we can produce a more flexible, less 
dogmatically-charged vision of “earth/land/nature art.”  
Land art: An Aesthetic Framework 
In the relative few publications in which AMD&ART has appeared, it is often 
quickly labeled “land art” or “earth art,” and hereby neatly pigeonholed. It is curated 
as such in the “Green Museum,” an online gallery of environmentally-conscious art, 
and appears with some regularity in survey publications of contemporary land art: 
Earthworks and Beyond, by John Beardsley and Designing the Reclaimed Landscape, 
edited by Alan Berger, are two recent publications in which AMD&ART receives 
mention. T. Allan Comp, the founder of AMD&ART, never expressly refers to the site 
as “land art” however, preferring to call it an “art park.” While it may seem a trifling 
titular matter, the declaration of the site as “land art” invokes a complex aesthetic 
genealogy, as well as a series of philosophical assumptions.  
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the term “land art” referred to a branch of 
minimalist sculpture that had migrated outdoors and assumed a large scale. 
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Enormous artworks by minimalist icons Nancy Holt, Robert Smithson, Michael 
Heizer, and Dennis Oppenheimer, among others, were the paradigmatic 
instantiations of the genre: Smithson’s Spiral Jetty (1970), the long spit of spiraling 
rock constructed at an isolated location in the Great Salt Lake, is an instantly 
recognizable major artwork of the twentieth century. Enormous in size, isolated, 
dabbling in the arcane symbolism of the spiral: this is a work whose ties to 
minimalist sculpture’s concern for aesthetic unity are apparent and profound.  
While land art and minimalist sculpture was championed by the 
aforementioned artists—and are widely respected in contemporary times—the 
forms were not without their detractors. Michael Fried, the heir-apparent to the 
Modernist criticism pioneered by Clement Greenberg at midcentury, wrote 
famously of minimalism (and by extension land art) that it is a “theatrical” or 
“literalist” art. “Literalist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with it, it is 
concerned with the actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters the 
literalist work, “ (153) wrote Fried in his famous Art and Objecthood. Fried viewed 
the interactive aspect of these works as a sordid, kitschy, unrefined quality that was 
developing in contemporary art. Whereas Fried’s ideal artwork was a distant, 
uncommunicative object whose overpowering presence deadened its audience’s 
awareness of context, the minimalist sculpture fairly called out for attention: the 
works are often large, altered the behavior of their audiences by being accessible 
from many directions and angles, and sprung up unexpectedly in unusual settings 
(like the outdoors). Non-theatrical art, conversely, appears before its audience in a 
moment of “presentness” that does away with all interactive elements: “It is this 
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continuous and entire presentness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation 
of itself, that one experiences as a kind of instantaneousness, as though if only one 
were infinitely more acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to 
see everything, to experience the work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever 
convinced by it” (Fried 167, italics in original).      
My focus on a relational model of aesthetic production puts me at odds with 
the philosophy of Michael Fried, as well as a host of other midcentury artists and 
critics such as Barnett Newman, Clement Greenberg and Ad Reinhardt. Grant 
Kester’s paraphrasing of Ad Reinhardt is a useful illustration of the Greenbergian 
modernist’s view on relational art: “The work of art constitutes an act of resistance 
to socially shared meaning or communicability. By refusing to communicate with 
the viewer (or at least the kitsch-sodden viewer), the artwork asserts its difference 
from, and resistance to, banal culture” (38). While much about the world has 
changed, including the belief that it is possible for a work to produce meaning that is 
not the result of social consensus, it is worth rehearsing the arguments of these 
critics because they provide a counterpoint to my own efforts. Where Reinhardt 
envisioned a “perfect” artwork as the absence of “sharing,” this study progressively 
makes a case for the fundamental necessity of sharing (relationality, interaction, 
performativity, theatricality) as the crux of the AMD&ART enterprise.  
This second chapter is the chapter most devoted to the “object” of AMD&ART 
(the physical site) of any in my study.  It is therefore concerned with the antithesis 
of Fried’s modernist art, the place of an entity in the world, as opposed to isolated on 
an idealized picture plane. Instead of an isolated, compositional unity demarcated 
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by the edge of a canvas, AMD&ART is a nigh-infinite aesthetic object (a topic I cover 
in depth in chapter three) composed of radically shifting elements. Thus AMD&ART 
fails Clement Greenberg’s call for “medium specificity,” the manipulation of the 
materials and features that are “unique to the nature” (111) of a particular medium, 
a process which gradually refines the art’s formal characteristics. AMD&ART is 
extremely messy, in the sense that is does not present a neatly curated suite of 
relationships or objects whose appearance on the site is thought to be self-evidently 
aesthetic. In fact, as opposed to the logical progression toward greater and greater 
specificity and refinement presupposed by Greenberg, I would suggest that the 
longer AMD&ART lasts, the less refined it will be become, and the more the lines 
between nature and culture—and as per Fried, art and objecthood—will blur.  
In the intervening years since the conceptual debates about formal criticism 
of the 1960s, the art-world has drifted from Greenberg, Fried, and the other 
formalists. The concept of land art has been extended to works as diverse as Hamish 
Fulton’s walking art (long walks, documented with photographs and texts); Andy 
Goldworthy’s ephemeral, deeply site-specific sculptures of rock, ice, leaves, flowers, 
dirt, rain and other local natural features; Newton and Helen Harrison’s oeuvre, 
ranging from self-contained ecosystems, as in The Lagoon Cycle (1972-1985), to 
complex analysis of urban biodiversity and land-use patterns made manifest in a 
series of maps, as in Casting a Green Net: Can It Be We Are Seeing A Dragon? (1996-
1998); Dwyer Kilcolin’s Nestgirl (2003) and Burrow (2003-2004), wherein she 
replicated animals’ constructed dwellings and lived in them for a time, as well as her 
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Fluxus-esque pun Get Your Ducks in a Row (2004), which saw Kilcolin release ducks 
into a gallery exhibition and attempt to line them up. 
The short representative sampling offered here resists my efforts to 
satisfactorily gather them together under an easy label, and offers little consolation 
to Fried and Greenberg’s desire for aesthetic purity. Are they “environmental art?” 
Perhaps the ambiguity of the abbreviated “eco-art” allows for enough conceptual 
leeway to accommodate such disparate forms and practices. Or shall I stick with 
“land art” for the sake of tradition? There is something to be said for choosing your 
terms carefully. In the end, I have settled on “land art” as that body of literature and 
theory that most benefits my analysis of AMD&ART (though kept all of the other 
terms in my back pocket. They will emerge later in this document.).    
Running beneath loftier concerns for terminology, aesthetic expression and 
experimentation are ethical concerns for the very material in which the land artist 
works: the land itself. The earliest land artists regarded the earth as a malleable 
canvas, while many contemporary land artists are exceptionally attentive to the 
preservation of existing living communities, perhaps even to the extent that it 
constrains their capacity for aesthetic freedom.  As in all broadly characterized 
aesthetic movements however, there are degrees of adherence to what are viewed 
to be the “founding principles” and ideals of land art. Broadly declaring an object, 
configuration of materials or entity that appears “out of doors” and manifest on a 
large scale “land art,” without properly contexting it within the evolving principles 
and ideals of the form (as evidenced by a genealogy of “major” works), is to 
dramatically water-down the value of the term “land art” for critics and art-lovers. 
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The golden age of land art, as William Malpas has pointed out, was undoubtedly the 
late 1960s and 1970s, an era whose works have been characterized by Rosalind 
Krauss as “sculpture in the expanded field” (Krauss 30). For Krauss, this era signaled 
the end of sculpture-by-virtue-of-exclusion: sculpture would no longer be that 
which was, by common estimation, not landscape and not architecture. Instead of 
this exclusionary field, she imagined an “expanded field” of aesthetic opportunity, 
wherein “site construction” or “marked sites” could produce sculpture that was both 
landscape and architecture, yet neither singly. This was also, of course, a direct 
rebuke of Greenberg’s idea of medium specificity.  
 Iconic works of the 1960s and 1970s such as Nancy Holt’s Sun Tunnels 
(1976), Michael Heizer’s Dragged Mass (1971), James Turrell’s Roden Crater (1979-
ongoing), along with famous works by Robert Smithson, Carl Andre, Alice Aycock, 
Robert Morris, Walter de Maria, Dennis Oppenheim, Alan Sonfist, Christo and Jean 
Claude, and many others, have come to represent the initial burst, and to some 
extent orthodoxy, of land art. Many of the aforementioned artists worked in 
monumental scale, their art profoundly and inextricably tied to its context (being 
“of” the land, not simply “in” it), and seeking to transcend the baseness of sculptural 
form. In particular, they sought to escape art’s attendant ties to the gallery-based art 
market, through experimentation with materiality, isolation and transience.  
 These early works have been criticized for their seemingly uncritical, 
nostalgic vision of unspoiled nature, an arena in which art and artists could produce 
seemingly acultural artifacts accessible to all who encountered them. Perhaps more 
damning is the critique of the early land art as actively destructive: the havoc 
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wreaked by Michael Heizer’s Double Negative (1969), a set of mirrored chasms 
gouged into the face of Mormon Mesa in Utah, is one shocking example. Heizer has 
been quoted as saying, “I don’t care about landscape. I’m a sculptor. Real estate is 
dirt, and dirt is material” (Gablik 140). It is with this ethos that we might sum up the 
majority of early land art. John Grande has quipped about Heizer’s quotation that it 
“affirms the code of the original land art aesthetic which was not to integrate nature 
and art, but to impose an idea of art in the forum of the exterior landscape…the 
artist’s intention continued to involve the imposition of an idea of art onto nature by 
the artist” (87).  
During the 1980s and 1990s however, a particular branch of land art, 
remediative or recuperative art, came about as artists became interested in the 
potential of art to help reclaim sites of ecological, industrial or cultural spoilage. 
Works such as Revival Field (1990), by Mel Chin, set the tone for land art of a new 
sort. Revival Field is a 60 sq. foot section of the Pig’s Eye landfill in St. Paul, 
Minnesota, that has been sowed with a series of plants whose function is to 
accumulate the heavy metals that contaminate the site. As these hyperaccumulating 
plants mature, they’re harvested and burned in reclamation furnaces, wherein their 
residues produce metals of greater purity than newly mined ore. These metals are 
then sold to industry to further finance the project. The ground is stripped of 
harmful heavy metals, and the site perpetuates itself through active engagement in 
financial markets.  
AMD&ART falls squarely within this subset of art-making. It is clearly 
dedicated to the remediation of water contaminated by acid mine drainage, as well 
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as to the healing of psychic scars that burden the population of Vintondale in the 
wake of local economic collapse and the widespread abandonment of the area. This 
site, as Grande implies, is interested in integrating landscape and art, particularly if 
we consider landscape as a complex, reticulated construct, composed of various 
biomes, histories, processes, economies and psychic/emotional components, across 
many registers ranging from the human to that of the microorganism. In order to 
operate in these other registers, however, the discussions regarding AMD&ART must 
be broadened beyond the articulation of AMD&ART in the sculptural land art 
tradition, if indeed AMD&ART is land art at all.  
Attitudinal Assessment as Relational Marker 
Morphology (formal characteristics) cannot be the basis for authoring a 
designation for AMD&ART: there is no one thing that “looks” like land art or has 
“the” characteristics associated with land art, whatever those might be. While the 
earliest land art may have been easily linked to the logic of sculpture or Minimalist 
art, the wide breadth of contemporary art cannot be so clearly tied to any one 
particular school of aesthetic philosophy or mode of representation.  
Mark Rosenthal attempted to organize the land art movement into five 
“attitudes” in the early 1980s, a perspective that I believe to be far more promising 
than focusing on morphology. The notion of “attitude” refines the question of 
morphology, focusing more on the relationship between the artist and the land as a 
definitional opportunity than on the eventual product of that relationship (the art 
object). This is not say, however, that Rosenthal distances his analysis from the art 
object. The art object in this formulation becomes a token of the attitude held by the 
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artist with regards to the earth: raw material or collaborator, object of domination 
or salvation. It is therefore not an ontological question: “is it land art?” Rather, 
Rosenthal’s approach begs an examination of the ways in which the artist and the 
artwork interact with the land, looking to the art object for clues about the tenor of 
the artist’s feelings toward the land itself. 
The notion of “attitude,” as it pertains to land art, is a useful heuristic for 
critics; in my case, examining the form and functioning of AMD&ART is a more 
fruitful approach than attempting to ascertain whether the piece is “more” like 
sculpture or “more” like installation art, or whether it’s intended to be viewed as a 
non-human performer, or whether the artists and planners dealt with concerns that 
might suggest the isolation of an autonomous art-object. The case of AMD&ART 
suggests that as critics, coming to understand land art as a process of relating with 
the earth (an “attitude,” as Rosenthal would have it) is a more conceptually complex 
and generative means of approaching the site than cataloguing the ways in which 
the site does or does not adhere to preceding aesthetic codes or morphological 
conventions. Rather than engaging in a sort of “artistic taxonomy,” utilizing the 
perspective of “attitudes” allows critics to attend to the particularities of the site and 
acknowledge an art in which the natural features of an area work in tandem with 
the artist to produce the eventual art object. Allan Kaprow, writing on “nontheatrical 
performance” in the mid-1970s, asserts that “When you interact with animal and 
plant life, and with wind and stones, you may also be a naturalist or highway 
engineer, but you and the elements are performers—and this can be basic research” 
(177). This “basic research” is precisely the territory mapped by a criticism centered 
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on “attitude”: the relationship between the artist and the landscape in their mutual 
encounter. It is “basic” in the sense that it is fundamental to this type of artistic 
practice.  
Attitude 1: Gestures in the Landscape 
 The first of Rosenthal’s attitudes is encountered when examining the work of 
the early “monumental” land artists: Smith, Heizer, Walter De Maria, among others. 
Rosenthal dubs their tendency toward large-scale abstract artworks “gestures in the 
landscape.” These works are gestures in that they utilize “the vernacular of the 
modern world” and draw little of their conceptual footing from their particular 
locale (Rosenthal 64). While site-specificity is a feature often ascribed to works by 
these artists, I tend to agree with Rosenthal’s assertion that “site-specificness is an 
almost incidental result of the physical size of these pieces” and that these pieces 
“might have been placed at any number of locations” (64). Heizer’s Nine Nevada 
Depressions (1968) for example, a series of five twelve-foot gouges in the Blackrock 
Desert of Nevada, could have just as easily been Nine Kentucky Depressions, given its 
fairly simplistic physical form. Smithson’s jetty could have reached out into the Salt 
Lake from any other point or been placed in any other lake. This interchangeability 
stems from their gestural nature: they are closely linked to Abstract Expressionism, 
whose notion of the “gestural” in art retains its concern with the artist’s hand and 
the capacity of the medium to convey that gestural link while retaining its material 
independence.  
This attitude is made further evident by the methods described by artists, in 
this case Michael Heizer, for acquiring the land upon which their pieces are 
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eventually built: “You might say I’m in the construction business….To begin with, I 
have a tremendous real estate file on every available piece of property in six 
western states. I look for climate and material in the ground. When I find the right 
spot, I buy it” (Gruen 99). Robert Smithson, James Turrell, Nancy Holt and a host of 
other monumental earth artists survey(ed) in precisely the same fashion, flying low 
over arid stretches of the desert, or reading land-sale documents in county 
courthouses, searching for the proper location to suit their needs.  Practicality 
demands it, as the areas they’re casing are huge and isolated. This method of 
surveying works only because the artists are searching for locales in which to place 
their art however—the phenomenon of “plop art.” As we shall see, other attitudes 
toward land art draw their inspiration from the land, and the particularities of site, 
without any prior vision of the work at hand. In Heizer’s case, how can he know 
what he’s looking for, if he doesn’t already know what he’s looking to produce? How 
would he know which spot is the “right spot?”  
The final aspect of this attitude worth mentioning is the view of the land that 
can be deduced from the tendency of these works to disrupt natural systems. The 
critique of these works as destructive to fragile ecosystems and as conditional upon 
the utilization of the same techniques and technologies as extractive industry has 
haunted the monumental earthworks since their inception. Smithson and Heizer 
have directly addressed these concerns, though the logic of their rebuttal seems 
threadbare in the light of contemporary environmental discourse. For Smithson, 
those who criticized his work on ecological grounds were fetishizing a “jejune 
Eden,” wherein man and Nature lived in harmonious alignment, and the realities of 
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modern industrial capitalism might be forgotten in a haze of feel-good 
preservationist stasis. Heizer’s major bone of contention is that his works, while 
disruptive, are substantially less disruptive than other earth-moving operations 
currently at work in the United States, a fact about which he is undoubtedly correct: 
“the western United States alone has more than five hundred thousand abandoned 
and active mines, covering millions of acres and tens of thousands of square miles. 
Although the total acreage is difficult to predict, a vast new-post mined landscape 
approaching the scale of a hundred thousand square miles, will be created in the 
wake of US mining alone” (Berger xvii). Underlying the details of these allegations 
and their associated rebuttals, however, is the attitude that motivates the 
construction of these works: nature exists to be manipulated, and serves primarily 
as raw material which may be dedicated to the realization of sculptural, aesthetic 
goals: “…there’s no need to refer to nature anymore. I’m totally concerned with 
making art” (Smithson 174).  
Attitude 2: Enclosures in the Land 
Rosenthal titles the second attitude toward land art “enclosures in the land,” 
as exemplified by a number of artists whose work focuses on constructing spaces of 
interiority in the landscape: underground rooms, burrows, hollowed out spaces and 
the like. The work of Dwyer Kilcolin falls squarely within this attitude: both Burrow 
and Nestgirl focus on carving an interior, private space by replicating similar 
processes of spatial division among non-Human animals. Artists of the “golden age” 
of land art—e.g., Alice Aycock, Nancy Holt, Marry Miss—experimented with pits and 
sunken concrete pipes, gaps through solid earth, elaborate underground sculpture 
56 
 
and subterranean spaces, most of which were designed to be entered.  Many of these 
pieces appear to fall within the rubric of “gestures in the landscape”: large scale, 
geometric, ambitious in design and execution. It is their inclusion of this interior 
space that differentiates them from the monumental ramps and earthen slabs of the 
“gestures,” however. The interior space, whether it exists or not,  
qualifies the bold, uncompromising quality of the “gestures in the 
landscape.” Instead of simply viewing a wonder of human 
achievement, the viewer is enticed to approach and explore a space 
that is indicated structurally but hidden from view. The implication 
and then discovery of this space, if it exists, isolates the structure from 
its setting to some extent, for the space is largely separate from the 
surroundings. Moreover, once inside, the spectator is secluded, or 
perhaps protected, from the adjacent landscape (Rosenthal 64).  
 
To clarify, the aforementioned attitudes differ in two major ways. Initially, though 
both tend toward large scale, the “gestures” exist to be viewed as massive, unified 
additions to their surroundings, whereas the “enclosures” exist within a specific site, 
while simultaneously generating their own spaces. The contained spaces force the 
viewer into a subjective bodily relationship with the site. This participation prompts 
individuals to negotiate the enclosed space, and act as a relay whereby the exterior 
and interior sites are, or are not, reconciled.  
 The attitude that is suggested by these works, however, isn’t necessarily 
dissimilar to that suggested by the “gestures:” the surrounding environment is 
understood to exist in an instrumental relationship to the artist, as a site wherein art 
might be placed. The inclusion of a subjective isolation, however, and by extension a 
profoundly subjective experience, implies a relationship of greater intimacy than 
with the “gestures.” Lest it seem to fall prey to the utopianism of “communing” with 
nature though, one needs only look as far as Aycock’s early works for a rude 
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awakening: there is very little pleasant about descending into her Low Building with 
Dirt Roof (1973), a damp, cramped hole in the ground with a dramatically low 
ceiling, a cave-like dirt hole through which one must creep. The same could be said 
for her Circular Building with Narrow Ledges for Walking (1976), a concrete tube 
lined with a series of three narrow ledges that encircle the inside of the tube. These 
ledges, which grow increasingly narrow, descend into a pit whose floor is 17 feet 
below the lip of the tube. These are not comforting descents (or ascents) into the 
warm bosom of the earth; instead, they are forums for intense subjective 
examination and unusually potent experiences made possible by the land.  
Attitude 3: Modest Gestures in the Landscape 
 The third attitude described by Rosenthal exists at the midpoint of a 
continuum: it borrows both from the gestural, large-scale logic of instrumentality 
associated with the “gestures in the landscape” and the “enclosures in the land,” as 
well as a reverence for a vision of an intact, autonomous nature that will 
characterize the final two attitudes. Dubbed “modest gestures in the landscape,” the 
works in question are well represented by artists such as Richard Long (e.g., 
Snowdonia Stones [2008]) and Andy Goldsworthy. Long’s sculptural works, patterns 
of carefully arranged natural materials found in situ, are barely noticeable additions 
to the land. Goldworthy’s body of work, while often more sculptural and displaying a 
greater prominence in the environment, conforms to the basic logic represented by 
Long’s contributions: the imposition of human presence, as symbolized by orderly, 
intentional geometry or repetition, on a natural landscape, utilizing the materials 
present in the landscape itself.  
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  In the case of “modest gestures in the landscape,” “modesty” may be 
understood to represent a heightened regard, bordering on reverence, for the 
landscape and natural processes, wherein long-term damage or alteration is 
unthinkable. In a sense, these works operate within an ethics of propriety, the forms 
of the art-objects and behaviors of the artist subordinated to a moral obligation to 
leave landscapes altered, but undamaged. Writing on the term “propriety,” Wendell 
Berry notes, “its value is in its reference to the fact that we are not alone. The idea of 
propriety makes an issue of the fittingness of our conduct to our place or 
circumstances, even to our hopes. It acknowledges the always-pressing realities of 
context and of influence; we cannot speak or act or live out of context” (13). Both 
Long and Goldsworthy’s works are attentive to their conduct in the places wherein 
they’re created: both use local materials, neither disrupt the operations of natural 
forces, while both acknowledge that in order for humans to exist upon the earth, let 
alone make art there, there is an intrinsic dialectical relationship of influence. 
Neither Long nor Goldsworthy is afraid to alter the landscape, yet neither is willing 
to alter it so intensely as to render it permanently deformed.  
 The question of context is fundamental to the notion of site-specificity, an 
aesthetic consideration whose import grows as the attitude of land art under 
examination drifts away from gesturality and toward an idealized, autonomous 
nature. Rosenthal, considering the work of Richard Long and Michael Singer, writes 
that they both “concede precedence to the landscape” (66). More telling is 
Rosenthal’s assertion that “both view their works as ritualistic responses to the site 
with which they are interacting”  (67). Herein lies the crux of the difference between 
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the “gestures” and “enclosures,” and the “modest gestures”: the modest gestures 
represent an attitudinal shift away from an artwork that is simply made upon, or 
within, the land. The modest gestures represent a concern with the adherence to 
notions of propriety, as manifest in an active consideration of the land as a series of 
participant entities. For the artists working in “modest gestures,” the ideal process 
of aesthetic creation is dialogic: the opportunity to represent the interaction of an 
aesthetic event, as well a natural state that predates the presence of the artist, and 
most pressingly, the ways in which this is an interaction fraught with meaningful 
contributions from each element.    
Finally, this attitude may be best explicated through an examination of the 
linked notions of entropy and impermanence.  By comparing the work of Robert 
Smithson with that of Andy Goldsworthy, I offer two contrasting visions of the role 
played by impermanence in land art. Smithson is famously credited with producing 
works whose degradation is supposedly part and parcel of their theoretical 
justification. Smithson’s claim regarding the importance of entropy to his work seem 
a bit disingenuous however, especially with regard to works such as Spiral Hill 
(1971), an enormous earthen mound constructed in Holland. The focus of Spiral Hill, 
as is the case with the other large-scale “gestures” is upon the impermanence of the 
artwork itself, and makes no concessions toward the site as a whole returning to a 
state akin to its condition before it was manipulated. Entropy is not, after all, 
inherently modest. This is especially true in Smithson’s case, as the manifestation of 
entropy in a mound of rocks requires an immensely expanded notion of duration. 
The rocks will degrade, the form will break…eventually. Spiral Hill, which has aged 
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and degraded visibly in the four decades since its construction, will probably persist 
for centuries, if not longer. This is hardly impermanent and decidedly immodest, 
particular in comparison with other artists working in the land art mode.  
 The sculptural forms of Andy Goldsworthy, serving as a point of contrast, 
display a very modest sort of impermanence: some last only a moment, others a few 
days, and only his very largest, most permanent stoneworks—Sheepfolds (1996-
2003), Storm King Wall (2000), Neuberger Cairn (2001), to name a few stone-based 
structures—stand basically unchanged since their construction. Goldsworthy has 
taken to documenting his work with photos precisely because the majority of his 
works in question are so fleeting that there’s almost no other way to exhibit them. 
One of his signature tropes, the “Rain Shadow” (an outline of the artist’s body 
produced by laying on a patch of ground before it begins to rain and blocking the 
rain from altering the color of the ground), is a prime example of the “modest 
gesture:” it is a quiet, fleeting imposition of a gestural impulse on the land, and most 
importantly, one which fades over a matter of minutes. The land, constrained within 
the passage of time, consumes the artwork, and its ephemerality becomes an artistic 
asset. A Rain Shadow begins to vanish the moment that the artist moves his body.  
Attitude 4: Nature for Itself 
To continue the conceptual drift away from the gestural, the fourth attitude 
of land art Rosenthal ascertains is “nature for itself,” wherein the hand of the artist 
becomes even more loosely affiliated with the production of the art object. As the 
title of this attitude makes clear, the art which falls under this categorization 
appears to be natural processes operating as they would with minimal intervention, 
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or standing for little outside of their very real, semi-autonomous material selves. 
One of the more famous pieces of “nature for itself” art is Agnes Dene’s Wheatfield-A 
Confrontation (1982), wherein the artist and volunteers cleared 4 acres of a New 
York landfill and planted 2 acres of wheat.  
Wheatfield-A Confrontation is a good representative of this attitude for a 
number of reasons. From the perspective of morphology, the wheat field, while a 
constructed environment (depending upon the conventions of agriculture, privy to 
the histories of land use in the area, recipient of constant maintenance and 
intervention strategies by participants), is still basically a scenario in which the 
wheat plant is allowed to germinate and grow on its own. The relationship of the 
farmer/artist to this particular piece is also telling, in terms of the “nature for itself” 
attitude. The artist, rather than managing the form and functioning of the piece, 
actively sculpting it in process with an eye toward an eventual outcome, is more like 
a facilitator or orchestrator of the initial conditions of a scenario. The processes 
enabled by the facilitator/artist are then allowed to unfold in an unmanaged or 
loosely managed fashion. Denes cleared the space, enriched the soil with added 
topsoil, installed an irrigation system, and planted the wheat. The rest, as it were, 
was up to natural processes. Eventually, the grain was harvested and fed to horses 
stabled at the New York City Police Department, thereby completing an ecological 
cycle.  
The attitude “nature for itself” does raise a series of interesting concerns 
about the ontology of the art object. The case of “nature for itself” art that is shown 
in galleries, such as Ingrid Koivukangas’ 5 Circle Project: Vancouver (2002), may 
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clarify these concerns. The hand of the artist is most obviously at work, if in no other 
capacity than an enabler or selector of material “nature.” Koivukangas’ work, an 
examination of the natural materials found within a series of 5 concentric circles 
drawn on a map of Vancouver, B.C., resulted in a collection of gathered objects 
which were displayed in a large grid of 144 clear plastic boxes in the gallery. The 
feathers, leaves, rocks, crustacean limbs and other objects are not intended to 
represent anything other than what they are: the constituent elements of a natural 
world. Yet, they are ideologically loaded, based upon their inclusion in an avowed 
art-construct. Koivukangas’ selections, while “nature itself,” beg the question: “Why 
this particular element of nature?”  
Thus,  “nature for itself,” while a useful attitude, is perhaps a bit naïve, with 
regards to the hand of the artist in shaping the “natural” scenario. Denes’ wheatfield 
is, after all, supposedly a confrontation, a state not usually associated with grains. 
This art-wheat, however, becomes in Brooklyn a token of the confrontation between 
industrial and agricultural land usage, between a view of land as a means for eliding 
the excess and waste of capitalism and a view of land as generative, productive, and 
the source of evocative, lived experience. Finally, the site juxtaposes the view of a 
wheatfield as a quotidian agricultural necessity, and the view of a wheatfield as an 
art object, albeit an organic, productive one. Are these attitudes toward the land, 
toward wheat, and toward art reconcilable, and if they were, would this make for 
compelling art? Nature may “be itself,” but that’s not say that its value or the 
repercussions of its claims will be self-evident.  
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Attitude 5: The Idealized Landscape 
The final attitude of land art, the “idealized landscape,” pushes the role of the 
artist nearly beyond a concern even for art. The artist becomes a servant of nature, 
in a sense, attentive to the conditions of the environment and dedicated to those 
conditions as an ideal. Rosenthal writes that artists such as Hamish Fulton and Alan 
Sonfist  
do not generalize about landscape or space. Whatever the place, its 
qualities and aspects are of the greatest significance, determining 
most if not all aesthetic decisions. Their veneration of nature is such 
that there is a corresponding diminishment of formal concerns. 
Rather, the effects of nature and the site predominate (68). 
 
Alan Sonfist’s Time Landscape (1978) is the quintessential example of this type of 
land art. Sonfist recreated a pre-Colonial forest on a patch of ground in Brooklyn, 
clearing the site of non-native vegetation and bringing into the 20th century a vestige 
of the biomes that once covered the island of Manhattan.  As such, Sonfist’s capacity 
to make decisions based upon aesthetic whim was limited; the potential list of 
species to be included is limited by their presence prior to colonization. As noted by 
Rosenthal, there is a diminution of formal flexibility in favor of an adherence to an 
idealized nature whose autonomous characteristics are the precedents whereby a 
work’s success is to be judged.  
Whereas the artists who displayed the attitudes of “gestures in the 
landscape” (even modest ones) were concerned about the fusion, often dubbed site-
specificity, of human and natural elements, the work of Sonfist and the other 
“idealized nature” artists diminishes the role of human abstraction completely. A 
work of Sonfist’s, Rock Monument to Buffalo (1965-1978), which featured a series of 
64 
 
large rocks collected across a 50-mile swath of Buffalo, N.Y., makes this point clear. 
The rocks were positioned in the same relationship that they originally possessed, 
save for the space between them, which was compressed from many miles into 
mere feet. The rocks, which sit in the same orientation in which they were 
discovered, are not meant to represent anything other than their prior and 
continued relationship to one another. John Carpenter, musing on Rock Monument, 
claims, “Sonfist's sculpture does not refer to the viewer's awareness to language or 
numerical relations. Rock Monument to Buffalo refers to the immediate context of 
the viewer, placing people in space and time and in relationship with nature” (146). 
The rocks in Sonfist’s art are simply rocks, but more importantly, they are specific 
rocks. Each rock is assumed to have a material existence whose features are worth 
recording and preserving through a recreation of their natural position and 
relationship to one another, and they were chosen because they were indigenous to 
the area: Lockport dolostone and Onondaga limestone, for example, are two 
varieties of stone that occur locally and feature prominently in the Rock Monument.  
AMD&ART in the Expanded Field: An Attitudinal Assessment 
By shifting the onus of the critic away from a definitional imperative—
deciding whether or not something is land art—Rosenthal’s attitudes support what 
Rosalind Krause, referring to the land art of the 1960s, has dubbed an “expanded 
field”: a mode of conceptualizing an artwork based more upon its negotiation (and 
eventual surpassing) of theoretical binaries than on its morphology or formal 
characteristics. In the case of sculpture, it was a movement away from definition via 
exclusion (whatever wasn’t landscape and wasn’t architecture must therefore be 
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sculpture), to a revised and expanded field that acknowledges the that art which 
was not architecture must in fact be landscape and vice-versa. Sculpture, which 
hung suspended in the binary between “not landscape” and “not architecture,” is 
hereby given a sort of dopplegänger: site-construction, which is both landscape and 
architecture. Additionally, this formulation suggests that works might be made that 
are plying the conceptual rift between “landscape” and “not landscape,” as well as 
“architecture” and “not architecture.”  
For my analysis, the value of Rosenthal and Krauss’s criticism stems from 
their easy inclusion of many disparate forms. In both cases, their approach to 
discerning how a particular artwork might be categorized is a process of 
justification. It’s as if these critics are asking artists to locate themselves within 
specialized theoretical matrixes of nature and culture and thereby take their place 
as the type of art that they’d like to be considered. For Rosenthal, it’s not necessarily 
what you make that characterizes your artwork or your position within the art 
world. Rather, it’s about articulating your relationship to the land on a continuum, 
reaching from instrumental visions of the land as raw material on one end of the 
continuum to the utter glorification of the land as a complex unified whole, the only 
proper response to which is reverence and servitude, on the other end. For Krause, 
it is a similar process of orientation on various axes: landscape or not; architecture 
or not; both or neither.  
The question at hand, finally, is whether this reassessment of the character of 
land art contributes to our understanding of a site like AMD&ART, and whether an 
examination of AMD&ART can contribute a fresh perspective on this debate. 
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Following the lead of Rosenthal and Krauss, I believe the claim that AMD&ART is 
“land art” is supportable by virtue of its negotiation of positions within the 
overarching frame(s) of nature/culture. These theoretical and ideological positions, 
and the very material political repercussions of these positions, include the 
following: the negotiation of relationships to the land based in instrumentality as 
well as in preservation, the attempted reconciliation of contemporary 
environmental/community politics and ethics with the political and ethical climate 
of the historical Industrial period, the debate regarding the possibility of land 
reclamation truly reclaiming and returning a despoiled environment to something 
akin to its pre-utilization state, not to mention a whole host of artistic and aesthetic 
debates.  
To clarify this mass of concerns and avoid the morphological, formal 
approach to art criticism, I’m going to locate AMD&ART on Rosenthal’s continuum of 
attitudes. This is a complex matter, and as we shall see, the site does not fit neatly 
into one “attitude.” It is illustrative, in this sense, of the dynamic negotiation that is 
part and parcel with employing Rosenthal’s attitudinal typology. In the absence of 
“authoritative” avowel of the goals and values associated with a site (and, perhaps, 
even in its presence), critics and audiences are left to interpret and infer (as I have 
done in all of the proceeding attitudinal analysis) the attitude to which they feel the 
artwork in question most clearly aspires.  
It seems apparent to me that AMD&ART clearly does not heed the impulse 
toward making a “gesture in the landscape”: the site simply doesn’t concern itself 
enough with geometric symbology, abstract form, or conspicuously large scale. The 
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site’s keystone shaped pools, aside from perhaps some sidelong allusion to 
Pennsylvania’s state sobriquet (“The Keystone State”), don’t seem to represent any 
particular geometric assertion; they’re certainly not tied to a complex web of 
symbolism as is, for example, Smithson’s spiral-form in Spiral Jetty. John Beardsley 
links the spiral to Smithson’s subjective perception of the site (“As I looked at the 
site, it reverberated out to the horizons only to suggest an immobile cyclone while 
flickering light made the entire landscape appear to quake. A dormant earthquake 
spread into the fluttering stillness, into a spinning sensation without movement” 
[Smithson 146]), to the molecular lattice of the salt crystals that encrust the work, 
and to a folktale about the Great Salt Lake being connected to the ocean by an 
enormous underground channel whose sucking draw creates a spiral on the surface 
of the lake. “The spiral was thus a key not only to the macroscopic world, but the 
microscopic and mythological as well,” notes Beardsley (22). In the case of 
AMD&ART, geometrical gestures are clearly suppressed in favor of practical, 
utilitarian decisions regarding form, and made with little concern for aesthetic cues 
microscopic or mythological.  
The site, which features very little of the logic of overt, lasting abstract 
expression of the “gestures,” also features little of the concern with interiority that 
characterizes the “enclosures in the land.” While the site is entirely contingent upon 
the presence of a vast, interior space (the abandoned coalmine that belches out the 
contaminated water), there is no sign or acknowledgment of this space in the 
aesthetics of the site, nor in the landscape. The mine remains, as do many 
underground mines in western Pennsylvania, hidden from view. The tell-tale sign—
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the pipe leading out of the mine that delivers the water to the purification system—
emerges from a small hump in the ground with little fanfare. Indeed, the only place 
at the site that hints at the underground workings of the piece is the Mine No. 6 
Portal, the enormous slab of polished black stone blocking the entrance into Mine 
No. 6.  Here, standing in front of the slab, staring at the etched images of coalminers 
emerging from the gloom, we’re forced to remember that the whole site is wedded 
inextricably to a subterranean economy and the repercussions of the underground 
mining practices. This isn’t, however, an experience of interior space in the same 
fashion that the underground mazes of Mary Miss might enable. We can know, 
intellectually, that there is a mine under the hillside, but we do not experience the 
dank, damp, cool air or the claustrophobia of the narrow spaces or even the fear of 
the dark. The logic of the enclosure privileges a subjective interactive element, by 
focusing on the isolating effects of the created interior space—something this site 
simply does not attempt.   
The permanence of the site and its prominence would seem to suggest that 
AMD&ART is not ascribing to the logic of the “modest gestures” either. The pools, 
signage, trails and pavilions are extremely prominent in the landscape, and the site 
is fundamentally designed to persist: there is no end in sight to the problem of acid 
mine drainage in Vintondale, let alone the rest of the country. The chemical and 
biological conditions at the root of the problem—the constant influx of fresh water 
into the abandoned mines, the stripping away of already exposed seams of pyrite, 
which in turn creates more sulphuric acid and dissolves more minerals—demand 
that the site remain in operation as long as possible. The site is designed in its 
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passivity to operate with a minimal amount of intervention for long periods of time. 
It may be in the landscape, but it is not of the landscape in the same sense that 
Richard Long’s stone circles are of the landscape: created of local materials, 
potentially occurring without the intervention of man (albeit highly unlikely).  
There is, however, an aspect of the site to which one might ascribe the logic 
of a “modest gesture”: the Litmus Garden. This garden, which runs parallel to the 
water treatment pools, is a series of native tree plantings whose autumn foliage 
colors are meant to represent the increasing pH of the water in the pools that they 
overlook. Beginning at the first pond (the “Acid pool”) with the intense red of the 
White Ash and Red Maple, the colors shift along the Yamada Universal Indicator 
litmus test pattern through red, orange, yellow, and finally green-blue, a color that 
indicates neutral pH2.  
With time, it might be possible to mistake the Litmus Garden for a naturally 
occurring, albeit unusually neat, row of native trees. The garden does, after all, 
operate with minimal intervention once established and will propagate itself and 
continue to spread. These trees, just as other natural materials in land art of the 
“modest gesture” variety, both represent something abstract in the human world 
(the colors associated with particular pH), as well as existing autonomously as 
species (and singular entities) dwelling in their habitat. 
                                                        
2 The tree species in the Litmus garden are as follows: White Ash (Fraxis 
Americana), Red Maple (Acer rubrum), Sweet Gum (Liquidambar styraciflua), Black 
Cherry (Prunus serotina), Shadbush (Amelanchier arborea), Sassafras (Sassafras 
albidum), Sugar Maple (Acer saccharum), Hawthorne (Crataegus spp.), Tulip Poplar 
(Liriodendron tulipifera), Big Toothed Aspen (Populus grandidentata), Hackberry 
(Celtis occidentalis), Sycamore (Platanus occidentalis), Black Willow (Salix nigra) and 
Northern Catalpa (Catalpa speciosa). 
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The two remaining attitudes—“nature for itself” and the “idealized 
landscape”—come closest to articulating the attitude informing the AMD&ART site, 
in its relationship with the land and with land art as an aesthetic exercise. Following 
the logic of the “nature for itself” artists, the site appears to be a sort of 
choreography of natural processes, albeit toward an orchestrated end, rather than a 
“letting be” of the natural processes. The passive acid mine drainage treatment 
system relies on a number of naturally occurring processes to operate, for example. 
The extremely acidic water, as it passes through the treatment system, has its pH 
altered by a combination of biological and chemical processes. In the second, third, 
and fourth pools, the water flows through artificially constructed wetlands, whose 
annual addition of decaying biomass removes oxygen from the water and increases 
the pH. These pools fall squarely within the logic of “nature for itself.” There is 
nothing special about the biotic communities of these artificial wetlands; their 
constituent species are identical to other wetlands found throughout western 
Pennsylvania. The site relies on naturally occurring, self-perpetuating plant species 
to provide the decomposing biomass integral to this step in the remediation 
process, and as each year’s growth matures and topples over, it provides a new 
substrate upon which the heavy metals suspended in the water may be deposited.  
The fifth pool, a Sequential Alkalinity Producing System, is a strategic 
combination of biological and chemical processes: a deep layer of decaying organic 
material resting atop a limestone slab. The decaying material further strips the 
water of oxygen, while the base pH of the limestone neutralizes the residual 
sulphuric acid in the water. The bottom of this pool is lined with vertically oriented 
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pipes, designed to hasten the flow of water through the limestone and thereby allow 
less time for the water to deposit the iron, aluminum, and other metals suspended in 
the water. This process occurs when the pH of the water increases, and by 
minimizing the deposition rates, the limestone slab remains operational for longer 
periods of time between servicing (a cost- and labor-intensive affair that’s 
extremely disruptive to established biological communities).  
The aforementioned processes simply utilize the behavior and chemical 
processes of naturally occurring organisms and substances. They are, however, 
unusual in configuration; rarely does a scenario such as this occur unaided by 
human intervention. The key term in this formulation—“utilization”—implies a 
strategic element to the planning of the site and its operation, and it is herein that 
the site finally conforms to the logic of the “idealized landscape.” While it is perhaps 
not attempting to recreate the landscape as it existed before the era of coal mining 
(there may well have been wetland plants growing along the creeks of nearby 
Blacklick Creek), it is attempting to restore the water itself to its pre-contamination 
state. The site exists in the service of this very goal: remediation, the correction or 
reversal of a defective or undesired state. 
At this point, it is worth considering the term remediation as it relates to the 
final attitude in Rosenthal’s formulation, the “idealized landscape.” Remediation, a 
term intimately linked with the more commonly used term “reclamation,” occupies 
a contested place within the literature of environmental recuperation and landscape 
architecture. It resides at the nexus of a debate about the (im)possibility of perfectly 
recreating a pristine site, precisely as it was before environmental tragedy befell it. 
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Basically, it is a question of whether perfect recreation is materially possible, and if 
so, whether it is disingenuous to erase the traces of past encroachments by man. 
Frederick Turner, whose perspective advocates acknowledging the impossibility of 
“going back,” so to speak, asks,  
The often-used term remediation implies the restoration of health to 
something that was sick. But if health is defined as the status quo ante, 
the situation that prevailed before the alteration, then the plateau of 
Arizona was a healthier place before the Colorado incised the Grand 
Canyon in it, the devastated slopes of Mount St. Helens were healthier 
than the forests and meadows that have since grown up there, and the 
frozen rock beneath the glaciers of the last Ice Age was healthier than 
the mixed deciduous forest of the upper Midwest. So another 
question, which must accompany our question about human beings 
and nature, is: can reclamation go beyond remediation? (5)  
 
This notion of “reclamation beyond remediation” is troubling to the perspective 
espoused by Rosenthal’s final attitude, “the idealized landscape.” A clue as to why 
this is the case resides in the title of the attitude: idealization. It is precisely this 
idealization that transforms what an observer might christen “nature” into an 
instance of artistry. Sonfist’s Time Landscape may well be beholden to the natural 
occurrence of vegetation of New York City at a time before colonization by 
Europeans, but in final consideration, as an art object, it is beholden so primarily 
through Sonfist’s idealized (conceptualized) version thereof. Idealized landscapes 
do not necessarily have to subscribe to the temporal logic of Time Landscape (most 
do not), but they do necessarily fall within the boundaries of a subjective 
idealization that sets them apart from their non-idealized but seemingly identical 
brethren.  
 AMD&ART, while remediative in the sense that it attempts to heal the 
landscape via organic processes, is not a return to an idealized landscape of 
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unspoiled grandeur. This idealized landscape attitude is infeasible when a site 
designed not only to serve as an aesthetic entity but also as a practical, functioning 
treatment facility. The landscape of western Pennsylvania, no matter how beautiful 
and precious, cannot sustain the presence of AMD; this was precisely the condition 
that prompted the construction of AMD&ART in the first place. The site, while 
perhaps not an “improved upon” version of the original streambed and wooded 
surrounds of Vintondale prior to the founding of the town, is undoubtedly a vast 
improvement over the despoiled and toxic town dump it replaces.  
In his essay, Turner goes on to ask, “Can alteration of a landscape…[provide] 
the landscape with a destiny and a role that are grander than its original ones?” (5) 
“Grander for whom?” I am compelled to retort. This question, which presupposes 
that the landscape had a destiny and a role initially, haunts my thinking about 
AMD&ART. I am hesitant to ascribe a destiny or role to the land, as if those might 
have been somehow subverted through human interference. Was the land 
surrounding Vintondale and the coal in the underground seams “destined” for 
human acquisition and despoliation all along? If so, then perhaps Turner is correct, 
and the work of remediative artists and landscape architects truly is an 
improvement on the original destiny of such sites.  
Unfortunately, Turner’s claim seems preposterous at best, and truly 
dangerous at worst. The profoundly contingent configuration of agencies, 
individuals, and histories that constitute a landscape is not a projection of our 
destiny, nor the conflation of all destinies into one greater “destiny of place.” It is not 
the teleological march toward a final state of completion or else obsolescence, nor is 
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it the realization of an intention that preexisted the landscape and guides its 
development. Instead, it is simply a landscape; i.e.; a specific place in western 
Pennsylvania, with mineral histories linking it to the Carboniferous era, plant and 
animal inhabitants making do and making their way in the protean world-at-large, 
and humans dwelling among and in tandem with a glut of other (co)narratives. Jim 
Cheney, whose notion of postmodern environmental narrative is deeply indebted to 
the philosophy of bioregionalism, knows this intimately: “Our position, our location, 
is understood in the elaboration of relations in a nonessentializing narrative 
achieved through a grounding in the geography in our lives. Self and geography are 
bound together in a narrative which locates us in the moral space of defining 
relations” (31). Relations, destinies, are thus defined, rather than discovered; co-
authored, rather than granted. To paraphrase Nietzsche, the deed produces the 
doer, almost as an afterthought.  
AMD&ART, while attempting to ameliorate a devastating environmental 
problem, is not attempting to return Vintondale to an idealized state. The designers 
of the site seem to have acknowledged that this prospect, while aesthetically 
intriguing, is infeasible when coupled with the practical aims of treating AMD-laden 
water. Vintondale does not need a patch or two more of second-growth hemlock and 
deciduous woodland, á la Time Landscape. What Vintondale needs is AMD&ART: a 
lease on a cleaner, more pristine future. If this necessitates the prolonged, overt 
presence of an artwork on the landscape, it seems that the artists, planners and 
designers are willing to make compromises on ideological purity, both in the 
spheres of art and of technology, to negotiate a successful water-treatment strategy: 
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“We [the AMD&ART team] spent long months being too environmental for the arts 
funders and too artsy for the environmental funders,” (“Science” 66) muses Comp in 
an essay completed after the site became operational.   
Lessons and Considerations 
The dichotomy between arts funding and environmental funding—an 
economically-skewed version of some general tensions understood to operate 
within the sphere of land art—is precisely the sort of definitional jockeying for 
accessibility and transparency that has come to define and delimit the possibilities 
for artists working in public art contexts. Indeed, we return in this moment to the 
discussion of “nature” as a contested domain, for in this register we again find a 
series of polarized interpretations vying for dominance in the narrative of the site.  
AMD&ART as I have described it thus far is obviously an effective, functional piece of 
environmental remediative technology. It has also proven plausible that a critic 
might attempt to view the site as a whole as an aesthetic response to environmental 
degradation, rather than simply an “art park” where sculptures co-exist in a bucolic 
setting. Both of these formulations hinge upon the acknowledgement that 
AMD&ART—a vibrant, material entity—is actively interacting with its environment, 
as well as the people of the town.  
It is my hope that I have made clear how truly murky the distinction 
between, in this case, art and science (broadly, culture and nature) becomes when 
discussing a site such as AMD&ART. These types of art-objects trouble an easy 
categorization of “art” or “science” or “culture.” The value of conceptualizing 
AMD&ART as an argument for regarding “ecological art” as the site of a complex 
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negotiation regarding values and relational dynamics is that AMD&ART is concerned 
with local phenomena. It is not just “nature” broadly that is being contested, but a 
vision of nature for Vintondale, in the Allegheny Mountains, tied to the history of the 
land and its inhabitants. The attitude of Comp, et al., inferred from the site to be 
something of a modest gesture, suggests the following: the role of humans in the 
history and present state of Vintondale and similar communities is to be ignored at 
the peril of the artwork; nor can the role of the non-human players in the scenario 
(ranging in scale from microbes to mountainsides) be ignored or taken for granted.  
To move beyond this definitional and attitudinal hubbub however, to truly 
plunge into the heart of the matter at the AMD&ART site, I feel compelled in closing 
to make a case not for a grandiose narrativization of the site as either a stunning 
example of remediative artistry, or else a failed attempt at integrating art into a 
damaged landscape. Instead, I think it important to acknowledge what it is that the 
site produces, aside from clean water: subjective experiences for its visitors, and an 
avenue into the relations and history of the Allegheny Mountains themselves. 
AMD&ART is the site of surprising and often unexpected instances of serendipitous, 
unique visitor experiences: it is still, after all, slowly transitioning back into a wilder 
place. By “wilder” I do not simply mean a place less regularly trod by man, a 
wilderness; if anything, more people visit the site now than ever before. Instead, I 
take my understanding of wildness from nature writer David Gessner:  
"In wildness is the preservation of the world," wrote Thoreau, but 
people often get the quote wrong and use "wilderness" instead. While 
wilderness might be untrammeled land along the Alaskan coast, 
wildness can happen anywhere — in the jungle or your backyard. And 
it's not just a place; it's a feeling. It rises up when you least expect it 
(n.p.). 
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This is the amorphous, unmeasurable contribution of AMD&ART to the community 
of Vintondale and to me every time I visit the site: it is stumbling upon a muskrat 
crossing the bicycle path as it heads into the constructed wetlands and feeling the 
involuntary animal reaction of my body as it stiffens in shock. It is recoiling at the 
stench of the rotting cattails and sweating out in the open sunlight of the ballpark. It 
is the thrill of knowing that each visit to AMD&ART will be different, noticeably so, 
from the last—an experience and a promise that few pieces of art housed in 
galleries and museums can offer up to their audiences. AMD&ART, by offering up a 
space for the wild to emerge and thrive in subjective experience, reminds us of the 
link drawn between wildness and freedom by Gary Snyder: “To be truly free one 
must take on the basic conditions as they are—painful, impermanent, open, 
imperfect—and then be grateful for impermanence and the freedom it grants us” 
(5). The site at Vintondale, once poisoned and unloved, has been repurposed to 
precisely this aim: reminding those who visit that it is impermanence—the potential 
for moving our present toward a mutually imagined vision of betterment—that has 
given this patch of ground, this mountain stream, and this neglected town a chance 
to refashion itself in light the ethics and values of a new era.   
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Chapter Three 
“Make Something Indeterminate, Which Always Looks Different, The Shape of 
Which Cannot Be Predicted Precisely”3: AMD&ART as System and Network 
 
 The preceding chapter laid out a framework for assessing AMD&ART from 
the perspective of land art and elucidated many of the aesthetic concerns ascribed 
to the site by its creators. There are other tendencies within contemporary artistic 
expression, however, whose tenets and practices serve to shed light upon the 
intricacies of AMD&ART: systems art and network art. In this chapter, I make use of 
systems theory and network theory to highlight the degree to which critics and 
spectators alike must examine the AMD&ART site. AMD&ART is not a neatly bounded 
art-object that can be hung on a wall or contained within a gallery. It is an aesthetic 
environment of possibility into which myriad agents enter and interact. Accounting 
for the conditions of this potential is the goal of this chapter.  
 The first portion of this chapter examines the genesis and history of “systems 
art” and its forbear, “Systems Theory.” Systems theory is a philosophical and 
practical approach to research that emphasizes the interconnectedness and 
codependence of phenomena. As a heuristic trope, the “system” has become 
influential across an array of fields, including aesthetics. During the boom in 
Conceptual Art during the 1950s and 1960s, various artists—chief among them 
German artist Hans Haacke—became enthralled with the notion of utilizing systems 
theory as an impetus for creative expression. Haacke’s systems art serves this study 
as an exemplar of the systems art style, and provides a useful example of the style 
for my examination of AMD&ART as systems art.  
                                                        
3 Haacke (“Untitled Statement” 37) 
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 The second portion of this chapter expands upon the tendency in systems art 
to lay claim to extant systems as “artworks.” A fairly common approach to art 
making that is employed by systems artists is to declare existing systems artworks 
of their own making. For example, the art collective Critical Art Ensemble is 
infamous for their aesthetic work with transgenic E. Coli bacteria. The bacteria were 
produced by CAE for the exhibition GenTerra 2001-2003, as a means of engaging 
conversations about the outcome of creating self-replicating, autonomous 
recombinant organisms. Damien Hirst, perhaps the most famous artist of the 1990s, 
utilized and claimed the decomposition of a cow’s head by maggots as his own in A 
Thousand Years (1991). Beyond the realm of organic systems, other artists have 
used art to highlight and examine the systems of production whereby their careers 
were made possible. This is the case, for instance, in Bruce Nauman’s Raw Materials 
(2004-2005) show at the Tate Modern, which was an audio retrospective of his 
career.  These artworks draw upon the logic of the “readymade”: the nomination of 
an everyday object to the status of art, by means of avowal: “This object is my art, 
because I say so.” Marcel Duchamp, the French artist and provocateur by whom the 
readymade—as a style of cultural and material appropriation—was first utilized, 
has a long and storied history in a particular genealogy of contemporary avant-
garde artistry. I explicate the act of nominating a readymade in my discussion of 
AMD&ART because it offers a perspective on aesthetic objects that is beholden to a 
conceptual doubling. The artistic quality of the readymade depends, to some extent, 
upon the contrast of its status as “mundane object” and its new status as “art object.” 
In this sense, it is a space where both designations must exist. Similarly, AMD&ART is 
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a material and conceptual environment in which the designations of “nature” and 
“culture” must both exist and be fused, in order for its aesthetic merit to become 
apparent.  
 The final element of this chapter is a discussion of AMD&ART as a profoundly 
complex, participatory readymade. While systems theory provides a neat 
framework for understanding the complex flows of affect and materials that 
characterize a site such as AMD&ART, it is insufficiently ambitious in its efforts to 
provide a truly comprehensive evaluative model. Network theory, whose literature 
provides a series of clues as to the shocking complexity of an art/environment like 
AMD&ART, provides the final, if daunting, assessment of the site: AMD&ART is an 
exercise in imbricating the viewer into a co-constitutive, performative relationship. 
It is co-constitutive in the sense that the readymade requires a participant observer 
in order to act as a site of rendezvous between different interpretations of the object 
that has been nominated. It is performative in the sense that the production of that 
environment of semiotic and material possibility is dependent upon the affective 
contributions of participant entities in order to unfold.     
By radically increasing the complexity of a seemingly straightforward work 
of environmental art, I have provided with this chapter a glimpse at the possibilities 
offered by an aesthetic that glorifies a nature/culture muddling. There are lessons to 
be grasped in the case of AMD&ART that go beyond facile reminders not to pollute, 
and to protect our waterways. By focusing on the inclusive dynamism of the site, its 
systemic character and the relationships of participant actors, I have thrown into 
question the perceptual framework that haunts so much art criticism: critical 
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distance. Distance has its roots in a very different understanding of the relationship 
between art and life than the one that I believe informs AMD&ART. It is the assumed 
position of structuralist criticism, in which the artwork represents a key to a larger 
hidden interpretive reality. My analysis breaks with structuralist aesthetic criticism, 
which is an important philosophical milestone for this study. Clarifying this matter 
will put into motion the major philosophical discussions of this chapter. 
Structuralism, as the name implies, proceeds from the assumption that the 
features of existence—particularly culture—exist as they do because of an 
underlying “deep” internal structure. This structure organizes and exerts influence 
on the manifestation of different facets of culture by means of conventionalized 
precedence. Structuralist critics view language, for example, as a system of 
communication with a series of fundamental rules that have been given consistency 
by virtue of historical precedence. Ferdinand Saussure makes an analogy between 
chess and language that is illustrative:  
In chess, what is external can be separated relatively easily from what 
is internal. The fact that game passed from Persia to Europe is 
external; against that, everything having to do with its system and 
rules is internal. If I used ivory chessmen instead of wooden ones, the 
change has no effect on the system; but if I decrease or increase the 
number of chessmen, this change has a profound effect on the 
‘grammar’ of the game…everything that changes the system in any 
way is internal (23). 
 
As in chess, the “grammar” of language preexists as a structure that gives cohesion 
to the phonemes and utterances of a speaker, while allowing the speaker room for 
improvisational meaning making. The deep structure is, in essence, the “rules” that 
must be followed for a system of communication to be considered a language: 
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Saussure’s insight about the apparent division between that which is a 
structural grammar (a conventionalized pattern of action and socially-constructed 
protocol) and the effect of that conventionalized protocol (langue and parole, 
respectively) results in his most famous insight: the relationship between signifier 
and signified. This dynamic—the signifier is a culturally-specific representation of 
an object (the signified) that has no necessary relationship to the signified, beyond 
convention—is important for my study because it acknowledges the importance of 
critical distance in a structuralist aesthetics. For Saussure (as well as Jean Piaget, 
Claude Levi-Strauss and other structuralists in various disciplines) the existence of 
the “deep” structures of culture are revealed by their effects. Examining languages 
leads one back to the “rules” of all languages, whereas examining aesthetic objects 
leads one back to the “rules” of aesthetic beauty and content. Aesthetic objects, in 
this view, are the result of preexisting grammars of value and beauty that are the 
separate antecedents to the object.  
Saussure was not the first to suggest that a mental distance characterizes the 
relationship between the art object and its reception. A similar view is present in the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, who asserted that a certain distance must be 
maintained between an artwork and its viewer, so as to allow the viewer to 
adequately assess the artwork’s “beauty.” As Donald Crawford puts it, “experiencing 
beauty is thus, for Kant, a doubly reflective process. We reflect on the spatial and 
temporal form of the object by exercising our powers of judgement [sic] 
(imagination and understanding), and we acknowledge the beauty of an object 
when we come to be aware through the feeling of pleasure of the harmony of these 
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faculties, which awareness comes by reflecting on our own mental states” (58). This 
type of “reflective process” is a precursor to structuralist criticism because 
“beauty”—which is a Kantian expression of artistic validity—is the external 
confirmation of an internal mental state. In other words, form is a manifestation of 
the universal “grammar” of aesthetic beauty.  
While this line of reasoning may seem outlandish, it is precisely the thinking 
that characterizes many twentieth-century artists and critics. Clement Greenberg 
and Michael Fried (whom I discussed in the previous chapter), for instance, 
championed this idea at midcentury. The Modernist ideal of a contemplative 
spectator remaining distant from the aesthetic object is apparent when they criticize 
“theatrical” artworks as aggressive or demanding. Instead of an “anthropomorphic 
art” (Fried 129) that makes the spectator aware of their presence or body, Fried 
would have an art that is thoroughly distant from the bodily experience of the 
spectator, and is regarded via the mental faculties. This isolation produces the sort 
of purity and autonomy that characterizes the Kantian view of aesthetics: a mental 
art-space through which the spectator may roam unburdened. In this pure “mental” 
space, the Greenbergian demand that each generation of aesthetic expression more 
thoroughly refine those elements that are its sole purview makes a strange sort of 
sense. The paintings of Mark Rothko, for example, demonstrate the “external” 
idiosyncrasies of color choice and color-block form, which reveal the specific 
“internal” grammatical attributes of painting: two-dimensional flatness, 
complementarities of color, medium-specific techniques, to name a few.  
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This chapter of my analysis is a break with structuralist aesthetics, 
particularly the notion of critical distance. AMD&ART, as I describe it, proceeds from 
the assumption that entities, processes, and visitors alike are constitutive parts of 
the artwork. While AMD&ART might be viewed as conforming to certain conventions 
associated with land art (as discussed in the prior chapter), these conventions do 
not explain the moment-by-moment unfolding of AMD&ART. In particular, my 
characterization of AMD&ART as an art “environment” makes the notion of critical 
distance less applicable. An immersive art—one into which the audience enters, and 
with which the audience interacts—undoes the binary between object and observer 
and collapses critical distance. My characterization of AMD&ART as a network 
makes it particularly unfit for description via structuralist analysis. Structuralism 
assumes that there is some fundamental, preexisting grammar that is being partially 
represented by an artwork. Networks are not “things” or “wholes” in the sense that 
they preexist, however. Networks such as AMD&ART do not preexist, and in fact 
appear newly minted in each moment, their apparent consistency of form and 
function an artifact of repetitious relating. The participant entities, conditions and 
features of AMD&ART change from moment to moment. As critics, we are not simply 
spectators of the AMD&ART object, we are the AMD&ART object, if only 
momentarily. Distance itself, and particularly critical distance, is erased. AMD&ART 
is not hiding any sort of interpretive secret: it is simply what it appears to be, 
necessarily viewed from the inside as a participant in an aesthetic environment.  
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Systems Theory: First-Order and Second-Order Systems as Perspectives 
 Thinking in terms of complex systems of discrete objects is a challenging 
mental exercise. More challenging still is thinking about the systemic nature of the 
objects that comprise the larger system: the system of systems. Such thinking is 
necessary, however, to probe how AMD&ART may exceed an instrumental, 
sculptural dimension. The task of criticism—a perspectival assessment—is 
fundamentally dependent upon our understanding of the systemic nature of the 
whole of the AMD&ART system. 
In order to facilitate the kind of criticism that best represents the 
complexities of AMD&ART, a division must be made between what have been loosely 
termed “first-order systems” and “second order systems.” First-order systems are, 
for all intents and purposes, systems as commonly understood by the layperson: 
configurations of independent elements whose participation, in concert with one 
another, results in an emergent wholeness, particular to a specific aim. This is the 
sense in which “the nervous system” is meant, for example. The nervous system is 
commonly discussed as a constellation of independent elements (dendrites, 
synapses, neurotransmitters and the like) whose functioning contributes 
constitutively to the whole “nervous system,” which then functions to some end 
(information relay).  The limiting of elements in a system suggests that there is a 
distinction to be made between a system and its environment, as a boundary across 
which inputs and outputs travel. 
Systems theorists quickly realized, however, that approaching systems as 
self-evident groupings was an insufficient, shallow examination of the entities 
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themselves: were not, after all, the dendrites of the nervous system systems of their 
own accord? It is, in fact, possible to recognize everything that appeared to be an 
independent entity as a system of its own accord. The documentation of the 
systemic nature of systems, a so-called “second order” systems theory, has emerged 
and flourished in the wake of the technological and philosophical developments of 
the last twenty years.  
 The thinking of first-order systems and second-order systems is a 
perspectival assessment of any given system. Francisco Varela addresses the 
importance of the observer’s cognitive perspective on their assessment of a system 
and its boundaries, suggesting two possible modes of conceptualizing the unity of a 
system: a “behavioral” view and a “recursive” view. On one hand, the behavioral 
point of view, “reduces a system to its input-output performance or behavior, and 
reduces the environment to inputs to the system" while the "effect of outputs on 
environment is not taken into account” (Varela 86). The behavioral view is the logic 
of linear inputs and outputs, focused on the environment and based upon the 
assumption that it is possible to comprehend clearly and completely the necessary 
inputs to perpetuate the system, while paying little regard to the outputs that result 
from the system’s functioning. In Varela’s terms, this system is a “simple unity.” It is 
simple in that it appears to exist as a united system that continues to remain 
constant as long as its constituent parts and necessary inputs remain.   
The recursive point of view, on the other hand, “emphasizes the mutual 
interconnectedness of its components” and “arises when emphasis is placed on the 
system’s internal structure” (Varela 86). In the case of the recursive view, the 
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environment is not the object of an observer’s focus for purely instrumental 
reasons: it is rather the operations within the system, the constituent elements of 
which are viewed as simple unities whose interactions form the system itself, 
without any consideration for the linear logic of input/output. I will return 
momentarily to the importance of this relationship between an observer and the 
system in question.  
The word “recursive” serves as clue to perhaps the most fundamental of 
second-order systems theory’s assumptions about the nature of systems: they are 
autopoietic, and demonstrate “operational closure.” Autopoiesis (autos [“self”] and 
poiesis [“production”]) is a term introduced by Chilean biologists Humberto 
Maturana and Francisco Varela to describe the operations of a system whose 
continuation is predicated on the operations of the system itself; in other words, it is 
a recursive, self-producing production. Maturana and Varela, who applied the term 
“autopoieisis” strictly to living systems, realized this feature of systems while 
attempting to document the process whereby a system such as a cell manufactures 
the necessary chemical elements and repairs its structures so as to maintain its 
place in space. This is not to say that there are not inputs and outputs to the system, 
but simply that the system itself is responsible for its form and behavior, prior to 
these inputs and outputs. An example of this principle is the theory of Darwinian 
evolution. The inputs of an environment on a system (organism) do not shape the 
system (as would be the case in the now-debunked Lamarckian theory of evolution), 
but rather trigger pre-existing effects in the system that render it more or less 
effective at managing environmental stressors. This relationship, between a system 
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and its environment, is referred to as “structural coupling,” and it suggests that a 
non-teleological relationship of plasticity characterizes the relationship between 
two system-structures. It is finally this plasticity that differentiates autopoietic 
systems from “allopoietic” (allo [other]; poiesis [creation]) systems, in that 
allopoietic systems are inflexible. The logic of allopoiesis, where the system does not 
produce the necessary elements for its continued survival but rather some other 
product, means that an allopoietic system is incapable to self-guided plastic 
alteration. The canonical example of an allopoietic system is an automobile 
assembly line, whose function is to produce automobiles, rather than producing 
machines that would be capable of producing their own replacements. As such, an 
assembly line cannot alter its final product without external guidance (in the form of 
information or data from an operator or designer, for example), and is consistently 
dependent on other systems for its continued existence.  
 As I intimated earlier, Maturana and Varela initially conceived of autopoiesis 
in strictly biological terms, and Varela was vocally reticent to apply the concept to 
other types of systems (social, economic, mechanical). John Protevi notes this, 
writing of Varela’s fear that the application of biological logic to social phenomena 
regularly results in eugenics, fascism and authoritianism: “without that possibility of 
novel production [political change], modeled by dynamic systems means, 
autopoietic social systems, once formed and mature, construct a world only in their 
own image and, when locked in conflict with another such system, cannot ascend to 
an ‘observer’ status that would see them both as parts of a larger social system. 
89 
 
Instead, the two conflicting systems are locked in fratricidal combat, producing a 
torn civic body politic and, in turn, civil war” (101).  
Autopoiesis is not, it should be clear, a workable model for a dialectical, 
reciprocal social contract. In its purest conceptual form, autopoiesis describes 
behavior that is too single-minded in focus, too constantly striving for its own 
maintenance. Hence Varela’s (and Protevi’s) fear that a brutal agenda—wherein the 
ends justify the means—might emerge if autopoiesis is taken at face value as a social 
mechanism. In an effort to address this concern, I return now to Varela’s concept of 
perspective, which I feel is too often overlooked by systems theorists. Varela’s 
notion of perspective depends fundamentally on a very simple distinction: does an 
observing entity perceive itself to be a part of the system in question, or not? If the 
former is the case, and the observer maintains the recursive point of view regarding 
their own imbrication in the system, it seems possible that there is a diminution of 
agency in their ability to radically alter the system at large. After all, the system (via 
autopoiesis) constructs the necessary conditions for the observer’s continuation (as 
a simple unity), and the destruction or alteration of the system may result in the 
cessation of necessary resources or conditions. On the other hand, if the observer 
perceives their position to be autonomous of the social system in question—
perhaps able to reap its rewards or bear its burdens—but not actively involved in 
the operations of the system, it appears that agency is once again diminished, by 
virtue of the observer’s isolation from the conditions of production and 
maintenance. This double-bind is precisely the condition against which Protevi 
warns would-be social systems theorists who would deploy an “observational” 
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rather than a participatory model. Agency must factor into the equation, including 
the capacity to halt autopoiesis.  
Autopoiesis and Authorship in Systems Art 
Protevi’s concern with the participation associated with systems theory is an 
overlooked component of the logic of systems art. While “observation” has been 
understood to be a component of major trends in twentieth century art (including 
the sculptural land art that began the last chapter), systems art very carefully 
negotiates this relationship, and troubles the neat separation of observation and 
participation.  “Systems Art,” or “systems esthetics,” as Jack Burnham originally 
characterized the style, represents one of the fundamental shifts toward a 
participatory impulse in contemporary art. Burnham’s 1968 article “Systems 
Esthetics” offers the first comprehensive vision of what had, by that point, become a 
distinct presence in the more forward-thinking galleries of New York. “We are now,” 
Burnham writes, “in transition from an object-oriented to a systems-oriented culture. 
Here change emanates, not from things, but from the way things are done” (30).  As 
such, systems artists, chief among them Hans Haacke, began constructing or 
appropriating entire constellations of phenomena not for their formal appearance, 
but rather for their operations. Burnham continues, “the specific function of modern 
didactic art has been to show that art does not reside in material entities, but in 
relations between people and between people and the components of their 
environment” (Burnham 31).  The early works of Hans Haacke (1963-1972) serve as 
a helpful means of discussing this relationship between artist, system and audience, 
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and will illuminate a number of the more conceptually challenging elements of 
AMD&ART with regards to a systems perspective.  
     Hans Haacke, originally a painter and printmaker, began experimenting with 
proto-systems art in the early 1960s. Column with Two Immiscible Liquids (1964) 
and Wave (1964) were sealed acrylic containers in which liquids were housed, 
whose “operation,” as it were, was dependent upon direct involvement from the 
observer: Column with Two Immiscible Liquids is filled with two liquids of different 
specific gravities, which mix as the container is handled and then sort themselves 
according to their density once the container is set down. Wave transferred the 
tilting motion of the acrylic housing to the liquid inside, which created a wave that 
traveled up the length of the box and back down.  Haacke called these works “event-
containers,” and they were the first inklings of the complex webs of affect and 
interaction that would define his later systems. The event-containers are bluntly 
systemic in two ways. They are interactive, which suggests that their autonomy as 
art objects is in question. This is in keeping with Jack Burnham’s assessment of 
systems art as focused on the means whereby things (aesthetic expression) are 
“done.”  Furthermore, while necessarily interactive, they are to some extent immune 
from considerations as representational art by virtue of their mundane 
construction: they are, after all, just liquids in a box. I read their mundane 
countenance, which is in direct contrast to their lively relational aspect, as evidence 
of autopoietic closure that has little to do with “meaning,” and much to do with the 
ephemeral effects of structural coupling. In Haacke’s Condensation Cube (1965), 
arguably his most famous event-container, an example of this ephemeral structural 
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coupling is made visible in the form of water-droplets that condense on the inside 
walls of a Perspex cube.  The ambient air temperature in the room determines the 
extent to which the water contained within the cube sublimates and recondenses. 
Temperature change, in the tightly controlled environment of an art gallery, occurs 
primarily because of the number of warm bodies present in the room, as well as the 
amount of light entering the space. In other words, the more individuals are present 
viewing the cube, the more rapidly condensation occurs. The water inside the cube 
and the gallery-goers are structurally coupled, if we understand this system to be 
producing not only physical alteration within the cube, but an additional 
dematerialized aesthetic of reciprocal interaction as emergent condition. It is the 
causal, reciprocal relationship between viewer and cube that constitutes the artistic 
“system” in question.  
 Haake’s cultivation of an ephemeral art such as “the relationship between a 
viewer and a cube” is in keeping with a general trend in systems art to privilege the 
operation of the system rather than the constituent elements of the system.  Lucy 
Lippard and John Chandler, whose 1968 article “The Dematerialization of Art” 
brought the notion of “dematerialized” art to the fore, write that many artists of the 
mid-1960s were losing interest in the physical achievement of an object’s form. 
Instead of a craft-based approach to aesthetic creation, Lippard and Chandler 
foresaw a transition to an artistry that was scientific and post-aesthetic. This final, 
projected stage of the historical evolution of art “will make possible the 
manufacture, distribution and consumption of a perfect art product and will be 
characterized by a fusion of the art forms and materials, and, finally, a 
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‘disintegration of art,’ the ‘abstraction and liberation of the idea’”(47). While Lippard 
and Chandler acknowledge that artists will perhaps never reach this point, their 
assertion that the abstraction and liberation of the idea is a goal of conceptual and 
systems art is spot-on. While Haacke’s later systems become more technically 
complex and aesthetically daring, they retain a tendency drawn from Conceptual Art 
to focus on producing an art idea rather than an art object. This art/idea may prove 
to be the very rudiment of systems art, that thing which begets further artistic 
exploration, and thereby demonstrates its legitimacy as an aesthetic mode. 
Accepting this assertion goes a long way to answering one of the lingering questions 
of systems art: is systems art itself a system, and if so, how does it autopoietically 
maintain its own viability and demonstrate operational closure (boundary 
production)?  
 Haacke’s later systems works, as I have mentioned, demonstrate 
substantially more complex and nuanced understandings of systems theory than his 
“event-containers.”  They also begin to drift into working with the “natural” systems 
that constitute AMD&ART: stones, rocks, sprays of water and ice, living creatures. 
Some of Haacke’s works, such as Grass Grows (1969)—a mound of earth sowed with 
winter wheat and annual rye—demonstrate Haacke’s concern with the transfer of 
energy and information across systems. Haacke spoke about Grass Grows during a 
symposium on earth art at Cornell University in 1969. In the case of Grass Grows, 
Haacke stressed that he was examining “growth as a phenomenon which is 
something that is outside the realm of forms, composition, etc., and has to do with 
interaction of forces and interaction of energies and information” (Smithson 180). 
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Haacke produced other plant-based works, such as Grass Cube (1967) and Directed 
Growth (1970-1972), each of which examined similar principles of energy 
harnessing and systemic interaction.  Walter Grasskamp suggests that this notion of 
energy is integral to understanding Haacke’s works of this era: “The works created 
in the 1960s could be categorized in terms of the physical energy they harnessed or 
consumed. Haacke himself began to call them 'Real-Time Systems' from around 
1966 on. Thus he stressed the fact common to all, that the energies and the 
materials used for these works of art and their functioning as a system of 
interrelated elements existed independent of the viewer and the interpretations an 
audience would bring to them” (41). Thus, it was energy transformation that was 
Haacke’s focus, rather than, say, the plants or animals in pieces such as Ten Turtles 
Set Free (1970).  
In Haacke’s work, it was transformation (both growth and decay) which 
made apparent the operations of autopoietic systems: the grass on a lump of earth 
perpetuates itself, subject to structurally-coupled interactions with its environment, 
and in doing so the grass subverts the common attributions to the artist of 
intentionality and material mastery. Haacke’s drift toward systems that could 
conceivably persist perpetually would characterize his later systems works, 
including a work whose similarity to the stated goals of AMD&ART makes it worth 
mentioning: Rheinwasseraufbereitungsanlage (Rhine Water Purification Plant) 
(1972). 
Haacke produced Rhine Water Purification Plant as a response to the 
pollution of the Rhine River by a municipal sewage treatment plant in Krefeld, 
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Germany. The piece is composed of a series of chemical treatments and filters that 
restore polluted water drawn from the Rhine to a sufficient quality that it could be 
reintroduced into the river. Once treated, the water flowed into a large acrylic tank 
that housed goldfish, and the overflow was introduced into the garden of the gallery 
where Haacke’s treatment system was located.    
Rhine Water Purification Plant was intended to bring to light the questionable 
practices of the German industrial complex whose pollution had rendered the Rhine 
toxic, while simultaneously offering a galleried meditation on the problems of water 
pollution. The parallels between Rhine Water Purification Plant and AMD&ART are 
hard to miss, as they both espouse the goal of water purification through a non-
representational aesthetic treatment system. Beyond a concern for water quality 
however, Rhine Water Purification Plant and AMD&ART seem to be very different 
entities in my estimation. Whereas Haacke’s work is small, compact, and ultimately 
about demonstrating the feasibility of a system to clean the earth, AMD&ART is a 
massively complex array of participant entities that far exceeds the neat gallery 
display of the Rhine Water Purification Plant. The goldfish in Haacke’s treatment 
system, for example, are there primarily to act as a visual marker of the cleanliness 
of the water. They do not reproduce in the tank, nor are they expected to survive 
there indefinitely. The creatures at/in AMD&ART, however, are playing out the 
whole of their complex lives enmeshed in, and of, the AMD&ART system. They are 
systems within systems that contribute to the whole. In this way, AMD&ART is a 
grander, more fully systematized vision of systems art than Rhine Water Purification 
Plant could ever hope to achieve.  
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AMD&ART: A Systems Art Perspective  
 AMD&ART is clearly a system composed of many systems: the form of the 
pools, for example, is prescribed by the depth of water that  cattails need to grow, 
die, and settle to the bottom. In their decay, they provide a substrate for the bacteria 
whose processes remove oxygen from the water and prevent iron deposition. 
Tracing the wildly numerous relationships between systems, in all of their myriad 
forms and functions, is a daunting challenge, and it would do little to explain the 
functioning of the site as a whole. After all, it is not the operations of the individual 
“simple unities” that constitute the functionality of a system, but rather the 
emergent autopoietic whole that demonstrates the functionality of the AMD&ART 
process.  
In order to consider AMD&ART from a recursive, systemic perspective, it is 
necessary to isolate a moment of the system’s functioning. This step is necessary 
because once the notion of systemic causation is invoked it becomes tempting to 
retroactively assign systemic participation to prior elements of the system that have 
since faded away. The old “beehive” ovens used for making coke (clean-burning fuel 
produced from bituminous coal) that were present on the site of AMD&ART, for 
example, are undoubtedly part of the reason that the mining operations existed, and 
therefore, might be thought of as part of the constellation of simple unities present 
within the AMD&ART system. This line of reasoning is a slippery slope, however, one 
that quickly spirals out of control and begs the question of where to draw the 
boundaries of any one system as opposed to another. Systems routinely encounter 
this problem, and the temporal “event” is one strategy whereby autopoietic systems 
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limit the amount of novelty and complexity to which they are subject, so as to prove 
capable of boundary-making processes.  
 The winnowing of potential simple unities for inclusion into a system is the 
underlying logic of Haacke’s assertion that a constructed system, such as AMD&ART, 
might have a series of interdependent physical elements united under a “joint 
purpose.” This purpose, in other words, becomes a conceptual litmus test of the 
merit of including any particular element within the purview of the system: does it, 
in the case of AMD&ART, somehow aid in purifying the water? On a more complex, 
recursive level, is the element directly produced by AMD&ART, and does its 
presence contribute directly to the continued existence of AMD&ART?  
 A quick assessment of the elements necessary for AMD&ART’s systemic 
“purpose” produces a by-now familiar cast of characters: the acid mine drainage 
(complete with extremophile bacteria), the holding pools, the limestone slabs for 
neutralizing acidity, the marsh vegetation, the aerobic and anaerobic bacteria 
present in the mire at the bottom of the pools. Elements of the site are a model of 
autopoiesis, as well: the water flowing out of the mine (which is itself a constantly 
replenishing system of extremophile bacteria devouring pyrite, which in turn 
produces acid, which in turn exposes further pyrite deposits, all the while being 
replenished with new groundwater) nourishes the plant materials of the site, whose 
eventual death and decay aid in purifying the water and provide a substrate and 
nutrient load upon which their offspring may germinate and thrive. The site will, to 
some extent, regenerate and maintain its capacity for purifying acid-laden water 
over time.  
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AMD&ART, as a system, will not persist indefinitely, however. A “Strategic 
Alkalinity Producing System” such as AMD&ART is a combination of self-renewing 
and manually maintained elements. The limestone slab, for example, will slowly 
become clogged by deposited mineral residue and will eventually dissolve entirely. 
Once this slab vanishes, the capacity of the site to neutralize the acidity of the AMD 
will be greatly diminished. AMD&ART must, for this reason, be considered a system 
of systems: some autopoietic, some allopoietic. The same boundary-making 
declaration that led Hans Haacke to declare a group of seagulls a live airborne 
system in Live Random Airborne Systems (1968) have been mobilized by the 
AMD&ART team to impose “common sense” boundaries on the system: 
geographical, temporal, functional telos-driven criteria. When considering the 
boundaries of the AMD&ART system, one is typically left to negotiate closure with 
the materials, histories and dynamics one finds at the site. While other unseen 
agents may be at work on the site (sweeping trends in climate, economic and 
cultural shifts), the role of perspective in regarding systems suggests that as viewers 
(and participant systems), we are left to engage with what is present at the site 
during our assessment. 
Systems Art and the Readymade: Material and Immaterial Skill 
 The assumption that the AMD&ART system is to be understood as “that which 
is present and effective” segues nicely into the idea that AMD&ART is an enormous, 
participatory readymade. The logic of Duchamp’s readymade resides at the very 
core of systems art’s methodology. The exemplary readymade is "an ordinary object 
elevated to the dignity of a work of art by the mere choice of an artist" (Breton and 
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Elúard 328). This useful and concise definition of the readymade, while most likely 
the work of André Breton rather than Duchamp, offers an established avenue 
whereby AMD&ART can be understood as an aesthetic system as well as a natural 
system.  
 The readymade, as an artistic gesture, is an inherently doubled object: it has 
a dual aspect, both quotidian and avowedly aesthetic. The process of elevating an 
object to the status of a readymade is the means whereby this doubling occurs. John 
Roberts, examining this conceptual operation, has dubbed the productive act of 
nominating an object to readymade status “copying without copying.” Roberts 
asserts that this “doubling” is a type of reproduction, and that “reproduction 
becomes a form of creative re-presentation, or reenactment, insofar as it brings the 
thing reproduced to life, or rather, releases it from its previous identity” (16). What 
is evident from Roberts’ assertion is that nominating the readymade is a generative 
moment, one that differentiates the readymade object from its mundane (albeit 
identical) aspect (hence “copying without copying”). The “production” of a 
readymade is less a question of formal or technical achievement and more explicitly 
an exercise in the conceptual redefinition and appropriation common to avant-
garde art throughout the course of the twentieth century. The newly wrought 
conceptual identity of a readymade object thereby becomes the focus of sustained 
inquiry by critics and audiences, diminishing the importance of the physical 
attributes of the object in question.  
 One consequence of a shift of spectatorial attention toward a relatively 
consistent conceptual operation, as opposed to the particularities of the object at 
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hand, is that the readymade appears to represent the “deskilling” of art. At first 
glance, the traditional marks of artistic excellence (linked inextricably with the 
notion of “skill”) are absent from the readymade: it is not unique, irreproducible or 
unprecedented, nor is it the work of a singularly dexterous individual or group of 
individuals. In fact, it needn’t necessarily be a thing created at all; it might be a found 
object (a seed, a mountain, a galaxy) and fall under the category of “readymade” via 
the same conceptual operation of “copying without copying.”  
 With this deskilling in mind, it may appear that the readymade represents the 
nihilistic endpoint of art-practice, the conceptual devastation of artistic skill as 
indication of aesthetic value, and the surest sign of an “art is anything” laxness 
pervading contemporary practice. This line of thought is the result of a 
commonplace attribution of “artistic skill” to individuals who demonstrate manual 
dexterity. This unnecessarily narrow definition of artistic skill is precisely that 
which is intimated by those who would bemoan the coming to pass of the 
readymade, conceptual art, abstract expressionism, and a whole host of non-
representational artistic practices. The readymade, rather than relying on an artist’s 
ability to work skillfully with materials (wood, paint, fiber, glass, etc.), relies on the 
artist’s to demonstrate conceptual skills (juxtaposition, irony, recategorization). The 
readymade is thus not “deskilled” or without-skill at all—it is simply differently 
skilled than traditional craft practices. The relationship between an artistic skill 
defined by manual dexterity and one defined by mental dexterity is strikingly 
consistent with the traditional understanding of the aims of “artistic skill” more 
broadly: a novel transformation of materials, via some process of refining or 
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alteration, so as to produce a heretofore unprecedented aesthetic experience in 
audiences. In the case of the readymade, the conceptual “skill” demonstrated by 
artists employing the technique invariably manifests as at least one fundamental 
process of alteration to the readymade object in question: artists orchestrate its 
transition from the realm of valuation and labor (as evidenced by an object’s 
exchange value on the commodity market) to the representational arena of art. This 
confounding ontological ambiguity between the readymade object as a mundane 
commodity object and as an art object is precisely the emergent conceptual terrain 
blazed by Duchamp. Duchamp was well aware of this resultant morass of conceptual 
confusion, referring to the readymade as a site of “rendezvous” for competing 
notions of authorship and value. Roberts notes this tension within the readymade:  
By submitting itself to aesthetic judgment (and thereby losing its 
objective status as productive labor) the readymade's original sign-value 
is made subordinate to other sign-values. Original sign-value and other 
sign-values establish a hermeneutic bond; or, to be more precise, a 
hermeneutic triangulation. The readymade's empirical form as a 
particular kind of common object is conjoined with its conceptual 
identity as a form of productive and alienated labour, and with its 
subjective identity as a sign of non-alienated and immaterial artistic 
labour. (51)4 
                                                        
4 It is worth examing here, momentarily, the possibility for artists working in the 
readymade form to declare a “cultural” object “natural” (a “naturemade,” perhaps?). 
As per the theory of tripartite rendezvous laid out by Roberts, we might consider, 
for instance, the automobile. First, it retains its form as a manmade object, produced 
in a factory according to willfully designed specifications. Second, the car retains its 
conceptual identity as a semiotically-loaded entity: it is a symbol of production, of 
labor, of freedom, and a host of other associated concepts. Finally, the car must be 
placed into the conceptual space of “nature.” While this is a challenging—and 
ultimately uroboric—attempt to discern which elements of nature are “natural” and 
which are “cultural,” for the sake of simplicity I will momentarily revert to the 
commonplace understanding of “nature”: the material and processes of the world 
which exclude humanity, precede human existence, function without our input, and 
ultimately will persist after our demise. In this sense, the car is understood to be a 
“natural” object in that it is, in fact, mostly just a large rock: aluminum, iron, carbon, 
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This entry into the world of art (not forgetting that Duchamp’s Fountain (1917) was 
a literal entry into the Society of Independent Artists’ 1917 exhibition) is evidence of 
the representational capacity granted to the readymade by virtue of the 
aforementioned conceptual skill of the artist. The readymade is indicative of an 
artist’s intentionality, at least insofar as selecting an object and nominating that 
object for readymade status constitutes a token form of artistic intent. This selection 
process reveals that while any object may be declared a readymade, it was a 
particular object among many chosen and nominated into the realm of art. 
Nomination, it seems, is an intrinsically representational prospect, and while the 
readymade does not necessarily represent any one thing in particular (as say, a 
pictorial image might), it does seem to possess the aforementioned capacity to 
represent. Indeed, without this capacity to represent, it could not function as a 
tripartite site of rendezvous, as Roberts previously pointed out. In order to activate 
the competing discourses of commodity value and aesthetic theory, it must 
simultaneously act as “itself” (an objective object) and as a newly minted art object 
(a subjective object). The capacity to represent is what distinguishes the art object 
from the commodity object. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
sandstone (in the form of glass). Beyond this metallic aspect, the majority of the rest 
of the automobile is composed of intensely decomposed organic material, in the 
form of refined crude petroleum. The bumpers, headlights, seatbelts, floormats, 
hoses, and most of the rest are ferns, bark and wood. Whether or not this 
“naturemade” offers to audiences a productive conceptual challenge is difficult to 
surmise. It does remind us of that, behind the veil of semiotics and cultural 
appropriation, we are very much still beholden to working within the confines of the 
natural materials at hand. Where Neolithic man banged and polished rocks, so too 
do we. Ultimately, we come again into the murky space of natureculture via this 
route of inquiry, however, which may speak to the final necessity the natureculture 
thought. Is the car—a highly refined rock and plant mass—a product of culture, or a 
natural object? It is, of course, both. 
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 While “conceptual skill” and other immaterial skills may seemingly be an 
ineffable and oft-overlooked aspect of artistic labor, these skills rise in prominence 
as it becomes clear that the logic of the readymade does, in fact, destroy the basis of 
conventional artistic labor. Concurrent with the demise of conventional artistic 
labor, the readymade weakens claims to the stability and coherence of the 
conventionalized artistic subject. Whether critics and audiences consider the 
displaced authorship of the master/apprentice workshop model or the unified 
singularity of the Modernist author, the readymade introduces radical new forms of 
authorship that exceed an easy ascription of “skill” tied to the production of a novel 
object/entity/scenario. Instead, we should consider the readymade an exercise in 
social dexterity: the uptake of a product of commodity labor, natural and cultural 
processes or traditional artistic creation into the sphere of art, with the 
aforementioned ambiguity about the status of the art object arising from its 
nomination. It is an exercise in social engineering, the readymade serving as the 
point of entry for a dissection of the relationship between mass-
production/craftwork, high/low culture and art/everyday-life, to name a few 
possible avenues of inquiry. Roberts came to a similar conclusion about the effects 
of the readymade on our examination of authorship:  
[it]…releases the hand from the tedium and preposterousness of 
expressive painterly mimeticism, thereby transforming not only what 
the artist produces, but how he or she sees himself as a maker of 
meaning. Author and authorship are re-made through general social 
technique. It is the transformation of the identity of the artist, 
therefore, that is presupposed by the readymade, and that makes the 
dispersal and displacement of authorship and the readymade 
indivisible. (101) 
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This notion of authorial dispersal and displacement via the readymade goes a long 
way toward examining the “art” in AMD&ART.  
 If we presume that AMD&ART is a series of systems (simple unities subsumed 
under the rubric of a larger functional system), we can assume that much of 
AMD&ART is transposed into the world of art by virtue of the previously discussed 
process of nomination. The processes of anaerobic respiration amongst the bacteria, 
the chemical processes of sediment deposition and acid neutralization and all of the 
various elements of the site are doubled, by virtue of their copying-without-copying 
as “AMD&ART.” Were I to suggest that AMD&ART was “created” or “produced” by a 
traditionally defined singular author (T. Allen Comp perhaps, or else the AMD&ART 
group more broadly) I would reify the wholesale elision of various types of 
productive and creative labor whose executors pass unnoticed. The individuals 
driving earthmoving vehicles to clear and grade the site, hydrologists, botanists and 
biologists consulted for their expertise, townsfolk from whom the group drew 
primary source materials for various projects pass unnoticed as so many hirelings of 
the AMD&ART enterprise. By considering the AMD&ART site a series of readymade 
artifacts and processes, we are reminded that the readymade is intrinsically the 
work of multiple hands and that this site too is the work of generations of 
coalminers, environmentalists, plants and creatures. If Duchamp’s Fountain draws 
attention to both Duchamp himself, as well as the nameless factory worker who 
produced the original urinal, AMD&ART goes much further.  
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It is a site whose apparent naturalness—by being nominated to the status of 
readymade art—reveals its very construction at the hands of a vast web of 
individual participants, diffuse and displaced.  
 As with other readymades, we are placed, by the multiple hands of a 
displaced, dispersed author(s) into what Eric Peterson and Kristen Langellier dub a 
“creative double bind” (Peterson and Langellier 242). It is of little surprise that this 
chapter regarding systems theory should engage “double bind theory,” for it was 
Gregory Bateson—an original systems theorist—whose Steps Toward An Ecology of 
Mind first introduced the concept as a sociological condition. Peterson and 
Langellier’s article focuses specifically on the double bind as a moment of creative 
genesis in aesthetics. Their discussion of oral interpretation tracks a series of 
apparent contradictions and paradoxes that performers face due to the expectations 
of live performance—demonstrating spontaneity as well as refined technique, for 
example—and the resulting aesthetic bind (and anxiety) that can arise in the face of 
these conflicting desires.  Rather than being paralyzed by indecision in the face of 
apparently paradoxical demands, however, Peterson and Langellier locate the 
moment as a fertile breeding ground for innovation and discovery. Craig Gingrich-
Philbrook characterizes this response positively, writing, “Successful performance 
responds to such contradiction and paradox combinatorially, embodying an 
emergent position between them rather than indulging in the safety of an either/or 
commitment” (34).  
 An emergent combinatory approach, arising out of the specifics of the context 
in question, is precisely the mode of creativity Peterson and Langellier are 
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advocating. “When meaning is emergent, it cannot be resolved at the level of the 
message” (246), Peterson and Langellier advise, continuing, “text describes a 
multiplicity of messages, and aesthetic text defines a multileveled discourse among 
messages, performer, and audience which locates meaning” (246). Here, Bateson’s 
signature on the notion of the double bind is apparent: aesthetic texts are systems 
(multileveled discourses) of communication. This systematic negotiation is the 
process whereby meaning emerges and is altered, while meaning’s dynamism is 
manifest as aesthetic flexibility and novelty. In short: out of the limitations and 
anxieties of an apparently paradoxical scenario, new insights and aesthetic avenues 
become necessary and apparent.  
 The readymade by its very definition exists at the center of just such a series 
of double binds, most obviously between the distinctions of “art” and “non-art.” The 
notion that a “non-art art” could exist at all, spawning as it did Dada, Surrealism, 
Minimalism, Conceptualism, Performance Art and a whole lineage of twentieth 
century artistic practices, drew legitimacy from Duchamp’s readymade innovation. 
Allan Kaprow, who thoroughly theorized “non-art” throughout the latter half of the 
twentieth-century, writes,  
whatever resembles the Readymade is automatically another 
Readymade. The circle closes: as art is bent on imitating life, life 
imitates art […]. This recreation in art of philosophical and personal 
inquiry, the forces of nature, our transformation of the environment, 
and the tactile and auditory experience of the “electronic age” does 
not arise, as could be supposed, out of renewed interest in the theory 
of art as mimesis. (110)  
 
Rather than mimesis, the readymade (as an object and its double) relates to its 
“other” in a fashion more reminiscent of the doppelgänger than the copy: a fleeting 
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presence, halfway-glanced, and ultimately ungraspable. As the doppelgänger is often 
characterized as an “evil” double, or an uncanny presence, we find a bit of the 
unsettling disorientation that informs my reading of the readymade. The seemingly 
mundane aspect of an object, with which we are familiar in our daily estimation of 
its character, is altered by our encountering of this same object in an art context: “it 
is the old experience that the traditional, the usual and the hereditary is dear and 
familiar to most people, and that they incorporate the new and the unusual with 
mistrust, unease and hostility (misoneism)” (Jentsch 9). It is not that the readymade 
object is unknown; to the contrary, it is precisely because it is well known in its 
quotidian aspect that the doubleness is strange. Jentsch offers a possible reason for 
the strangeness of the readymade to the eyes of the general public, writing, “some 
stirrings of the feelings of psychical uncertainty arise with particular ease either 
when ignorance is very conspicuous or when the subjective perception of vacillation 
is abnormally strong” (10). It is the latter, the perception of vacillation, that arises as 
individuals are confronted with the double bind of the readymade: is it art or not? 
When visitors arrive at the AMD&ART site, are they experiencing nature, or artistic 
culture?  
AMD, Art & AMD&ART: Boundaries and Networks of Art and Nature 
 The act of establishing a creative double bind is finally about negotiating 
conceptual boundaries. In order for an aesthetic event to generate novel responses 
to paradoxical aesthetic demands, those demands must both be entertained 
seriously. If a paradox is to operate as an actual paradox, each potential demand 
requires a contradictory demand to receive an equal level of consideration and 
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attention, without which the paradox unravels as one side is deemed “better” or 
“truer,” or in some other way granted valuation that supersedes the alternate 
demand. AMD&ART, for example, must maintain its distinction as “scientific” or 
“aesthetic,” as well as its competing distinction of “nature” or “culture,” so as to 
function as the tripartite site of rendezvous. This reliance on conceptual boundaries 
is what allows rendezvous to occur, after all: a rendezvous is a meeting, in a 
particular time and place, of expectations and assumptions regarding the ontology 
of the art object, of productive labor, of nature, and of culture. This “meeting,” so to 
speak, stems from the protracted meaning making exercise that is the experience of 
encountering a readymade. The readymade, we might say, harnesses and begins the 
process of “bordering” a particular sort of aesthetic environment: the network.  
   Craig Saper, in his seminal work Networked Art, describes a network as a 
“situation” (ix), a characterization that fits nicely into my framework of aesthetic 
systems. To describe a network as a situation is to declare oneself present within a 
particular context and, consequently, an aspect of that situation. As I have laid out 
earlier in this chapter, imbrications of discrete entities within a framework may 
constitute a system, binding these entities to particular functions within the system 
as per the operative telos of the system in question. Individual cells of living 
organisms (systems in their own right), for example, are conscripted into 
perpetuating the growth and maintenance of the greater body system as they 
maintain themselves. Vascular tissues cannot alter their functioning beyond a 
certain degree without causing widespread system failure, thereby undoing their 
own autopoeisis.  
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 A network, however, is different from a system in precisely this way: a 
network is not beholden to a particular telos. It is less a “process” with a finite goal 
and more an encompassing environment within which things can occur. While 
AMD&ART may be designed with a particular aim, the success or failure in this aim 
does not exhaust the potential aesthetic and subjective richness of the site. Nor does 
the goal of cleansing AMD-laden water account for the other aspects of the site, be 
they aesthetic objects of their own accord (the Mine No. 6 Portal, the Sanborn 
Insurance Company Map mosaic) or incidental and transient elements of the 
network: pedestrians, wild creatures, changes in regional atmospheric conditions 
and the like.  
 Joost van Loon characterizes “network” as a trope, a conceptual “device for 
organizing and conceptualizing non-linear complexity,” and one which “is at odds 
with a basic literary device: the narrative. Network also disrupts our dominant 
vernacular of understanding time, i.e., the chronology” (307). As such, the network 
defies linearity and genealogy, consequently bankrupting an overarching telos. The 
absence of a telos results in a perplexing question, however: how does one know 
where the network “ends,” as it could conceivably go on linking elements together 
forever? Without a teleological goal to guide the delineation of boundaries of the 
network, nearly anything might be included, whether vital or not.  Van Loon writes 
that whereas the structural characteristics of a network “indicate that there are 
limits and boundaries separating what is within from what is beyond the network, 
the ontological status of the network-boundary ('the rim') is unclear. It only when 
we come across problems of accessing networks that we discover that there are 
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boundaries that make inclusions and exclusions” (307). If it is a question of access to 
AMD&ART—causality supposed as a type of access across time—we must be willing 
to incorporate into the fabric of AMD&ART an awareness of the forces which 
maintain and perpetuate the site as a readymade object: historical subsurface 
mining, for example. Similarly, I am willing to grant inclusion into the network to 
those entities present on the site, however fleetingly: the bicyclists on the trail that 
skirts the ponds, migratory birds, and long-term residents of Vintondale, human and 
otherwise. Indeed, if it is presence that merits inclusion into the network, the very 
ground upon which visitors tread must be included, as do the mechanisms used in 
the creation of the site.  
 To take up a “whole” network (such as AMD&ART) as a readymade is to 
nominate a truly vast entity with fluid boundaries. The readymade network 
functions as an exceedingly complex hypertext, a non-linear manifestation of 
Peterson and Langellier’s assertion that an aesthetic text is a “multileveled 
discourse” of communication. As these levels of discourse increase exponentially, 
“hypertext induces non-linear forms of mediation, which in turn transform the 
relationship between 'author' and 'reader.' There is no longer a single process of 
mediation (governed by the text), but instead a continuous process of remediation” 
(van Loon 309). Interpretation, it would seem, turns back upon itself recursively as 
it is introduced into the network that it is regarding.  
 AMD&ART is a more complex aesthetic text than an assessment based solely 
on its environmental good would reveal. To be content with a purely functional 
reading is to dramatically underestimate the value of the site to other examinations 
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of similarly aestheticized networks, as well as to undervalue the notion of the 
readymade as a vibrant contemporary practice. While at the outset AMD&ART 
appears to depend upon conceptual boundaries (rigid concepts such as “art” and 
“nature”), it is in reality a network: an environment wherein boundaries are 
constantly exceeded and subverted through relational processes. As such, the 
network AMD&ART is both conceptually autonomous and materially wedded to the 
site in Vintondale.   
 The notion of an inhabitable art community is the culmination of this chapter 
and the means of segueing into the fourth chapter of this document. Bruno Latour 
has theorized an understanding of networks that focuses on the participant 
elements, organic and non-organic alike. Latour’s “Actor Network Theory” (ANT) 
understands networks to be a mechanism for creating agency among “actor” 
participants. “Actor networks are established around a series of relationships 
between humans, animals, technology, artefacts and spirits” (309), van Loon 
glosses, highlighting a central feature of the upcoming chapter: ANT denies the easy 
assumptions of contemporary Humanist thought, expanding the “social” far beyond 
the Cartesian subject. The social, for Latour, “doesn’t designate a domain or reality 
or some particular item, but rather is the name of a movement, a displacement, a 
transformation, a translation, an enrollment. It is an association between entities 
which are in no way recognizable as being social in the ordinary manner, except 
during the brief moment when they are reshuffled together” (Latour 65; italics in 
original). This definition of the social begins to clear up the ambiguity regarding 
how one might define and understand the ontological boundaries that confounded 
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van Loon’s assessment of networks: networks are fleeting “entanglements of 
interactions” (Latour 65), rather than conventionalized and persistent structures 
from which elements are constantly added and subtracted. Networks come about as 
temporary stabilizations of forces and actors, and consequently manifest a 
temporary border that dissipates and reforms as another network as it incorporates 
or sheds actants. The result of this constant shifting of borders is that networks are 
more aptly thought of as emergent phenomena than solid, stable “things.” Their 
historical precedence (stability), insofar as it exists, is the result of recurring 
interactions. Practically, this means that the interactions that give networks their 
character and affective potential are those that recur more regularly than others. 
ANT is a processual model of network formation and dissolution that does away 
with the notion that a network (such as AMD&ART) can prefigure its dimensions: the 
network exists and generates its own multiplicity by virtue of its contemporaneous 
manifestation with its actants. Latour, assuming the role of pupil and teacher in a 
fictitious dialogue about ANT writes, “Its main tenet is that actors themselves make 
everything, including their own frames, their own theories, their own contexts, their 
own metaphysics, even their own ontologies” (147).  
 The notion that actants are responsible for “making everything” speaks 
volumes about the inherently performative assumptions of not only ANT, but of 
both systems theory and network theory.  While Judith Butler, Eve Kosofsky 
Sedgwick and Elin Diamond have thoroughly explicated the repetitious, reiterative 
capacity of performativity to alter the fabric of identity, Judith Hamera has turned 
that performative lens toward the power of performativity as it relates to place and 
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matter. Hamera reminds readers that art communities (whose membership I am 
trying to extend beyond the realm of the human) are responsible for laying both the 
cultural and material groundwork for their spaces: “the vernacular landscapes 
constructed through performance are the settings, the literal and psychic grounds, 
for the daily, routine time and talk that shape art in communities of practicioners. As 
J. B. Jackson argues, such landscapes are always local, regardless of the ideals 
incarnated there; they are stabilized by idiosyncratic ways of seeing the world” 
(“Performance, Performativity and Cultural Poiesis” 53). Hamera argues that it is 
what is done, in addition to the representational value ascribed to an act, which has 
a constitutive input on place.   
 Hamera’s performative understanding of the construction and maintenance 
of place is particularly useful for my argument because it is a workaround of 
hierarchies of valuation. By this I mean that through emphasizing the “relational, 
embodied nature of context” (Hamera, “Performance, Performativity and Cultural 
Poiesis” 54), Hamera makes way for other non-human agents, as well as the 
collective agency of human/non-human agents, to be acknowledged as both 
participants and contexts. This is the essence of a network and of remediation as 
van Loon sees it: the constant alteration of interaction and influence between 
elements of the network. In the case of AMD&ART, visitors to the site are both agents 
(affecting change and doing interpretive work) as well as subsumed within the 
larger sphere of AMD&ART’s functional operations. Their exhalations are taken up 
by the cattails growing in the artificial wetlands, while their senses reach out into 
the plenum of material Being that surrounds them. In bearing witness to the history 
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of Vintondale—whether the unstructured and open-ended presence of the colliery 
ruins, or the representational Great Map—they are contributing to the work of 
AMD&ART in maintaining a contextual and historical series of associations. While 
AMD&ART can successfully purify the water of Vintondale without a human 
audience, the site depends upon the reiterative, productive performance of millions 
of entities to function and expand. That this dynamism can extend into the realm of 
aesthetics and be taken up as the very fabric of the naturalcultural output of the site 
is a testament to the importance of this wayward place.   
  In summation, AMD&ART is not a stagnant image to be interpreted. It is not 
designed in the likeness of another site nor the site as it stood prior to its pollution. 
It is a fluid, transformational network whose aesthetic dimension is, for lack of a 
better term, an ambience. The presence of AMD&ART colors and subsumes that 
which enters its sphere, and the ephemeral dimension of the term “ambience” 
manages to capture this strange condition of inclusive possibility that circulates 
within the AMD&ART network. The notion of ambience both supersedes individual 
input, and is simultaneously dependent upon it. In this way AMD&ART affirms its 
status as a network and as an artwork that is meaningfully participatory.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
115 
 
Chapter Four 
Relational Emergence and Community Unfolding 
 
As I describe AMD&ART as a participatory, lived art/environment, I embed a 
concern for ethics deep within this project.  In this chapter I address these ethical 
questions and, in the process, offer a final assessment of the performative ontology 
at work in the constitution of AMD&ART. AMD&ART is fundamentally an ethical 
proposition, one that offers a sense of remediative practice that combines 
environmental remediation with the prospect of cultural remediation. AMD&ART is 
not simply a site dedicated to restoring Vintondale’s nature, but its culture as well.  
 My analysis begins by detailing what can be gained by considering the 
“landscape” as a “companion species.”  Companion species is a term repurposed by 
feminist scholar of science Donna Haraway to serve as the cornerstone of her 
project of attending more closely to the worldly, material process of relating across 
species lines. “A bestiary of agencies, kinds of relatings, and scores of time trump the 
imaginings of even the most baroque cosmologists. For me, that is what companion 
species signifies,” (6) writes Haraway, suggesting a number of important 
considerations for those seeking to utilize her term. In particular, examining the 
concept of “landscape” as a companion species benefits this study as it begins to 
document the material effects of broadening a networked perspective into the realm 
of worldly relating.  
The bulk of this chapter is composed of my efforts to elucidate a 
performative ontology, and finally collapses the divide between nature and culture 
irrevocably. By combining the work of Jean-Luc Nancy—in particular his ontological 
framework of Being singular-plural—with the performative, intra-active material 
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theories of Karen Barad, this chapter examines performativity as the driving force 
behind the emergence of Being. In particular, it is the terminology of the “re-“ in 
performance that is highlighted. The acknowledgement of a repetitive element is 
foundational to the study of performance: Richard Schechner defines performance 
as “restored behavior” (36), action that is semiotically loaded by virtue of its re-
presentation. Elin Diamond clarifies and expands this assertion: “’Re’ acknowledges 
the pre-existing discursive field, the repetition—within the performative present, 
while ‘embody,’ ‘configure,’ ‘inscribe,’ ‘signify,’ assert the possibility of materializing 
something that exceeds our knowledge, that alters the shape of sites and imagines 
other as yet unsuspected modes of being” (2). As this chapter demonstrates, it is 
pivotal that the implicit “re” that haunts discussions of performance be thought 
across the whole of Being. It is only through preexisting codes and patterns of 
embodiment and interaction that the world can be seen as having the level of 
consistency with which we are acquainted.     
By asserting that “landscapes” are a type of companion species, I am 
stressing the importance of interaction and participation in the constitution of 
AMD&ART. We draw, fundamentally, some of our Being from our relationships with 
the land, and the land is constitutively altered by our attentions and presence, even 
our passive presence. Each of us, humans, non-humans, minerals, gases and all the 
rest need the others to give consistency to our Being. This notion, as broad as it must 
be early in this discussion, is the key to my final assertion regarding the value of 
AMD&ART: this site not only cleanses the water of Vintondale, but also establishes 
the possibility of emergent community at the site. It does so in two ways.  
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The first is by ameliorating some of the conditions associated with what 
philosopher Glenn Albrecht has termed “psychoterratic illness”: “earth-related 
mental illness where people’s mental wellbeing (psyche) is threatened by the 
severing of ‘healthy’ links between themselves and their home/territory” (S95). The 
work of Sue Thering—a landscape architecture professor who was associated with 
the AMD&ART team—probes the mental well being and attitudinal shifts over the 
course of the long process of bringing the AMD&ART project to completion. As I 
outline in my summary of her research, people seem to genuinely improve in their 
estimation of Vintondale’s prospects for the future as the site progresses. While I 
eventually question a number of her conclusions, her work is the clearest indication 
that there is a psychoterratic relationship between the townspeople and the 
naturalcultural environment of Vintondale. 
The second way in which AMD&ART serves as a model for future community-
oriented works is by cultivating a beneficial, mutually constitutive ethical 
relationship between the many participant entities that make up the site and its 
surrounds. I am speaking here of a particular vision of an ethical relationship 
between humans, non-humans, nature and culture: a hyperbolic ethical stance that 
acknowledges the role of instrumentalization. I mobilize the concept of “hyperbolic 
ethics” from the later works of Jacques Derrida because it is an “impossible 
absolute”: it is the acknowledgement that an absolutist ethical stance toward all of 
Being is the only condition under which true ethics can flourish, while 
simultaneously acknowledging that this condition can never be. As François Raffoul 
writes, “the impossible would no longer be the opposite of the possible, but on the 
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contrary, would be what ‘haunts the possible,’ what truly ‘enables or possibilizes the 
possible” (273). The impossibility of behaving—Being—ethically toward all of 
AMD&ART, is the very condition that compels us to strive for (and acknowledge) its 
possibility. AMD&ART, defined as it is by the instrumentalization of biological and 
chemical processes, offers participants in the site lessons in proper comportment 
(particularly toward non-human, non-animate matter) when confronting a world of 
unfolding material Being. Our instrumentalizations are evidence of our failings at 
ethics—and yet also evidence, in some small way, of the failing of failing.  
Companion Species: Landscape 
 The notion of “landscape” is one of the thorniest of contemporary critical 
concepts. While succinctly defined in the clipped language of dictionaries as “1: a 
portion of land or territory which the eye can comprehend in a single view, 
including all the objects it contains; 2: a picture representing a scene by land or sea, 
actual or fancied, the chief subject being the general aspect of nature, such as field, 
hills, forests, waters, etc.; 3: the pictorial aspect of the country” (Merriam-Webster 
828), sustained scholarly inquiry from a wide-array of fields—cultural geography, 
art history, literature, environmental studies, philosophy, to name only a few—has 
dramatically expanded the scope of this term. Indeed, the preponderance of 
neologisms currently being generated that culminate in the suffix –scape speaks to 
this widely thought concept: Appadurai, for example, suggests that the concepts 
ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, financescape and ideoscape (Appadurai 51) 
could be used to map the impacts and origins of global cultural flows.  
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 The usefulness of the suffix –scape for theorists is linked intimately to its 
etymology. Descended from the autonomous word “scape,” meaning a landscape 
view, it is also associated with an obsolete, aphetic form of “escape.” The shared 
definitional element in both cases is the notion of distancing, whether in order to 
take in a view or to escape from someone or something’s presence. Appadurai 
expressly locates the value of the suffix in precisely this distance, as it implies 
perspective: “-scape indicate[s] that there are not objectively given relations that 
look the same from every angle of vision but, rather, that they are deeply 
perspectival constructs, inflected by the historical, linguistic, and political 
situatedness of different sorts…” (52). While Appadurai focuses his analysis broadly 
(“nation-states, multinationals, diasporic communities” [52]), he finally culminates 
his discussion of the perspectival nature of “–scapes” with a nod toward the scale in 
which we find ourselves most comfortable: “the individual actor is the last locus of 
this perspectival set of landscapes, for these landscapes are eventually navigated by 
agents who both experience and constitute larger formations, in part of their own 
sense of what these landscapes offer” (52).  
 This notion of the “individual actor,” whose very being is inflected by 
“historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts (Appadurai 33),” is 
our entrée into the discussion of landscape as a companion species. The suffix –
scape in landscape implies precisely the same perspectival viewing and distancing 
maneuver that is the case with all other “-scapes.” In this way, it signals the profound 
relationality between the “individual actor” and the “landscape,” to the extent that 
the actor and the landscape are assumed to be component parts of the configuration 
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of myriad histories and agencies.  Landscapes, as per the previous discussion, 
coalesce along the subjective lines of perspective and lived experience into an 
emergent sense of cohesive wholeness. This wholeness is, of course, illusory: 
landscapes, as are all perspectival views, are necessarily partial. But this does little 
to diminish their affective power. “Art and engineering,” writes Haraway, “are 
natural sibling practices for engaging companion species” (Companion 23), explicitly 
acknowledging two fields whose reliance on perspective—both in the sense of 
visual perspective, as well as “perspective” understood as standing in for “a way of 
seeing (conceptualizing) the world”—is paramount. Perspective, in all of the senses 
of the word it must be recalled, is profoundly specific, and located fleetingly in the 
momentary configuration of component parts: “We are not one, and being depends 
on getting on together” (Haraway, Companion 50). 
While Haraway mentions that “landscape” very much falls within the 
conceptual reach of the “companion species,” making it both a terrain of history and 
sudden co-emergence, mapping this pattern of relationality is a daunting task. A 
landscape, a locale, is fundamentally an emergent phenomenon, made up of 
multiplicities of heterogenous connections between participants, who themselves 
are simultaneously unicitous5 and co-dependent. They are unicitous in the sense 
that at each unfolding, nonteleological moment, they are precisely and fully that 
                                                        
5 The term “unicity” specifies a precise dimension of “uniqueness.” It is the 
acknowledgement that exactly one object with certain properties exists, coupled 
with the added connotation of wholeness. Unicity: “the condition of being united; 
quality of the unique; unification” (Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary 1575). 
In this instance, I use the term to signal that the elements of a landscape, while 
independent singularities, are simultaneously the result of the unification of other 
singularities. For further information, see: Nancy, “Limits, Borders and Shores of 
Singularity” 102. 
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which they are: the concrescent joining of all related agencies into an emergent and 
temporally-bound whole. Yet, without these contributing agencies, there is no 
“whole” to be said to exist, forcing the realization that all singularities are co-
dependent on all other singularities, and therefore difficult to cast as a unified 
“whole.” To simplify: any account of a landscape is necessarily partial, because the 
forces and agents contributing to the “whole” of it are themselves partial.   
 In an effort to more clearly elucidate the notion of landscape as companion 
species, I am going to track the term through Haraway’s four-part analysis of the 
“tones” simultaneously resonating in her understanding of the concept “companion 
species.” This formulation, while still acknowledging the heterogeneity of each case, 
should provide a workable frame of reference through which to view the 
concatenated histories of flesh and culture that come to be called “landscapes.”  
 The first tone insisted on by Haraway is of “the history of evolutionary 
biology, with its categories of populations, rates of gene flow, variation, selection 
and biological species” (Companion 15). These categories, of course, are no longer as 
self-evident as they once might have seemed, in no small part thanks to Haraway 
herself, particularly her “A Cyborg Manifesto.” Drawing on insights from her earlier 
work, Haraway continues, “Species is about biological kind, and scientific expertise 
is necessary to that kind of reality. Post-cyborg, what counts as biological kind 
troubles previous categories of organisms. The machinic and textual are internal to 
the organic and vice versa in irreversible ways” (Companion 15). Thus what seems 
to begin as a discussion of biology, as it is popularly understood, quickly expands 
beyond the neat tales of heredity and flesh covered by textbooks.   
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 Landscape—post-cyborg and wedded to the new biology—is troubled by a 
discussion about “what counts.” What might have seemed self-evidently unified—
the landscape defined as everything present in a given area—has now assumed a 
conditionality related precisely to this internalization of the machinic and textual. 
Rather than focusing on an imaginary idyllic past of unmediated, Edenic nature 
scenes, the modern landscape must be reconceived as a space of contested 
meanings and naturalcultural negotiation. Genetically-modified organisms, self-
replicating technomachines masquerading as drought-resistant crops, now provide 
the “view” lurking within landscape’s busy suffix. In Vintondale, the landscape of 
AMD&ART, while aesthetically pleasing, is a convoluted system of mechanical 
operations making possible the “natural” processes of wetland growth and 
regeneration. The site, a manmade habitat whose purpose is to diminish AMD, is the 
mirrored double of the abandoned mines themselves: manmade sites in which 
extremophile bacteria such as Thiobacillus ferooxidans thrive in vast numbers, 
consuming iron oxides and producing the sulphuric acid that comprises AMD. 
Without these bacteria, AMD would not occur, and without the histories of 
industrial technological intervention in these subterranean environments, the 
conditions for their proliferation would not have been present. Habitats within 
habitats, landscapes whose overt histories of manipulation and alteration prompt 
new manipulations and alterations, in keeping with the “view” of how and what 
those landscapes “ought” to be. 
 The notion that a landscape “ought” to be anything, whether an unspoiled 
riverine valley or a technomarvel such as AMD&ART, demonstrates that the textual 
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has come to rest firmly within the bosom of landscape as well.  The postmodern and 
poststructuralist turn toward “textualization,” the recasting of all things as methods 
of reading and writing the world, has fundamentally undermined the easy cohesion 
of a concept such as landscape to an external reality. The attempt to align the word 
“landscape” precisely with an external reality, in the fantasy of perfect 
representational Truth, is the moment of rupture. Una Chaudhuri notes, “the term 
landscape suggests a systematicity and a coherence that often prove elusive in 
applications” (12). This incoherence is the characteristic avenue whereby 
interpretation (textuality) enters into the discussion of landscape.  
Volumes of essays, such as Uncommon Ground: Rethinking the Human Place in 
Nature, The Great New Wilderness Debate, and Placing Nature: Culture and 
Landscape Ecology, trace the status of words such as “nature” and “landscape,” their 
referents argumentatively defined as physical, material realities, or else wholly 
social constructs. Commonly (as in the essays included in the aforementioned 
examples), commentators settle on a fusion of the two perspectives: natureculture, 
in Latour and Haraway’s term. Beyond these broad lexical struggles however, a 
would-be participant in a landscape’s definition is forced to attend to the 
particularities and specificities of the place(s) in question and their attendant 
histories and cultures—biological, chemical, manufactured: the fusion of domains. 
This failure of the transcendent interpretive schema is in keeping with Haraway’s 
body of work: “the certainty of what counts as nature—a source of insight and 
promise of innocence—is undermined, probably fatally. The transcendent 
authorization of interpretation is lost, and with it the ontology grounding “Western” 
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epistemology” (Haraway,“A Cyborg” 152). If we are to “read” a site such as 
AMD&ART not for its adherence to a transcendent “nature,” but rather as the nexus 
of variously interpretable lineages of biological inheritance, historical retelling and 
representational valuation, we are forced to do so from our intimately situated 
position with regards to that place. When I gaze down the main street of Vintondale, 
I do not see only the quaint dilapidation of this one particular town, but an entire 
sensorial idiom associated with these wayward coal towns and their associated 
wooded surrounds. The sloping rise and fall of the Allegheny hills that tower over 
the town; the defunct stores and American Legion Halls; the sound of the Fox 
Sparrows scrabbling around in the brambles in brushy overgrown yards; all of these 
elements affirm a code of familiarity for me, a lifelong inhabitant of western 
Pennsylvania. In common parlance, it “reads” as western Pennsylvania to me. This is 
one final clue as to how firmly entrenched the logic of textuality has become in our 
relationship to the organic, and vice versa.   
The second tone articulated by Haraway draws attention to the specificity 
and particularity of “species.” “I remain alert to species as a generic philosophical 
kind and category. Species is about defining difference, rooted in polyvocal fugues of 
doctrines of cause,” (Companion 15) writes Haraway. In other words, Haraway is 
attempting to signal that the construct “species” exists as a categorical distinction, 
drawing on the work of Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas, who remains a well-regarded 
commentator on the work of Aristotle, expanded upon the Aristotelian system of 
categorical logic from which “species,” in the sense currently being discussed, is 
drawn. The Aristotelian notion of “genus,” as a broad category that exists beyond the 
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material being of things, is subdivided in “species,” which are subcategories of said 
genus. This is the logic adopted by the Linnaean system of taxonomy (binomial 
nomenclature), for example, wherein a genus is a broader category of organism 
(Homo), while species is the specific type of organism within that genus (sapiens).  
For the purposes of her discussion, however, Haraway focuses on this 
original categorical sense of the logic of species, of which the biological “species” is 
an obvious utilization. Her stressing of the root of species as the notion of defining 
difference is the pressing concern, and it is reiterated in her characterization of the 
process of speciation as a fugue. A fugue, a contrapuntal musical composition, is 
characterized by the presence of two differentiated and complete musical lines that 
exist independently, yet when played simultaneously, harmonize. Benjamin Boretz 
has described the challenge of composing this type of music, writing, “The internal 
structures that create each of the voices separately must contribute to the emergent 
structure of the polyphony, which in turn must reinforce and comment on the 
structures of the individual voices” (177). In this quotation we find an intimation of 
Haraway’s characteristic tendency to conceptualize the world as the interaction of 
many material flows, and of her belief in the affective power of an emergent gestalt 
state which recursively alters its constituent elements.  
This emergent notion of gestalt states jives with Haraway’s allying herself 
with the work of Judith Butler: “There are no pre-constituted subjects and objects, 
and no single sources, unitary actors, or final ends. In Judith Butler’s terms, there 
are only ‘contingent foundations;’ bodies that matter are the result” (Companion 6). 
The inclusion of the word “matter” in this quotation, which follows in the original 
126 
 
text an assertion about the reality of all nouns functioning as gerunds, further 
supports this claim; bodies that do the act of “matter-ing” are the result. Attempting 
to trace the polyvocal causal relationships between the myriad gerund-nouns, each 
of which exists at the convoluted nexus of its own shifting gerund-noun causal 
swarm, is an exercise in seeing just how far down the rabbit-hole goes.  
Haraway’s work, however, is nothing if not an attempt to refocus the lens of 
contemporary critical discourse on the materiality of the world at large, beyond the 
easy binaries of nature and culture, human and animal. The use of the Thomist 
“species” in her argument, and the value of introducing it into her formulation of 
companion species, reminds readers and theorists of the importance of being 
attentive to the mechanisms whereby difference is made manifest—and of defining 
that difference. The logic of “genus” and “species” simultaneously suggests that 
while a broad category may exist it is also important to attend to the specific species 
in question. The landscape of Vintondale, for example, might be characterized along 
the lines of a number of genera. It might be broadly characterized as representative 
of the topographical, climatic, geological and biological patterns represented in the 
Appalachian Mountains generally; or, more specifically (a word derived 
etymologically from the Latin species), the Allegheny Mountains; or, more 
specifically, the Allegheny Mountains in the Laurel Highlands region of western 
Pennsylvania; or, more specifically still, the area surrounding a former coal mining 
town. This is precisely the subdivision that characterizes the logic of categorical 
species, and it is a perspective that offers a valuable lesson to those attempting to 
think the landscape as companion species. The lesson of winnowing each instance of 
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reality down to its most specific possible form (its role as co-emergent agent in a 
“place” known only to the subjective experience of one individuated participant) 
provides a mode of valuation that is not reducible to an autonomous, and therefore 
transferable, object. Wendell Berry writes about the danger of scientific language 
(read as: objective language) for precisely this reason:  
The problem, as it appears to me, is that we are using the wrong 
language. The language we use to speak of the world and its creatures, 
including ourselves, has gained a certain analytic power (along with a 
lot of expertish pomp) but has lost much of its power to designate 
what is being analyzed or to convey any respect or care or affection or 
devotion to it. As a result, we have a lot of genuinely concerned people 
calling upon us to “save” a world which their language simultaneously 
reduces to an assemblage of perfectly featureless and dispirited 
“ecosystems,” “organisms,” “environments,” “mechanisms,” and the 
like. It is impossible to prefigure the salvation of the world in the same 
language by which the world has been dismembered and defaced (8; 
italics in original).  
 
The logic of Thomist “species,” when coupled with Haraway’s notion of contingent 
foundations, is a direct answer to Berry’s concern about the tendency of modern 
language to parse the world along interchangeable lines, and it culminates in a view 
of the landscape as fundamentally a species of the most subjective sort: a species 
whose very being is contingent upon the species-being of another species. The 
landscape of Vintondale is not finally beholden to language (the mechanism 
whereby speciation would seem to occur most frequently), but instead it is 
constantly in flux. Indeed, Aquinas makes it clear that the irreconcilable gap 
between the material and the categorical rests in this flux-state: “For what is in a 
continual state of flux cannot be grasped with certitude, for it passes away before 
the mind can form a judgment of it” (Aquinas 421). Aquinas strove to rectify this 
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situation with the categorical notion of species as autonomous from matter, and 
Haraway strives to acknowledge (and perhaps widen) this gap.  
 The third tone of “species” emphasized by Haraway draws 
autobiographically on her upbringing in a Roman Catholic household: the 
Eucharistic species, the bread and wine that are transformed into the body and 
blood of Christ, via the logic of transubstantiation. “Species is about the corporeal 
join of the material and the semiotic in ways unacceptable to the secular Protestant 
sensibilities of the American academy and to most versions of the human science of 
semiotics (16),” asserts Haraway, whose attentions highlight the characteristic 
inheritance by the academy of a fundamental ontological assumption about the 
unbridgeable gap between a representation of an object and the thing-itself.  
The logic of the Eucharist moves beyond the binary logic of signifier and 
signified, relying instead on the Aristotelian distinction between the “accidents” of a 
material object and the “substance” of the same. The “accident” is understood to be a 
changeable characteristic, whose alteration does not alter the “substance,” or 
essence, of a thing. Aristotle articulates nine types of accident: “quantity, quality, 
relation, habitus, time, location, situation (or position), action, and passion (‘being 
acted on’) (Aristotle 1b25-24a).” A bottle, for example, might be made of glass or 
plastic, may be located on a windowsill or in a ditch, in the 2nd or 21st century, and 
yet regardless of accident, it does not cease to display the essential property of its 
essence, its “bottle-dom.” The accidents of the bottle, those traits that make it a 
unique individuated form, do not interfere with that which makes the bottle a bottle: 
its substance.    
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To return in a roundabout way to Thomas Aquinas, his doctrinal 
understanding of the logic of Eucharist is basically an inversion of quotidian 
malleability: instead of changing the accidents of the bread and wine, the invocation 
of the final supper before Jesus’s crucifixion alters the substance of the bread and 
wine, while leaving the accidents intact. Thus, the bread and wine are literally the 
body and blood of Christ, while their accidents (being composed of wheat and 
grapes, in some particular Catholic church, in the early 21st century) remain 
unchanged.  
It is the moment of invocation that I believe is valuable to Haraway’s project. 
Aristotle’s distinction between accident and substance/essence seems contrary to 
the bridging of the material and the semiotic that Haraway espouses, and thus it is 
in the moment of their conflation—the moment of consecration—that makes the 
Eucharist an innovative mode of conceptualizing the semiotic relationship. The 
Eucharist isn’t a sign in the classical sense, because it isn’t the case of a separate 
signifier pointing to a separate signified via a conventionalized relationship. Instead, 
it is a transformative fusion of signifier and signified, a becoming-flesh of bread 
through the power of language.  
Students of performance will recognize this moment for what it is:  a 
performative utterance, drawing together the power of word and matter to produce 
novel, emergent states. The concept of performativity is drawn from the work of 
linguist J. L. Austin, whose characterization of the word “performative” points 
toward an active “doing” of something with words: “…in saying these words we are 
doing something…rather than reporting something…[the action in question] is at 
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least preferably (though still not accurately) to be described as saying certain words, 
rather than as performing a different, inward and spiritual, action of which these 
word are merely the outward and audible sign” (Austin 177; italics in original).  
 Haraway’s vision of this post-representationalist conflation of corporeality 
and semiotics is wedded inextricably to the logic of performativity. I have dubbed 
Haraway’s position “post-representationalist” in an effort to signal the 
representationalist logic of traditional semiotics, in which language has the capacity 
to be either “true” or “false,” based on a word’s capacity to “accurately” represent an 
already-existing condition in the world, thereby representing it. In accordance with 
Haraway’s philosophy of worldly, co-emergent becoming of participants, the logic of 
representationalism must be abandoned, if for no other reason than its presumption 
of pre-existing entities that may or may not be representable via semiotics.  
Karen Barad, in an article titled “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an 
Understanding of Matter,” presents a program of conceptual rearticulation that will 
be useful for examining the value of the Eucharist-as-performative to Haraway’s 
program. The first of Barad’s insights relates to the notion of “intra-action,” as 
contrasted with “interaction.” Interaction, as we understand intuitively, is 
predicated on the existence of two entities, each of which must exist so as to be 
capable of generating the “gap” across which interaction might occur. This is tied, of 
course, to the categories of representationalist thinking: “words” and “things.”  
Intra-action, on the other hand, is Barad’s attempt at understanding the mechanisms 
whereby matter comes into being as phenomena. She prefers the concept 
“phenomena” to that of “independent entities” because “phenomena” implies a 
131 
 
malleable character, while also introducing an event-like, unfolding quality to 
reality. “This account,” writes Barad of her profoundly performative model of 
“mattering,” “refuses the representationalist fixation on 'words' and 'things' and the 
problematic of their relationality, advocating instead a causal relationship between 
specific exclusionary practices embodied as specific material conditions of the world 
(i.e., discursive practices/(con)figurations rather than 'words') and specific material 
phenomena (i.e., relations rather than 'things'). This causal relationship between the 
apparatuses of bodily production and the phenomena produced is one of 'agential 
intra-action'” (“Posthumanist” 814; italics in original). Agency, in this formulation, is 
not simply a quality of some observer but rather is a performative contribution to 
the emergence of phenomena. This notion that agency (understood to be not an 
attribute but rather the name given to the “ongoing reconfigurings of the world” 
[Barad 818]) is integral to the local resolution of phenomena within the broader 
matrix of Being. This resolution occurs not (only) via language, but rather through 
material practices which prompt contingent, emergent “things-in-phenomena.” 
These phenomena/things are “dynamic topological 
reconfigurings/entanglements/relationalities/(re)articulations” (Barad, 
“Posthumanist” 818), whose dynamism highlights precisely the sort of intense 
fusion of corporeality and semiotics for which Haraway is striving. This sort of 
dynamism is unthinkable when confronted with prefigured entities.  I will attend to 
Barad’s work more fully later in this chapter in an effort to flesh out the 
repercussions of this “agential realism” on the ethics of environmental remediation.  
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The Eucharist (species), we may finally sum up, is utilized by Haraway as a 
reminder that the performative “mattering” of corporeal practice and semiotic 
representation are never distinct. Instead, they are akin to Barad’s formulation of 
agential realism, a profoundly emergent account of discursive practices that 
emphasizes discourse not as the process of communicating via written words or 
statements (this is representationalism once again), but rather as a set of discursive 
practices that produce phenomena and are produced by phenomena. While reified 
through repetition, these discursive practices—which set the stage for all other 
discourses, including language—are fundamentally processual and thereby both 
capable of radical reform as well as wedded to precedent.  
The performative has been thoroughly examined in terms of race, gender, 
semiotics and a host of other areas of study; it’s an extremely fruitful concept, and 
one that seemed omnipresent once I became aware of it. In terms of discussing 
performativity and landscapes, two dominant approaches have emerged. The first 
entails the consideration of the landscape as an actor and agent, capable of 
producing distinct outcomes on the built environment and associated cultures. This 
agenda is typified by the work of Czerniak (109), Howe (437), and Dirkmeier and 
Helbrecht (158). The second approach, which focuses expressly on the relational 
emergence of landscape as an unfolding co-production, is more akin to my project. 
Geographer David Crouch characterizes this perspective as directing attention to 
space (and landscapes) as “relational, dynamic and contingent” (“Flirting” 6). 
Crouch continues: “Space emerges from this as persistently ‘in the making,’ through 
a complexity of forces, influences, practices” (“Flirting” 6). Crouch’s work, along with 
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the work of Elizabeth Grosz (31), Doreen Massey (140), and Edward Casey (118), 
has begun to articulate a distinctly performative ontological model for landscape 
creation/participation. The lessons are, roughly, the same as in other instances 
wherein the term has been applied: landscapes are understood to be after-effects of 
stylized patterns of interactional behaviors by many parties (read as: not only 
human interactions). If gender is conceived “as performance which is performative, 
[…] an ‘act,’ broadly construed, which constructs the social fiction of its own 
psychological interiority” (Butler “Performative” 195), might not the semiotic and 
material coupling of performative action produce a similar sort of transformative 
power in the landscape? Certainly this logic of performative landscape is present in 
a site such as AMD&ART, whose very purpose is to “act natural,” and thereby restore 
a type of natural health to an environment. As with gender, however, there is 
nothing inherently “real” or “timeless” (“natural”) about nature; there is only flux, 
and thereby only interpretation coupled with a grasping at elements consistent with 
one’s own rate of flux. The constructs of historical gender pre-date individuals, and 
as per Louis Althusser’s formulation of interpellation, “hail” individuals into their 
matrixes of behavior, ideology and affect. Might not human/non-human 
Other/landscape formulations hail us in the same fashion? Indeed, if this is so, 
Haraway’s Eucharistic species, the moment of consecration, seems as good a tool as 
any for directing our attention toward the ways in which speaking of Vintondale as a 
“resource” or “liability,” or even “home,” might very well make it those things and 
hail us into ideological relationships with that very co-emergent form.  
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The final tone emphasized by Haraway is that of species as specie: coinage, 
gold, lucre, wealth, metal. The will-to-power of financial markets weds the collective 
destinies of individuals together, human and non-human alike. AMD&ART, however, 
activates a very particular facet of the notion of specie: the linkage between coinage 
and its representative mineral wealth. The bituminous coal, the very agent of 
Vintondale’s precipitous rise and fall, represents a particular type of economic 
model and historical narrative. While the structures that served as precursors for 
the town may have been built in the 1840s to capitalize on the fortunate confluence 
of the materials necessary to make iron (carbonate ore, limestone, timber for 
charcoal and running water), it was not until the boom in mineral rights speculation 
by eastern investors that Vintondale, née Barker City, was formally established in 
1892. From this point forward, in both its meteoric rise to economic prominence as 
well as its precipitous decline, the tonnage and pricing of coal governed the fate of 
this small valley town.  
AMD, the very disaster that the AMD&ART site seeks to ameliorate, is itself a 
financial and economic phenomenon as much as chemical and biological. When the 
economic winds of fortune shifted away from western Pennsylvania in the 1970s 
and early 1980s, caused by an influx of cheap Asian steel that gutted the American 
steel industry, the coal mining industry’s close ties with the steel industry became a 
profound liability. The mines of Vintondale were finally shuttered in 1968, setting 
the stage for the flooding of the mines and the acidification of the groundwater to 
begin. That there is still coal in the hills surrounding Vintondale is undeniable; its 
extraction via underground mining is simply no longer economically feasible, and 
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therefore the groundwater pumps, long silent, have vanished. With the closing of the 
mine came the final blow to an already reeling town, and Vintondale today 
continues its slide into obsolescence.  
 While Haraway attempts to sum up her notion of companion species neatly, 
writing that it is “about a four-part composition [the four aforementioned tones of 
“species”], in which co-constitution, finitude, impurity, historicity, and complexity 
are what is” (Companion 16), she is well aware that neatness, while perhaps 
possible when encountering concepts, is dramatically not feasible in material 
experience. It is an amorphous, inherently fluid formulation whose truest, most 
central tenet is the move beyond human exceptionalism and into respect. 
“Companion species—coshapings all the way down, in all sorts of temporalities and 
corprealities—is my awkward term for a not-humanism in which species of all sorts 
are in question. For me, even when we speak only of people, the 
animal/human/living/nonliving category separations fray inside the kind of 
encountering worthy of regard. The ethical regard that I am trying to speak and 
write can be experienced across many species differences” (When Species 164), 
Haraway finally clarifies in her later work.  
Interaction and Intra-Action 
 Haraway is hardly alone in her desire to locate the fundamental grounds of 
ethical regard and respect in that peculiar configuration of historicity, biology and 
finitude that passes for the individual and her partner(s); as per the notion of 
companion species, she can hardly even be thought of as alone at all. I interpret this 
sense of togetherness, of the inter- (as well as intra-) dependence of worldly 
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relating, as the next logical step toward a comprehensive ethical program that 
embraces the AMD&ART site, the inhabitants of Vintondale, and the emergent 
landscape. In what follows, I draw on the work of two philosophers: Jean-Luc Nancy 
and the already-acknowledged Karen Barad. In both cases, the philosophies 
espoused by these individuals plumb the nature of relational Being at the level of 
matter itself. It is my hope that detailing two potential explanatory mechanisms for 
that most fundamental of categories will demonstrate the dire need for an ethical 
program which addresses, with respect and regard, all those phenomena that might 
count as species: “artifact, machine, landscape, organism or human being” 
(Haraway, When Species 165).  
The task of addressing matter is always first and foremost a question of 
ontology, and requires staking out a piece of territory from which to build (in all 
directions, past and future, across every register) a comprehensive account of the 
multiplicitous, thoroughly contingent, utterly mundane graspings alongside one 
another that reside at the root of a companionship-ontology, a “comprehensile” 
arrangement. Jean-Luc Nancy suggests a revised ontological stance that focuses on 
“Being singular plural,” a mode of conceiving the basic condition of Being as a co-
appearance of singularities, utterly dependent upon one another, and yet 
simultaneously unique and separate. From feminist scientist Karen Barad, I mobilize 
her theory of “agential realism” to track out the performative aspects of this mutual 
emergence. Combined, Nancy and Barad’s contributions offer an avenue for scholars 
to deconstruct the binaries between nature/culture, human/nonhuman and 
matter/idea. The philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, in particular his concept of “Being 
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singular-plural,” is illustrative of an ontological perspective that breaks with the 
humanist “subject,” preferring rather “singularity” as a broad catch-all term for that 
which exists. By christening the origin(s) of Being “Being singular plural,” Nancy 
relies on a syntactical ambiguity to advocate a complex examination of the 
assumptions of representationalist/atomist (and, consequently, humanist) thought. 
He writes that these words “which do not have any determined syntax (‘being’ is a 
verb or noun; ‘singular’ and ‘plural’ are nouns or adjectives; all can be rearranged in 
different combinations), mark an absolute equivalence, both in an indistinct and 
distinct way. Being is singularly plural and plurally singular” (Being Singular 30). In 
other words, Being does not consist of an essence of Being that preexists 
existence—only that which exists, exists, without anteriority. This requires further 
explication to become clear.  
Singularity is the conceptual operation whereby Nancy articulates the 
profound strangeness of worldly Being; in an essay entitled “Limits, Borders and 
Shores of Singularity,” Nancy asks rhetorically, “What is singularity? As what has 
place at only one instance, one single point—outside time, outside place—it is, in 
short, an exception” (“Limits” 101). All that exists, then, in each instance, is 
singular—and yet, as Nancy makes clear, simultaneously remains plural. How is this 
so? Singularity, as Nancy stresses throughout his essay, contains within it the 
acknowledgment of a necessary plurality: in order to be articulated as singular, it 
demands the presence of another singularity from which it may be differentiated. 
Being then, is the distancing process of singular plurality, or plural singularity—
namely, the being with of singularity constituting the process of Being: “’Being’ is 
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neither a state nor a quality, but rather the action according to which Kant calls 'the 
[mere] positing of a thing' takes place ('is')” (Nancy, Being Singular 12).  
Being, then, as being with, existence rooted firmly in the with—the 
coeappearance of singularities—forms the foundation of Nancy’s rearticulation of 
ontology, and his vision of a world that is the co-existence of all that exists: nothing 
more, nothing less. This singularly plural world is free of an imposed telos, beyond 
the radical historicity engendered by an understanding of the material contingency 
of existence as the sharing of Being. This is what Nancy implies, I think, when he 
suggests that “we” no longer “have” meaning in the world, but instead are the 
meaning of the world, the constellation of singularities through which signification 
is produced and circulated.  
What remains unclear at this juncture is the relationship between the 
“individual subject” and the “singularity,” for it easy to consider the notion of 
singularity as some form of extreme heterogeneity located in a radical individuality. 
Upon closer thought, however, individuality is seen to rest upon the logic of a 
perfect individualism, which is contradictory to the utterly contingent view of 
existence as a being-with: individualism depends, implicitly, on the subjacent 
copresence of another entity from which it may be considered individuated. Hence, 
the individual ceases to be a practicable position within the relational matrix that is 
Being-with. 
The various singularities that mutually contribute their Being to the 
emergent phenomenon that is (for example) AMD&ART, come into being not in the 
world (this would assume the existence of a prefigured world into which one might 
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enter), but rather at the level of Being, precisely because of their copresence with all 
of the other singularities in a process-oriented doing of Being. This is a process of 
differentiation and similarity, of myriad singularities interacting in their utterly 
contingent, codependent autonomy. As such, each singularity is perfectly strange, in 
each fleeting configuration for singularity springs forth from the fertile copresence 
of the mundane:  
One cannot affirm that the meaning of Being must express itself 
starting from everydayness and then begin by neglecting the general 
differentiation of the everyday, its constantly renewed rupture, its 
intimate discord, its polymorphy and its polyphony, its relief and its 
variety. A “day” is not simply a unit for counting; it is the turning of 
the world—each time singular. (Nancy, Being Singular 9) 
 
Or, as Nancy writes later, “The modern world asks this truth be thought: that 
meaning is right at. It is in the indefinite plurality of origins and their coexistence. 
The 'ordinary' is always exceptional, however little we understand its character as 
origin. What we receive most communally as 'strange' is that the ordinary itself is 
originary. With existence laid open in this way and the meaning of the world being 
what it is, the exception is the rule.” (Being Singular, 10)  
 Yet this does very little to explain the happenstance of the mechanism 
whereby the singularities (be)come at the instant of Being, nor how the copresence 
of these singularities goes about producing an emergent phenomenon such as 
AMD&ART. If we are to believe that each instantiation of a singularity is 
foundationally heterogenous, we begin to encounter a mode of producing/Being 
that engages what Derrida has called iterability, which “does not signify 
simply...repeatability of the same, but rather alterability of this same idealized in the 
singularity of the event...It entails the necessity of thinking at once both the rule and 
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event, concept and singularity” (Derrida, “Afterword” 119; italics in original). 
Iterability further provides a clue as to how singularities come to influence one 
another: it is linked closely with notions of performativity (especially post-Butler), 
and through this connection with performativity, it engages the work of Karen 
Barad, feminist scholar of science, whose framework of “agential realism” seems to 
provide a practicable model of analyzing the interaction of singularities in their 
plural co-constitution.  
Barad’s theory of “agential realism,” as I have already described in the 
section of this chapter pertaining to Haraway’s Eucharistic tone of “species,” hinges 
on the notion of intra-action. Interaction, following the logic already articulated by 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s singularity, implies that entities must pre-exist in order to interact. 
This state of pre-existence, however, is something that Nancy’s ontology of “being-
with” has articulated as impossible. Instead, in the process of coming into being (co-
appearance), Being intra-acts with itself, defining the boundaries of singularity and 
thereby giving Being the consistency with which we are familiar.  
Nancy, however, never articulates the mechanism whereby this intra-action 
occurs, other than to simply posit its occurrence as constant and omnipresent. 
Barad, offering a perspective that begins to fill in the gaps in Nancy’s description, 
asserts that “intra-actions” are apparatuses in both the sense of a complex 
arrangement within a larger structure, as well as a mechanism whereby an 
end/knowledge is produced. We should be careful to point out that to call 
something an apparatus does not reinscribe its status as a “mere static 
arrangement[s] in the world, but rather [that] apparatuses are dynamic 
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(re)configurings of the world, specific agential practices/intra-actions/performances 
through which specific exclusionary boundaries are enacted” (Barad, “Posthumanist” 
816, italics in original). In other words, calling something an apparatus does not 
separate it from the world-at-large as an autonomous “thing” with self-evident 
boundaries. Instead, an apparatus has to be understood as a contigent reworking of 
the world-at-large whose boundaries are the result of its emergent state. Barad 
notes this, writing, “Apparatuses have no inherent 'outside' boundary. This 
indeterminacy of the 'outside' boundary represents the impossibility of closure—
the ongoing intra-activity in the iterative reconfiguring of the apparatus of bodily 
production/ Apparatuses are open-ended practices” (Barad, “Posthumanist” 816). 
An apparatus is the name given to a fleeting, emergent configuration of worldy 
affect that can produce other effects and boundaries (things).    
In other words, apparatuses delimit and embody the possibilities of 
performativity. In Barad’s terms, an apparatus is functionally similar to a “stylized 
repetition of action”: both are mechanisms for producing novel conditions in 
material Being, whose formulation in some fashion prefigures the outcome of their 
effects, and rely on precedent.  As Joseph Roach notes, “the paradox of the 
restoration of behavior resides in phenomenon of repetition itself: no action or 
sequence of actions may be performed exactly the same way twice; they must be 
reinvented or recreated at each appearance. In this improvisatory behavioral space, 
memory reveals itself as imagination” (Roach, “Culture” 46). While Roach is 
speaking expressly of memory as it is commonly understood, the importance of 
precedents in the constitution of memories links his point to Barad’s material 
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apparatuses.   The “apparatus” is also like a “stylized repetition” in that it operates 
largely by virtue of exclusionary practices: if Being is assumed to be an ongoing, 
dynamic, intra-active emergence, whereby the process of intra-action reconfigures 
the boundaries and properties of “parts” of the world, it does so by delimiting 
“parts” of the plane of material immanence as such.  Barad clarifies: “This ongoing 
flow of agency through which 'part' of the world makes itself differentially 
intelligible to another 'part' of the world and through which local causal structures, 
boundaries, and properties are stabilized and destabilized does not take place in 
space and time but in the making of spacetime itself. The world is an ongoing open 
process of mattering through which 'mattering' itself acquires meaning and form in 
the realization of different agential possibilities” (“Posthumanist” 817). As Nancy 
tells us, “meaning is itself the sharing of Being (Being Singular, 2).   
The topic of exclusionary practices rests soundly upon a practice of border-
ing, the discursive practices which result in temporary and locally contingent 
demarcations of one “part” from the next. It is important that an account of agential 
realism stresses this not as a proxy for “individualism,” nor as an attempt to 
formulate a “comprehensive” account of a phenomenon. The process of delimiting, of 
establishing borders, suggests that boundaries do not preexist their limits: “If 
'humans' refers to phenomena, not independent entities with inherent properties 
but rather beings in their differential becoming, particular material (re)configurings 
of the world with shifting boundaries and properties that stabilize and destabilize  
along with specific material changes in what it means to be human, then the notion 
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of discursivity cannot be founded on an inherent distinction between humans and 
nonhumans” (Barad, “Posthumanist” 818).  
In sum, the singularities associated with AMD&ART—the townsfolk, the coal 
seams, the bacteria and reeds, the Hawthorne trees, the plastic pipes and soccer 
field dirt—aren’t singular subjects at all, but rather phenomenal singularities, the 
result of the exclusionary practices of an apparatus whose performative operations 
depend upon other singularities to produce roughly cohesive phenomena that may 
pass, from moment to moment, as the “same” entity, something we’ve come to call in 
our peculiar shorthand, an “individual.” What we might understand as the very 
Being of Vintondale, of AMD&ART, of each “individual” townsperson and backyard 
bird, is thusly wholly and truly dependent on the Being of the others. 
Intra-active Ethics: Art and the doing of Being 
 My goal in articulating these profound, ontological matrices that constitute 
and reconstitute phenomena is, finally, to justify a comprehensive ethical program. 
This is made particularly obvious in the case of an artwork such as AMD&ART, 
indebted as it is to a wide array of disciplines, composed of such a variety of species, 
and with the capacity to potentially impact the naturalcultural world in many ways. 
It is, after all, a biological, chemical, cultural response to a particular set of 
contingencies, co-constructed by singularities (“individuals”), generationally as well 
as in the unfolding present. It is the result of the histories of human migrations and 
economic policies as much as the forest of the Carboniferous era, whose thick-
walled cells eventually became the coal seams. As daunting (and intellectually 
stimulating) as tracing these lineages of affect and happenstance may be, however, 
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critics, researchers and participants alike cannot forget that AMD&ART is very much 
still a material phenomenon with very real repercussions for the inhabitants of 
Vintondale. The site does not exist in a vacuum, and it must be accountable for its 
contributions to Vintondale as an emergent whole, particularly those seeking to 
remedy some of the social malaise and mental hardship that comes with dwelling in 
a despoiled place.  
I can offer firsthand accounts of the mental and emotional distress in the 
battered watersheds of western Pennsylvania. As my family drove through 
downtown Johnstown, PA, in the 1980s and 1990s, we passed often over the Little 
Conemaugh River and Stony Creek, both running orange with the iron sediments 
precipitated out of AMD. There was no life in these rivers, no grasses growing on the 
banks, no migrating birds stopping over to feed. They were otherworldly, 
godforsaken scenes, and were not rare in Cambria County. The town of Nanty Glo, a 
former coal camp in a valley near my childhood home, possesses not only a stream 
tainted by AMD, but is also towered over by immense “bony dumps”: piles of burned 
refuse coal. These mountains of coal and ash, hundreds of feet tall and the size of a 
city block, loom at the edge of the town, spewing mine acid and particulate matter 
into the air. The bony dumps are too caustic an environment in which any plant 
might begin to grow, at least without substantial remediative intervention.  
These are challenging environments to love, made even more so by the 
conventional beauty of the lush second-growth forest and clear, cold, mountain 
streams that dominate the Allegheny Mountains in areas without AMD or a history 
of surface mining. By contrast, the startling orange color and foul smell of an AMD-
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laden stream is hardly a thing of beauty. Blacklick Creek, contaminated with AMD, 
runs directly through the center of the town. It is impossible to ignore.  It is a 
constant reminder of both the lurking specter of toxic contamination and of the 
abandonment of the town at the whims of economics. Reading firsthand accounts of 
growing up in Vintondale in the 1940s and 1950s, the years following the first 
shuttering of surrounding mines, makes clear that Vintondale has hardly been a 
place of idyllic beauty or ease. Lucille Beistel Hagens, who graduated from 
Vintondale High School in 1945, has penned a short essay titled “Front Porch 
Panoramas” that recounts her experience living in Vintondale in the 1940s and 
describes the conditions in the town. In Vintondale, she writes,  
Houses are like grey ghosts, haunting the night, indentical [sic] in their 
weather-scarred structures and resigned look of poverty, thirsting for 
a coat of paint, a touch of beauty to distinguish them from their 
neighbors. Nothing unneeded had been added in a community which 
struggles for survival and is afraid of tomorrow. Windows are blind 
eyes, heavy lidded with blue-green shades. Curtains are as varied as 
the numerous races who live in this ugly town. […]This is my town; 
the dirt streets run through with deep cracks due to the miles of mine 
tunnels dug beneath their surface, the coke ovens burning nonstop, 
the reeking rock dumps, the company houses, even the stale odors 
that hang around like unwanted visitors. I am to learn in the years to 
come that this is a depressed area (Hagens).  
 
Clearly this is not a sentimental idyll, and while perhaps a bit overwrought, the 
prose speaks of a troubled and emotionally taxing environment. This history, even 
70 years later, is difficult to escape: the material conditions of this earlier era 
persist, and the inhabitants of the town, many of whom are elderly, lived their 
formative years in this troubling milieu. The town itself is slowly slipping away: a 
historic building turned apartment complex burned on February 4th, 2011. This 
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building (the old Cresswell Electric Company) will almost certainly not be rebuilt or 
replaced.  
To reorient the sensibilities of local inhabitants away from a disdain for the 
polluted environment and their associated despondent emotional state is a daunting 
task and perhaps the greatest possible legacy of AMD&ART. To achieve a goal such 
as this, to heal both the land and its inhabitants in one fell swoop, is a promising 
future direction for public art practice. This tendency must be cultivated if public art 
is to become, as I think it must, a truly ethical proposition: a mode of examining not 
only the lives and histories of inhabitants of communities, nor solely the 
experimentation with aesthetic forms, but a multivalent method of enriching the 
lives of those who encounter the artwork in question. 
The type of cultural change that I am advocating is not always easily 
swallowed, especially in a place like western Pennsylvania where established ways 
die hard. When I visited AMD&ART in July of 2010, one of the interpretive signs had 
either fallen or been pulled from its support structure of painted 4x4s, but not 
before being shot with some type of high-caliber rifle (judging by the size of the 
bullet hole). Whether this attack was intended as a crude commentary on the site or 
was simply the mark of a ballistics-inclined vandal is difficult to surmise. This 
bedraggled sign provides a telling bit of symbolism nonetheless. Regardless of the 
intentions of this mysterious marksman, the shot-up sign is just that: a sign. It has 
become a graphic representation of the tensions that exist in a community between 
an industrial heritage and a budding ecological consciousness, between those who 
are “insiders” (e.g., townsfolk, locals) and those who are “outsiders” (e.g., tourists, 
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designers, artists, critics), and perhaps broadly between those who see the value in 
a site such as AMD&ART for ideological reasons and those who will not or cannot.  
An example of this tension as it has played out in a widely-known public 
artwork will offer some guidance as to how to conceive of this dialectic between the 
“insider/outsider” tension. Beginning in 1983, Michael Heizer began work on a 
project titled Effigy Tumuli, a series of earthen mounds in the shape of abstracted 
animal forms, outside of Ottawa, Illinois. The area under reclamation was an 
abandoned stripmine suffering from many of the same problems of acidification as 
the AMD&ART site. Ottawa Silica Company donated the land for reclamation into a 
public space, prompting environmentalists and fans of contemporary art to swoon. 
Erika Doss, whose book Flying Pigs and Spirit Poles devotes an entire chapter to 
Effigy Tumuli, describes the art public’s response: “Anticipating public accolades and 
admiring Heizer's artful reclamation of an industrially spoiled landscape, one writer 
declared Effigy Tumuli 'a paragon of art in the '80s: a little corporate ingenuity, a 
dash of public/private cooperation, and a lot of artistic vision’” (117).  
The only problem with this strip of abandoned land is that it wasn’t, in fact, 
abandoned at all. The rain-eroded gullies and gravel hills had become a haven for 
off-road vehicle enthusiasts from across the Midwest, drawn to one of only a handful 
of truly free-access off-road sites in the region.  
“It was a dirt bikers’ paradise,” […] Kelly Dempsey recalls. “It was 
known all over the Midwest for great off-roading and every good 
weekend some sixty to eighty people would use the area to ride—
more on holidays. Off-road riding isn’t about drugs or drinking, you 
know, it’s about whole families doing stuff together, and this place 
was famous. It was a free space for public access, and we don’t have 
too many of those left in this country” (Doss 143).   
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In remediating the site to a state of environmental health, and situating that 
remediative strategy within the formal constraints of environmental art, Heizer and 
his corporate sponsors undid precisely what was most valuable to the off-roading 
residents of Ottawa: free access to space, and the capacity to build meaningful 
communities of their own accord.  Doss excoriates Heizer and his supporters on this 
account and many others, ranging from the poor construction of the earthen 
mounds (most have eroded and proven incapable of sustaining the necessary 
vegetation to stabilize) to the clandestine planning process and inaccessibility of the 
plans to local residents. Characterized “more as a stellar example of misguided 
environmentally correct art than anything else” (Doss 117), as well as “a corporate 
tax dodge contemptuously disguised as modern sculpture and disingenuously posed 
as public art” (Doss 155), Effigy Tumuli has come to symbolize the worst practices of 
imposing external values and “High Art” pretension on a community whose voice 
remains stifled throughout the process. It’s little wonder that Paul Smith, one of the 
most vocal dirtbike activists, descended upon the opening ceremony of Effigy 
Tumuli on his bike, unceremoniously riding through the attendant crowd and 
showering them with a hail of dirt and stones. Few other modes of expression 
remained available to the local residents. 
 These anxieties, as well as others, plague many types of remediative artwork. 
AMD&ART avoided many of the pitfalls demonstrated by Effigy Tumuli by actively 
involving the community in the planning and execution of the site. Community 
meetings designed to assess local interest in constructing the site that would 
eventually become AMD&ART began as early as 1995, and the townsfolk were 
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involved in clearing decades of rubbish from the “coal flats,” the old town dump that 
would become AMD&ART. The design of the site is attentive to the need for multiple 
utilizations of the land in question and includes a multi-purpose recreation field and 
walking trails in addition to the elements that might be considered conventionally 
“artistic”: the Litmus Garden, the sculpture park, and so forth. Rather than a 
dedication ceremony attended by corporate luminaries, the dedication of AMD&ART 
in July 2005, was a celebration of the mutual achievement of the AMD&ART team 
and the townsfolk of Vintondale. The “AMD&ART Hometown Parade” drew residents 
past and present to Main Street, where heritage organizations (the Ancient Order of 
Hibernians, the Slovak Heritage Association of the Laurel Highlands and a Welsh 
heritage group), local sports teams, volunteer fire companies, a local group of “Coal 
Miner’s Daughters” on a float decorated with old-timey ephemera invoking the 
hardscrabble history of the town (washtubs and butterchurns, old enameled stoves 
piled next to a faux outhouse) and others paraded through town to the fanfare of 
local marching bands. At the head of the parade, the Vintondale V.F.W. Color 
Guard—associated with the very V.F.W. organization into which T. Allen Comp 
walked ten years prior to pitch the idea of AMD&ART to the townsfolk—led the 
procession through what passes for a throng…at least in Vintondale (“AMD&ART 
news”).  
 While these events paint an idyllic, inspiring picture of the relationship 
between the townsfolk and the AMD&ART entities, my mind invariably drifts back to 
the bullet-riddled sign. My visit to the site came five years after its dedication, 
almost to the very day. Have relations between the townsfolk and AMD&ART soured, 
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as their hope for renewed tourism revenues in the town failed to pan out? The site is 
well known in the “green” art community but maintains a shockingly low profile in 
the minds of western Pennsylvanians; while anecdotal, my description of this 
project to fellow residents of western Pennsylvania in the course of this study was 
invariably met with incredulity. The most common response to my assertation that 
AMD&ART exists at all in Vintondale is undoubtedly a suspicious, “Are you sure?” It 
very much seems that the idea of a relatively famous artwork existing in western 
Pennsylvania, let alone a wayward place like Vintondale, is too much for locals to 
believe.  
Remediation and Amelioration: Healing Through Aesthetics 
 It is unfortunate that most residents of western Pennsylvania (my own 
family members included) are so skeptical of the existence or importance of 
AMD&ART, for the site has much to offer the residents of Vintondale and western 
Pennsylvania more broadly. The site is a stellar example of the kind of change made 
possible by a scenario in which, because there is so little left to lose environmentally 
and financially, radical solutions to environmental problems can be enacted more 
easily. The benefit of AMD&ART is not simply “arts education,” nor is its primary 
contribution solely aesthetic. There are environmentally derived psychological 
effects that are extraneous to the artwork itself, while remaining firmly dependent 
on AMD&ART. The relationships between townsfolk, non-human Others, natural 
phenomena and the myriad of other factors which contribute to the notion of 
“landscape” flow through and are co-constitutive of the AMD&ART site, just as the 
impacts of AMD&ART affect the rest of the phenomena of the town.   
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Philosopher Glenn Albrecht has dubbed these psychological effects 
“psychoterratic,”  (psycho: mind; terra: earth) making explicit an intensely relational 
co-constitutive model of mental processes. Albrecht drew his initial conclusions 
about the features of these psychological states from narratives of loss and anxiety 
in the Upper Hunter Valley of New South Wales, Australia, a newly minted coal 
mining community. As the residents of this area described the impact of vast “open-
cut mining” (“stripmining” in the United States) on their emotional and physical 
health, Albrecht began to suss out a workable psychological typology that described 
the psychological repercussions of the mines.  
Before the advent of coal mining in the area, the Upper Hunter was known as 
the “Tuscany of the South”; lush, rolling agrarian hills. Twenty years ago however, 
open-cut (strip) mining came to the Upper Hunter, and the landscape was 
decimated by the absurdly vast blast-wounds left by exposing the coal seams to 
surface mining. The relatively bucolic farm tractors and combines were replaced 
with dragline excavators, which are among the largest machines ever constructed. 
Explosive charges are detonated across the region many times daily, and the 
miasma of rock dust and trapped gases, coupled with the emissions of enormous 
coal-fired powerplants built nearby, permeates the countryside.   
The Upper Hunter Valley changed within the span of a human lifetime from a 
conventionally beautiful landscape to a scarred industrial waste, leaving those who 
had settled in the valley years earlier trapped where they stood. Property values 
tanked, and the productivity of the surrounding lands diminished. The Upper 
Hunter is gone, in a sense, yet the people remain. This experience, the sense of 
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“homesickness while still at home,” lies at the heart of “solastalgia,” Albrecht’s 
neologism for this particular psychoterratic condition. Etymologically, the word 
reveals this backward-looking tendency: it is a combination of nostalgia (originally a 
psychoterratic illness itself) and solace (implying a sense of comfort, particularly in 
place). Albrecht writes “solastalgia refers to the pain or stress caused by the loss of, 
or inability to derive, solace connected to the negatively perceived state of one’s 
home environment. Solastalgia exists when there is the lived experience of the 
physical desolation of home” (Albrecht, “Solastalgia: The Distress” S96).  
While his work on psychoterratic illness began with negative states, Albrecht 
quickly realized that there must also be converse positive states, leading him to 
develop a typology of psychoterratic mental states. This typology draws on the 
extant work of contemporary environmental philosophers, theorists of space and 
place and a number of other specialists. At a lecture I attended associated with the 
Louisiana Folklife Society Annual Convention in Lafayette, Louisiana, Albrecht 
detailed his completed typology: 
Realm Negative Origin Positive Origin 
Educational Nature-Deficit 
Disorder 
Louv 2005 Biophilia Fromm 1965 
Wilson 1984 
Personal and 
Ecological 
Ecophobia 
Ecoanxiety 
Various Ecophilia Sobel 1995 
Cultural and 
Political 
Ecoparalysis Various Solophilia Albrecht 2009 
Personal and 
Place 
Solastalgia Albrecht 2003 Topophilia Tuan 1974 
Home and 
Place 
Nostalgia Hoffer 1688 Endemophilia Albrecht 2010 
Psyche Global Dread Albrecht (Jill) 
2003 
Eutierria Albrecht 2010 
Fig. 5. The topology of psychoterratic states (Albrecht, Solastalgia and the 
Landscape) 
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As can be seen, Albrecht considers a number of facets of the psychological 
experience of landscape relation, rather than simply focusing on the perceived 
relationship between individuals and their home/place. I will focus my attentions 
only the neologisms coined by Albrecht: solastalgia, soliphilia, endemophilia and 
eutierria. I do this primarily with the aim of introducing these concepts more widely 
into the discourses of environmental relationality, as well as an acknowledgment 
that Albrecht’s concepts are explicitly about the dynamics of reciprocal constitution 
of landscape. Furthermore, Albrecht’s concepts cover the breadth of the potential 
psychological effect of AMD&ART on the landscape of Vintondale, ranging from a 
solastalgic state prior to the introduction of a the site, through the active 
construction of the site in the name of soliphilia, on to a state of renewed 
hopefulness about the status of the town in endemophilia.  
 Thus, I begin with solastalgia. As I have stressed throughout this document, 
the acidic water that would eventually prompt the construction of AMD&ART was 
but one of a number of serious environmental problems facing Vintondale. From the 
enormous piles of burned refuse coal, the garbage and pollution of the “coal flats,” to 
the persistent acid rain problems faced by much of Appalachia, the environment in 
Vintondale was, and is, badly degraded. The town itself was degraded as well: there 
are no longer any grocery stores, gas stations, or schools in the town. The median 
household income in Vintondale, according to the 2000 US Census, was 33,417 
dollars, and 0% of residents possessed a degree higher than a high school diploma. 
In sum, Vintondale is a depressed community in a number of senses. T. Allen Comp, 
the founder of the AMD&ART program, links this to the town’s history as a coal 
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camp; the “nothing good happens in Vintondale” attitude that I reference in the 
introduction is the result of precisely this economic and social stagnation.  
 In searching for a model that explains the psychic and emotional toll on 
Vintondale residents, critics must consider a wide array of possible causes. To 
overlook the effect of the environment on the inhabitants of Vintondale in favor of a 
model stressing economic conditions is to miss perhaps the dominant feature of the 
town: its rural location. Vintondale exists in a valley, surrounded on all sides by 
mountains and streams, covered by thick wooded patches and miles from the 
nearest town. Vintondale is isolated, a veritable outpost in the wilderness compared 
to a suburban area outside of even a modest city. To drive into Vintondale from any 
of the four possible routes is to pass through tunnels of greenery in the summer that 
are replaced with stark, snowy ravines in winter. Vintondale is, as is the town 
nearby in which I was raised, defined and to some extent delimited by its natural 
environment. This plenum, in my experience, prompts a greater awareness of the 
flora and fauna, not to mention the more immaterial forces such as weather, that 
shape the experiential fabric of a landscape.  
 An assertion that a decrease in overtly man-made elements will increase 
one’s awareness of “natural” elements should come as no surprise, given the prior 
discussion of the fundamental “with-ness” of unfolding Being, and the manner in 
which inescapable, mandatory relations with other phenomena constitute 
performative apparatuses that produce the very Being and sense of a place. The link 
between an environment and its persons (human and non-Human) is co-
constitutive, and subject to influence in both directions. Writing in the 1970s, during 
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the height of another Pennsylvania ecological crisis (the profound pollution of Lake 
Erie via heavy industry), Gregory Bateson decried the dualistic Cartesianism at root 
in conceiving of the environment as something aside from culture, and therefore 
aside from a “mind”: “You decide that you want to get rid of the by-products of 
human life and that Lake Erie will be a good place to put them. You forget that the 
eco-mental system called Lake Erie is a part of your wider eco-mental system—and 
that if Lake Erie is driven insane, its insanity is incorporated in the larger system of 
your thought and experience” (Bateson 492). Jon Goodbun explains that Bateson’s 
“mind” is not to be understood solely as a psychological construct (though it does 
operate in this sense, once compounded), but rather as a type of agency:  
For Bateson, the ecology of the living world is full of mind. They are 
minds that are constituted relationally, in networks, through their 
activity, their actual life-process. Bateson sees ecosystems as 
ecologies of mind. He also sees organisms as ecologies of mind. Today 
we might call much of what Bateson meant by mind as “agency.” (42) 
 
In other words, as per Karen Barad’s formulation of agential-realism, mind is an 
immanent, intra-active doing of Being, emerging via apparatuses (patterns of 
relationality) that shape and alter the extended concept of “mind,” beyond any 
simple activity located within an individual brain. Goodbun goes on to quote 
Bateson: “The individual mind is immanent but not only in the body. It is immanent 
also in the pathways and messages outside of the body; and there is a larger Mind of 
which the individual mind is only a subsystem…immanent in the total 
interconnected social system and planetary ecology” (42).  
 If Lake Erie was being driven insane by industrial waste, surely Vintondale 
was being driven mad as well. Histories of use and abuse make manifest truly 
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wretched conditions once left to fester unchecked, and Vintondale just prior to 
AMD&ART was just such a case. The mind-system of Vintondale was a prime 
situation in which Albrecht’s notion of solastalgia, the feeling of “homesickness 
while still at home” might emerge. In Albrecht’s original formulation, it was after the 
Upper Hunter was “gone,” that people began to pine for its unspoiled beauty; in 
Vintondale, the residents never had the luxury of seeing the Blacklick Valley before 
the iron smelters, timber companies and coal barons swept in. This doesn’t mean 
that the residents of western Pennsylvania might not have a sense of that which is 
missing, or else that which is undeniably present; Stewart Run, a nearby stream that 
is a tributary of Blacklick Creek, remains unpolluted by AMD, while Shuman Run and 
Blacklick Creek struggle under a caustic blanket of orange sediment. The old growth 
forests were long gone, replaced by second and third growth trees barely one 
hundred years old. Other area towns continued to grow and prosper, while 
Vintondale shrank to an eighth of its former population of 2,000.  
 As is often the case though, it is difficult for individuals living under duress in 
ecologically degraded mind/systems to reflect with sufficient distance upon the 
situation in which they find themselves; in an aptly eco-centric metaphor, it is 
difficult to see the forest for the trees.  It is only once the symptoms have been 
alleviated that individuals are able to retroactively assess the extent to which their 
perceptions of a state and its associated emotional load have weighed upon them. 
This is the precisely the case with AMD&ART: once the site was constructed and the 
subsequent cleansing of the area surrounding Vintondale were underway, 
measurable improvements in the emotional and mental states of Vintondale 
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residents were evident. Susan Thering, a researcher whose work focuses on 
communities dealing with the repercussions of historical events (“survivor 
communities”), conducted a series of surveys in Vintondale associated with the 
AMD&ART project, and reported significant findings in a number of areas of interest. 
Thering’s survey asked participants to rate a series of possible benefits of cleaning 
up acid mine drainage in their community and was administered twice: once in 
1998, three years into the AMD&ART project, and once in 2005, after the completion 
of the site. The resulting comparison found that townspeople reliably ranked 8 of 
the 9 benefits as “more important” in 2005 than in 1998: “Reintroduction of fish to 
the area”; “increased tourism”; “new recreational facilities are included in AMD 
cleanup and land redevelopment”; “resident participation in AMD cleanup and land 
redevelopment decisions”; “more visitors spending money in the area”; “educational 
activities, illustrations, and field trips for students”; “increased community 
cooperation as part of planning cleanup and redevelopment”; and “restoration of 
scenic beauty”. Only “restoration of stream health and clean water” was ranked less 
important, though only by a one-hundredth of a percentile , which implies that it 
was originally deemed of such import that little change in attitude could be 
reported.  
 Are these blanket increases evidence of the presence of a solastalgic 
mentality prior to AMD&ART? It is difficult to surmise from the whole of Thering’s 
data, but a niggling lexical ambiguity in the wording of her survey reveals the tell-
tale traces of solastalgic thinking: the word “possible,” as in the statement “possible 
environmental benefits,” might variously be interpreted as “potential” (Thering’s 
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original intent), and also as “that which is likely to be done” (the possible). 
Likeliness, in other words, plays an important role in the thinking of survey 
participants, and the four questions that displayed the most statistical variation 
(“Increased tourism”; “Resident participation in AMD cleanup and land 
redevelopment”; “More visitors spending money in the area”; and “Increased 
community cooperation as part of planning cleanup and redevelopment”) appear to 
be those facets of the AMD&ART experience that Vintondale residents thought were 
least likely (possible) to occur. 
 We might broadly group these four statistically significant potential benefits 
into two categories: the likelihood of Vintondale residents becoming actively 
involved, and the likelihood of anyone wanting to visit Vintondale. Either way, it’s a 
pretty bleak prognosis on the likeability of their home. They either felt powerless to 
change their surroundings, or else were skeptical of their fellow townsfolk’s desire 
to get involved. Nobody would want to come to Vintondale, and if they did, they 
certainly wouldn’t feel compelled to spend any money in town—after all, where 
would they? In other words, mired in solastalgia, the residents felt that their 
surroundings, and therefore their fellow inhabitants, were intrinsically devoid of 
merit, with nothing prompting outsiders to visit or spend time in their town. This is 
a bleak outlook, and it is perpetuated by the whole system that is Vintondale: natural 
landscape, manmade landscape, and cultural landscape, which are, as per Haraway’s 
formulation, companion practices. As goes Blacklick Creek, so goes the psychological 
wellbeing of Vintondale’s inhabitants. 
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The positive psychological effects of AMD&ART do not make change manifest 
in an inexplicable, untheorizable, emergent fashion, however. “Soliphilia” (soli: 
solidarity, philia: attraction, affinity, love) is a concept developed by Albrecht to act 
as an “antidote” to solastalgia and to characterize “the love of and responsibility for 
a place, bioregion, planet and the unity of interrelated interests within it” (Smith). 
Soliphilia, as is evidenced by its location on the topological chart, is intended by 
Albrecht to be understood as a political and cultural stance, one that is focused on a 
holistic affinity for place as manifest in direct action (solidarity in action being the 
natural remedy to the feelings of helplessness and wistfulness associated with 
solastalgia). He aligns soliphilia with other “-philias”—E.O Wilson’s “biophilia” and 
Yi-Fu Tuan’s “topophilia”—hoping to provide an overarching conceptual category 
that is attentive to the relationality of landscape, rather than signaling an adoration 
or affinity for specific constituent parts. Soliphilia draws on an understanding of 
place as a process “wherein people are the creators of places, and place creation and 
meaning flow from a continual process of interaction between the person, their 
social milieu, and the physical setting; this process results in the meanings that are 
endowed in a place, and thus a sense of place (SOP) that is personally and socially 
constructed” (Smaldone, Harris and Sanyal 397). I would interject that “people” 
ought be understood to stand in for those singularities with the capacity for agential 
impact, whether animate or inanimate.  By doing so, we are reminded of the 
dynamic exchange that occurs between agents and environments, to the point that 
the boundaries between each become increasingly blurred.  
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AMD&ART activates the discourses typified by soliphilia because it is an 
avowedly interventionist program, as evidenced by a section of T. Allen Comp’s 
“Founder’s Statement”: “this vast eastern mountain ecosystem seemed to be a place 
in which this nation could best confront — and overcome — its environmental and 
economic past, adding thousands of acres of reclaimed, healthy lands and waters — 
and peoples — to our national treasure — and where we could establish that the 
Arts and the Humanities are critical to that recovery process” (Comp, “Founders”).  
AMD&ART, motivated by an affinity for this “vast eastern mountain ecosystem,” is 
conceived by Comp and his fellow designers and executors of the site as a means of 
cultivating further solidarity, across the whole of the landscape and its inhabitants, 
as well as across the divides that separate academic discourses in the arts and 
humanities from those in the natural sciences. Solidarity, we can assume, is also 
being cultivated among the inhabitants of Vintondale. The results of Thering’s study 
support this hypothesis, because people deemed it more possible that people would 
cooperate in restoring the habitat surrounding AMD&ART as the study progressed. 
Yet, in the vein of Haraway’s companion species, we need only look beyond the 
seemingly neat divide between humans and the rest of nature to find solidarity, 
affinity and caring cultivated in many registers. The reintroduction of fish to 
Blacklick Creek, for example, was deemed to have substantial importance by those 
residents who participated in Thering’s survey (4.73/5.00). The fish’s presence in 
Blacklick Creek has little to do with edibility and everything to do with the sense 
that they “ought” to be there; their absence has obviously been keenly missed, if 
their reintroduction is such a high priority. They are an absent partner in 
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Vintondale, without whom Vintondale is not quite itself, and whose absence has 
been felt: the old Mill Pond—now drained—served as a source of fresh fish for the 
loggers and miners of the town. The absence of warm-water pond species such as 
Bass and Sunfish, and particularly the absence of the native Brook Trout from the 
streams surrounding Vintondale, is a glaring omission in the landscape.  
This solidarity, in the face of environmental despair, is thoroughly focused on 
a particular goal in Albrecht’s formulation: it is about acknowledging, as well as 
cultivating, psychological states wherein people draw contentment and joy from 
their relations within specific environments. Albrecht’s concept “endemophilia” 
(endem: based on the French endémique, with the Greek roots endēmia [a dwelling 
in] and endēmos [native in the people]) is intended to bolster current trends toward 
localism, typified by Lucy Lippard’s notion of the “lure of the local”: “The 
intersections of nature, culture, history and ideology form the ground on which we 
stand—our land, our place, the local. The lure of the local operates on each of us, 
exposing our politics and our spiritual legacies. It is the geographical component of 
the psychological need to belong somewhere, one antidote to prevailing alienation” 
(Lippard 7). It is no idle coincidence that Lippard offers the “local” as an antidote for 
alientation, and Albrecht offers “endemophilia” (love of the local) as an antidote for 
the “physical desolation at home” of solastalgia. In both cases, the local is assumed 
to be a responsive, flexible scale, at which individuals might find direct access to 
their surroundings and their compeers.  
One must be careful, though, not to romanticize far-flung hamlets like 
Vintondale in the search for an increasingly “authentic” localism, one that seems to 
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retreat in the face of anyone’s scrutiny save our own. “Local” isn’t a stand-in for 
“unknown” or “remote” or any of the other means of characterizing a place as 
special precisely for its novelty, in the face of homogenizing economic and cultural 
trends. Novelty of a different sort—novelty in familiarity—is at the root of the push 
toward localism. Former Poet Laureate Ted Kooser has written a short poem that 
cuts to the heart of this affair and published it in a book that bears the name of his 
thoughtful contribution toward articulating the local, Local Wonders:  
  If you can awaken  
  inside the familiar 
  and discover it new 
  you need never 
  leave home. (94) 
 
Localism is not a proxy for an old-timey, homespun “life-in-place,” to which 
denizens of the 21st century can only aspire. It is instead a mindful perceptual shift 
within the domain of the familiar, wherever and whenever that may be. In a word, 
what Kooser, Lippard and Albrecht are suggesting is imbrication, the day-by-day 
overlapping of experience and familiarity that breeds a depth of understanding and 
(re)discovery. This overlapping natural, cultural, ideological framework refines not 
only our narrativized sense of who we are, and from whence we spring, but also 
assures us that our fate is not to become unmoored from that which we know and 
might rely upon to bring us comfort and joy. To reiterate Wendell Berry’s assertion 
from the introductory chapter, “the real infinitude of experience is in familiarity” 
(139).  
 Infinitude, if this is not too grandiose a goal to ascribe to AMD&ART, is at least 
integral to my final estimation of the possible value of the site to Vintondale. Glenn 
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Albrecht, describing the most profound psychological component of his typology, 
“eutierria” (eu: good, tierra :earth, ia: suffix for member of a group of [positive 
psychoterratic] conditions), describes it “as a positive feeling of oneness with the 
earth and its life forces” (Albrecht, “Solastalgia and the Landcape”). The state is also 
described by Albrecht as “that oceanic feeling,” clearly drawing on Freud’s 
expansion of Romain Rolland’s view of an “oceanic” feeling associated with oneness 
with the cosmos, particularly in mystical traditions. In Civilization and Its 
Discontents, Freud attempts to understand Rolland’s concept (which he claims to be 
unable to access), writing, “it is a feeling of an indissoluble bond, of being one with 
the external world as a whole” (12).  Further along in this text, Freud equates it with 
the sensation of boundary dissolution associated with love: “Against all evidence of 
his senses, a man who is in love declares that ‘I’ and ‘you’ are one, and is prepared to 
behave as if it were a fact […] Thus even the feeling of our own ego is subject to 
disturbance and the boundaries of the ego are not constant” (13).  
 Norman O. Brown, counter-culture icon and Freudian disciple, interprets 
Freud’s reading of the oceanic as the unmediated condition of the unconscious, “that 
immortal sea which brought us hither; intimations of which are given in moments of 
‘oceanic feeling’; one sea of energy or instinct; embracing all mankind, without 
distinction of race, language, or culture; and embracing all the generations of Adam, 
past, present, and future, in one phylogenetic heritage; in one mystical or symbolical 
body” (81). Albrecht’s concept of eutierria is similar to Brown’s vision of the 
oceanic, in that it is contingent upon a sort of boundary dissolution, and as per 
Haraway, Nancy and Barad, must be understood to grow and change 
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phylogenetically; as our imbrication in the local reveals, the unfolding, emergent 
doing of relational Being constitutes an infinitely malleable plenum. Eutierria is felt, 
I would hazard to suggest, when we become aware, even momentarily, of the vast 
web of companionship and contingent affect that is the immanence of Being. This is 
the “wonder” of Kooser’s “local wonder,” our amazement at the revelation that as 
the myth of our autonomous humanist subject fades, we feel not as if we’ve 
evaporated or fallen from grace, but rather find ourselves caught up in the cat’s 
cradle of Being.  
 Asking whether or not AMD&ART provokes an oceanic feeling in visitors or 
townsfolk of Vintondale is a daunting and ultimately unanswerable question; Freud 
reports that Rolland acknowledges the oceanic as a “purely subjective fact, not an 
article of faith” (11), suggesting that it is unlikely that a scenario or instance could 
be fabricated that would reliably produce this sensation across groups of 
individuals. But, as AMD&ART attempts to remediate the area surrounding 
Vintondale, and in the process grows vibrant flowers and foliage, attracts animals 
and birds, transforms with the seasons and draws people to the town, it turns a 
formerly polluted site into a site in/with which people might feel capable of 
experiencing eutierria. Revulsion at the pollution of a site is in keeping with our 
intellectual inheritance from the Romantic tradition of a preference for unspoiled, 
grand nature, seemingly untouched by the hand of man. While AMD&ART is 
obviously a construct, and a technologically advanced one at that, it does encourage 
the flourishing of the people, environment and historical consciousness of the 
Vintondale area in a fashion that is in keeping with this Romantic tradition. 
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 Finally, it is upon this point—the acknowledgement of the flourishing of 
Vintondale in the wake of AMD&ART’s construction—that ethics enters 
unequivocally into the conceptual terrain of the site. Chris Cuomo has written that 
ethics (in particular a feminist ethics) must indeed focus upon flourishing, as it 
makes possible an ethical stance that both acknowledges the necessity of a human 
instrumental relationship with the rest of nature, while simultaneously providing a 
framework that values nature (including humans) for their intrinsic worth in a non-
instrumental sense:  
if we are to consider anything morally valuable, or if ethics is to get off 
the ground at all, some amount of human flourishing is necessary. So 
ethics implies human flourishing, both logically and practically. Also, 
ethics that assert the value of all people, and reject hierarchies that 
have led to the unjustifiable, categorical devaluation of women and 
others, assume that a preferred state of affairs is one in which, prima 
facie, as much human flourishing as possible occurs. Since nonhuman 
communities and entities are necessarily, intrinsically bound up with 
human life and interests, the well-being of nature is implied, to at least 
a minimal degree, in human flourishing. Some degree of nonhuman 
flourishing is instrumentally necessary for human flourishing. In 
addition to the necessity of nature for human life (and hence human 
moral life), ecological feminists hold that all living beings and systems 
are appreciable within ecological systems and values—as members of 
the moral universe, whose interests ought to be taken seriously by 
moral agents, and as entities that ought to flourish in their own right 
whenever possible. That is, even when we are unable to accommodate 
the interests of every relevant entity, the 'greatest good' that is sought 
by ethics includes the interests of all living beings and systems. (63)  
 
This lengthy quotation nicely summarizes the extent to which instrumentality and 
non-instrumentality overlap in our relationships with the other component 
elements that constitute Being (our intra-active phenomena). Instrumentality is 
operating, in many cases, as the mode of interaction that first alerts participants to 
the existence of a thing, which over time becomes valued for non-instrumental 
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reasons. AMD&ART, for example, has obvious instrumental value. It is cleaning the 
acid mine drainage of Vintondale, providing space for pleasant walks and 
recreational facilities. It is also a community of living entities, whose discrete 
lifestyles and interactions form the very core of AMD&ART, introducing visitors to 
creatures of all scales and sorts toward whom they might feel compassion or 
fondness. I might find a kind of partiality growing along with my repeated visits 
toward the trees of the Litmus Garden that has nothing to do with the conceptual 
content of the garden as an artform and everything to do with the trees as 
individuals with whom I am familiar.  
 AMD&ART, by this logic, is an ethical proposition. It is intended to cultivate 
the maximum amount of flourishing in the lives of wild plants and animals, in the 
psychological health of the inhabitants of Vintondale, and in the social and economic 
status of the town. This is a flourishing with an ecological bent, understanding that 
to bolster the capacity for flourishing in one sphere of possible improvement is to 
invariably assist with the rest of the constituent parties. Cuomo asks, “What would 
follow from the observation that we are ecological beings—“mere citizens of the 
biotic community,' in Aldo Leopold's words—as surely as we are human? Perhaps 
our social units ought to promote our flourishing as ecological selves, and therefore 
some degree of flourishing of nonhuman life, in order to create a stronger ecological 
community” (69). This is precisely the type of thinking whose logical framework I 
have been outlining in this chapter and throughout the course of this dissertation as 
a whole. It is, after all, always a matter of what “counts” as a member of a 
community: Rocks? Plants? Sentient creatures? The poor? The rich? What, whom, 
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and under what circumstances? What determines moral considerability, and 
therefore entre into the sphere of ethical concern, rather than simple instrumental 
valuation?  
Hyperbolic Ethics 
 On the point of extending ethics, I defer to Derrida, whose later work on 
hyperbolic ethics makes clear that in order for a truly ethical stance to exist, society 
must demand an absolute ethical stance: unconditional hospitality. Derrida 
implores, “let us say yes to who or what turns up, before any determination, before 
any anticipation, before any identification, whether or not it has to do with a 
foreigner, an immigrant, an invited guest, or an unexpected visitor, whether or not 
the new arrival is the citizen of another country, a human, animal, or divine 
creature, a living or dead thing, male or female” (Of Hospitality 77; italics in 
original). What is pertinent in this quotation is the requirement that we open 
ourselves to the arrival of the stranger; hence, we cannot pass judgment on their 
arrival, even to the extent that we assess their form. A truly unconditional ethic of 
hospitality receives the Other as a matter of due course—the very price of Being 
singular-plural, knowingly entering into an intra-active relationship. The very 
richness of our ontological condition depends precisely upon the perfectly mundane 
encounter that exceeds the very notion of encounter. For an “encounter” occurs 
between two things, and the scenario at hand is the genesis of two encountering 
things out of an event that produces both the encounter and its production. We must 
“say yes” to who or what turns up, because it is oftentimes us who is just arriving. 
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 Derrida knew that this formulation would quickly stray into the realm of 
untenable utopianism, but that it is the perfectly pure impetus for the practical 
modes of ethics. The practical ethics of interaction (the laws of ethics, plural) are 
thus antithetical to the unconditional law of ethics, and yet mutually dependent. 
Herein an antinomy arises that defines the very working paradox of ethical thought. 
On the one hand, the law of hospitality requires that we “give the new arrival all of 
one’s home and oneself, to give him or her one’s own, without asking a name, or 
compensation, or the fulfillment of even the smallest condition” (Derrida, Of 
Hospitality 77). Yet this hyperbolic formulation is tempered in practical application, 
demanding that we establish the laws of hospitality (plural), descended as they are 
from prior social formulations, particularly Greco-Roman tradition and Judeo-
Christian tradition. These laws govern a broad spectrum of social behavior, 
including family, civil society and the State. The antinomy arises at the juncture of 
this application, for the law of hospitality transcends and supersedes the laws of 
hospitality, rendering them illegal and transgressive (in an ethical sense), while 
simultaneously depending on the laws of hospitality to prevent it from slipping into 
dim suggestion or utopian abstraction. The laws of hospitality, on the other hand, 
require the law of hospitality to guide their hospitable actions as a singular concept, 
which is constituted by its application to the structures of the world: “It wouldn’t be 
effectively unconditional, the law, if it didn’t have to become effective, concrete, 
determined, if that were not its being as having-to-be” (Derrida, Of Hospitality 77; 
italics in original).  
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The negotiation between ethical demands for absolute, hyperbolic ethics and 
a programmatic series of implementable ethical laws does not occur in an abstract 
conceptual space alone. Instead, it is played out in the material practices of 
singularities in their emergent onto-encounters. Derrida characterizes the 
relationship between parties engaged in this ethical dyad as a relationship of mutual 
hostages. For Derrida, the stranger “is not only someone to whom you say ‘come,’ 
but ‘enter,’ enter without waiting, hurry up and come in, ‘come inside,’ ‘come within 
me,’: take place in me, which means, by the same token, also take my place” (123).  
In taking the place of the host, the stranger takes possession of that which the host is 
master: “it’s as if the master, qua master, were prisoner of his place and his power, 
of his ipseity, of his subjectivity” (Derrida, Of Hospitality 123; italics in original).   
Insomuch as we are able to preexist our existence, we are awaiting the 
arrival of the guest to free us of the burden we cannot shed alone: the emergence of 
singularity. That is our ultimate and most burdensome responsibility, one which can 
only be exercised through mutual irruption. We must await and welcome the guest 
so as to be the host, and in this way we are the guest’s hostage. Conversely, the 
guest, initially hostage to the host’s invitation and domination, is set free by 
assuming the reigns of mastery—only to fall prey to the host’s being held hostage. 
Ethics is coextensive with this negotiation of hospitality, for we are both host and 
guest, and thus embody both judge and judged; the powerful and the powerless.  
The very foundation of an ethical contract—one which balances the 
absolutist imperative of the law of hospitality with the multifarous laws of 
hospitality—is further complicated by my extension of the possibility for ethical 
170 
 
consideration so broadly to so many singularities. The ethical aim must be to 
distribute hospitality (and respect and valuation) more generously and evenly 
across the whole of Being, and particularly to those bodies whose grasp on existence 
is tenuous (including humankind).  
As I discussed in the introduction to this chapter and have demonstrated 
presently, a hyperbolic ethical stance is predicated on the aporia that makes 
impossibility the condition of possibility, and forces us to acknowledge failure to 
behave absolutely ethically as that which makes the striving for success (as the 
failure of failure) possible. The ethical standard for which AMD&ART makes a case is 
therefore an entirely aspirational ethics. It is the ambition to behave and embody 
ethically that informs our failings, and over time, refines them in an intra-active 
crucible of Being. To snatch a quotation from Edward Abbey, “the idea has nothing 
going for it but desire, the restless aspiration of the human mind. But when was 
aspiration ever intimidated by fact?” (Abbey 55)  By putting forth our 
instrumentalizations of nature as inescapable—but not inexcusable—we enter into 
embodied, reciprocal, and possibly ethical co-production with the rest of Being.  
This does not mean, of course, that all instrumentalization is permissible in 
some whitewashed, forward-oriented, “we’re getting better all the time” apologetics. 
As Cuomo pointed out, a general increase in flourishing is still the guideline against 
which an instrumentalization of Being must be judged: flourishing of an individual, a 
species, a landscape, a world. Some acts—mountaintop removal mining, for 
instance—are patently unethical instrumentalizations. This is by virtue of their 
status as the utter antithesis of widespread flourishing. Save for pocketbooks, 
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nothing flourishes in the wake of mountaintop removal: no plants, no animals, no 
streams, no communities. It is a pestilence in Appalachia, and demands the utmost 
reproach.  
In different proportions, under particular circumstances, there are unsavory 
elements that form the basis of a practicable ethical formulation: killing, destruction, 
consumption, disposal. Jane Bennett writes that a materialist ethics of this sort 
demands that we “speak of promoting healthy and enabling instrumentalizations, 
rather than treat people as ends-in-themselves, because to face up to the compound 
nature of the human self is to find it difficult even to make sense of the notion of a 
single end-in-itself” (12). The practice of relating under the auspices of an “enabling” 
instrumentalization is probably the most acceptable resolution to the antinomy laid 
out by Derrida. It is an acceptable resolution only in the sense that it fails both the 
call for an absolutist ethics, as well as that which is based in the laws of family, 
society, and State. This is an essential character of any actual, worldly practice in the 
realm of ethics, however, and is to be expected. Instrumentalization, though 
seemingly a contrasting force to the agency that I so liberally spread about this 
document, is a very real element of living in significant-otherness with our 
companion singularities. This is precisely because responsibility and suffering are 
inescapable, and yet also never calculable. Haraway, writing about the practices of 
laboratory testing on animals, writes that this incalculability “does not mean people 
cannot ever engage in experimental lab animal practices, including causing pain and 
killing. It does mean that these practices should never leave their practicioners in 
moral comfort, sure of their righteousness…The needed morality, in my view, is 
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culturing a radical ability to remember and feel what is going on and performing the 
epistemological, emotional and technical work to respond practically in the face of 
permanent complexity not resolved by taxonomic hierarchies and with no humanist 
philosophical or religious guarantee” (When Species 75). The instrumentalization of 
animals, plants—and especially inanimate/inert/dead matter—is a material 
necessity bordering on absolutely fundamental. An enabling instrumentalization 
means engaging in that instrumentalizing relationship in the same way that Derrida 
perceived the ethical act: recognizing in oneself the indebtedness to, as well as the 
mastery over, the singularity in question. I mirror Haraway’s sentiment when she 
writes that in the case of the pure and unadulterated suffering of laboratory animals, 
“calculations—reasons—are obligatory and radically insufficient for companion 
species worldliness…We have reasons but not sufficient reasons” (When Species 89).  
For the artists, townsfolk, dragonflies, ghosts of coalminers, seams of pyrite 
and all the rest who creep, soar, walk and persist across and within AMD&ART, 
instrumentalization is the very foundation of material Being, and the unfolding 
relational aesthetic sphere. Relationships of use are the practical, remediative heart 
of AMD&ART, and it is the fruit of the relationship’s ongoing presence that gets 
drawn up into the realm of representation. To do the work of criticism of AMD&ART 
is, in fact, to enter into a sort of instrumentalized relationship with the site as a 
whole. This is particularly true if we consider momentarily my relationship with the 
site—geographically aloof, seemingly disconnected, and yet mobilizing the site in 
concept and image to forward my theories regarding the fundamentally 
performative dimensions of nature, and culture, and finally natureculture. My hope, 
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of course, is that I am doing so in a way that is enabling, and that an increased 
profile helps not only maintain AMD&ART but boosts Vintondale in the process. 
Perhaps, with this in mind, AMD&ART is using me: instrumentalizing me as a 
mouthpiece for a peculiar place in a forgotten part of the country.  
Cuomo’s reference to Aldo Leopold reminds readers of Leopold’s famous 
“Land Ethic”: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and 
beauty of a biotic community” (Leopold 262). But as the work of Haraway, Nancy, 
Barad and Albrecht suggest, “integrity” and “stability” are hardly features of 
individual singularities in their momentary state, let alone entire biotic 
communities. The third element of Leopold’s triumvirate, beauty—overlooked, 
unquantifiable, whimsical compared to the others—is finally that which most aligns 
with an ethics of flourishing, and thereby an ethics of companionship.  Haraway’s 
program and the ethics of AMD&ART depend upon it: significant otherness, that 
“vulnerable, on-the-ground work that cobbles together non-harmonious agencies 
and ways of living that are accountable both to their disparate inherited histories 
and to their barely possible but absolutely necessary joint futures” (Haraway, 
Companion 7). AMD&ART, a beacon of hope for environmentalists and industrialists 
alike, for local “insiders” and professional “outsiders” (and vice versa), for 
singularities human and non-human as well as sentient and non-sentient, is finally 
about love—affinity, respect, infatuation. It is the very manifestation of significant 
otherness, a compact drawn up between the townsfolk of Vintondale, with their 
disparate histories of oppression, exploitation and environmental despoliation, and 
their landscape, a place that if not broken, is at least badly bent. 
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 Together, in what once seemed very much like a “barely possible” future, the 
myriad singularities of one small, out of the way western Pennsylvanian town have 
come together and made manifest precisely the system within a system, network 
with a network, world within a world that Surrealist Paul Éluard meant when he 
wrote: “Il y a un autre monde mais il est dans celui-ci.—There is another world, but it 
is in this one” (xi). An entire cosmos—a world within the world—tucked away in 
Vintondale, awaiting its next emergence.    
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this study has been to develop a perspective on ecological art 
grounded in radical philosophies of engagement. I selected AMD&ART as a 
representative example of responsible, complex and ultimately performative art not 
only because it is an artwork with much to offer critics, but also because of a sense 
of “hometown pride.” Very little is written about the mountains of western 
Pennsylvania that is not written in the past tense. The high-water mark, so to speak, 
of the area’s fame came in 1889 with the near-erasure of the largest city in the 
county during the Johnstown Flood, and books like David McCullough’s celebrated 
portrait, The Johnstown Flood, focus the public imagination deep in the past. The 
economic and cultural decline of the last forty years has been unkind to the area, 
and the noteworthiness of Cambria County has diminished. AMD&ART has offered a 
glimmer of notoriety to the Vintondale area and, in the process, radically altered my 
thinking about the nature of ecological art.   
 Successful ecological art, as this study demonstrates, must finally exceed a 
critic’s efforts to easily categorize the artwork along an axis of dichotomous 
terminology. It cannot be understood to be “natural” and “cultural”—that is, existing 
in a sphere of nature and in another sphere as culture, simultaneously—nor can it 
be understood as “natural” or “cultural”—regarded solely as one or the other. 
Instead, I offer that ecological art must be regarded as art that—even if it does not 
deal expressly in environmental themes—is actively involved in the task of 
integrating singularities of all sorts into newly emergent constellations of relational 
Being: natureculture. As Grant Harman states, art is a system of “expressive signs 
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whose function [is] not to tell us about things but to present them to us in the act of 
executing themselves” (105). AMD&ART, operating under the “nomination” logic of 
the readymade, offers up the interwoven process of cultural and environmental 
remediation as art, thereby rendering the processes both “expressive signs” and 
“things” executing themselves.    
 The notion that art is a framework whereby we might witness things 
executing themselves is emphasized in my study by Bateson’s notion of an 
“extended concept of mind.” According to Bateson’s theory of extended mind, the 
very act of bearing witness to an outside is a reflexive act, as it is the coming into 
being of a new manifestation of our imminently mutable mind. The environment 
and our experiences regarding it become dramatically participatory, and in the 
process suggest that what we used to call “nature” is an artifact of social convention 
and practices of Othering that historicize and reshape the basic materials of Being in 
light of the preexisting codes of “naturalness.” The inverse is true, of course, with 
regards to “culture”: it is interwoven with chemical, biological, elemental processes 
without which it can never manifest nor be transmitted (perhaps the defining 
feature of any culture). With these facts in mind, this study has from the very outset 
sought to answer Jane Bennett’s rallying cry: “Give up the futile attempt to 
disentangle the human from the nonhuman. Seek instead to engage more civilly, 
strategically, and subtly with the nonhumans in the assemblages in which you, too, 
participate” (116).     
 Following my introductory chapter, wherein I introduce AMD&ART, the need 
for a performative understanding of both art criticism and ontology, and offer a 
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strategic overview of my method for addressing this need, my second chapter 
examined the AMD&ART site according to the tenets of the artistic genre with which 
it is most commonly associated: land art. It was my hope that the existing body of 
literature and conceptual frameworks that have been developed by critics over the 
course of the past forty years would allow me to account for some of the formal 
aesthetic dimensions of AMD&ART. While this is the case, the majority of that 
chapter acknowledges that formal characteristics are a poor set of criteria for 
assessing AMD&ART’s place within the cannon of contemporary art. This is 
primarily because AMD&ART is only partially devoted to the ocular-centric, 
sculptural and purely aesthetic presentation that characterizes the majority of land 
art in the “golden age” of the 1960s and 1970s. Instead, I examine and expand upon 
Mark Rosenthal’s notion of “attitudes” of land art to account for the very prominent 
relational component of the AMD&ART site. It is a site devoted to the betterment of 
the environmental woes of Vintondale, as well as an exercise in fostering 
community-pride and activism among a disenfranchised community.   
 Chapter Three begins by suggesting that the task of addressing the ethical, 
participatory demands of the AMD&ART site warrants a rethinking and clarification 
of the tropes that are commonly used to discuss the site. Rather than considering 
the site as a unified whole—a fixed art-object with discrete features and boundaries 
that persist through time—I argue that the tropes of “system” and “network” allow 
for a more engaging and rewarding way of conceiving of AMD&ART. By examining 
systems theory—and Systems Art—I offer that AMD&ART is a self-sustaining 
aesthetic environment, one that continually maintains its own physical and aesthetic 
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integrity. As such, it is best thought of as an enormous readymade, in the style of 
Marcel Duchamp. While a constructed entity, it is undoubtedly the harnessing of 
natural forces and cultural histories that preexist the genesis of the site with a 
particular aesthetic aim: remediation.  
The trope of the “system” is a fairly limiting perspective on AMD&ART, 
however, as it implies an unseemly focus on the telos of the site. In other words, 
while the site was no doubt erected and maintained with remediation in mind, it has 
since developed to the degree that its original goal can hardly be said to comprise 
the entirety of its reason for being. The surpassing of its original telos speaks to the 
value of the “network” trope in understanding AMD&ART. The concept of the 
network forces critics to consider the possibility that any one particular aim is 
merely one of many possible interpretations of the complex functioning of the site, 
which I believe is the case with AMD&ART. Beyond a simple explanatory discourse, 
however, the network trope signals an encompassing material and semiotic web 
that extends to surround visitors, critics, human and non-human agents alike, 
binding them together with flows of affective influence. Indeed, the very act of 
regarding AMD&ART, let alone being present in/at the site, is a constitutive act.  
The fourth chapter of my study takes seriously the repercussions of this 
network perspective and makes a case for explaining the ethical considerations that 
are foregrounded at AMD&ART. The chapter does this in two ways. First, I have 
rehearsed the application of Donna Haraway’s rubric of “companion species” to a 
landscape, as a way of accentuating the degree to which on-the-ground, embodied, 
and deeply affective ties bind us to the non-human. This relational vision does not 
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hesitate to acknowledge the power of personal commitment, love, memory and 
other emotional components that are the tell-tale signs of our emergent engagement 
with individuals and places.  
The second effort that I have made in this chapter to document the 
repercussions of the network perspective is the task of examining and synthesizing 
the philosophies of Karen Barad and Jean-Luc Nancy. These philosophies offer a 
lively and rewarding perspective on how each element (singularity) of an encounter 
is dramatically important to the whole. In both cases, Being is seen as an emergent 
phenomenon, the result of individuated singularities producing one-another by a 
process of differentiation. In this sense, it is a performative act: the doing of Being is 
prescribed, to some extent, by the conventions that preexist the current 
instantiation of Being. In this sense, of course, performance studies can offer a 
unifying concept to a profound series of ontological questions, and needn’t defer to 
the god-terms “culture” or “nature” to explain the continuity of Being. I personally 
find a great deal of wonder—as well as a legitimate sense of enchantment in the 
world—in these “animist assemblage” models of Being. In the face of a world so 
inured to the radical separation of humankind and the rest of material Being, as well 
as blinded and hogtied by the competing narratives of science, religion, free-will and 
destiny, it is reassuring to feel again the possibility that my interaction (and intra-
action) with the world is fundamental and important.  
The diminishing of the gap between ourselves and the rest of Being results, 
finally, in a need for this study to account for the ethical dimension of an entity such 
as AMD&ART. Ethics are not conventionalized rules of engagement, but rather are 
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those fraught and delicate conditions that must be met so as to make moral 
consideration available for ever-increasing numbers of singularities. While this is a 
grandiose goal, it is, as my reading of Derrida demonstrates throughout the 
conclusion of the fourth chapter, the only truly ethical approach to Being that can 
exist. If we, as humans (singularities), seek our own flourishing and hope to increase 
the degree of flourishing that surrounds us, we must acknowledge that “the 'greatest 
good' that is sought by ethics includes the interests of all living beings and systems. 
Ethics that begin with flourishing capture the sense in which instrumental and 
noninstrumental value are often enmeshed” (Cuomo 64).  While I would hasten to 
add to Cuomo’s assertion that it is not only living beings that deserve this level of 
moral consideration, the gist of her statement is sound: we must ask, in the case of 
AMD&ART, if the conditions emergent within/alongside AMD&ART provide for a 
general sense of flourishing. In the case of AMD&ART, not only has the community of 
Vintondale flourished, but so too have living beings on many scales. Nonliving 
matter is both conserved and utilized, instrumentalized in a way that aids in a 
generalized flourishing, rather than in a way that unilaterally favors one party (as, 
say, coal mining might have traditionally done in Vintondale).  Perhaps in an obtuse 
way, I have flourished as well: my life enriched, my scholarship expanded, my 
regard for my homeplace altered by my association with the site. Ethics is not 
bankrupted by its expansion beyond the realm of the human; it does not lose its 
potency, nor does it become a permissive “new normal,” under which the same 
domination can occur anew. Instead, it is an intrinsically doomed, yet wholly worthy 
endeavor. This is the essence of Derrida’s hyperbolic ethics, and the only moral 
181 
 
approach to a world wherein the very stuff of the world actively constitutes us as we 
constitute it. It is also the basis for an ethical natureculture. 
Performance is a concept that is integral to natureculture. As this study has 
shown, the very emergence of the world is relational, and therefore symbolic and 
embodied. The lived process of creating Being is the constant, reciprocal play of 
physical and emotional desires and satisfactions. We take much from one another 
(human and non-human alike) in the process of doing the World. But, of course, we 
give much back. As Gary Snyder has written, “performance is currency in the deep 
world’s gift economy” (75). AMD&ART is a giving-back to land in the ways in which 
we can enact: it is a way of giving back a functioning watershed, a vibrant sphere 
wherein the world can unfold, a town with a glimmer of hope for the future. We 
cannot restore what has been taken; the coal is long since burned, the mines 
shuttered and sagging. But by producing an artwork such as AMD&ART we can make 
manifest our continued, embodied regard for such a place. Thinking the thought of 
performance and performativity help remind us to give credit and praise to those 
actants whose important contributions can sometimes get elided, by scientific 
rationalism, Cartesian dualisms and other Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
philosophies. The performance perspective spares us from the brutal, mechanic 
worldview of science and allows us to experience, even if briefly, a collaborative 
world of other performers.    
Instead of looking at AMD&ART as an object that rests “upon” nature or are 
placed into it, my efforts in this dissertation have been from the first dedicated to 
casting AMD&ART as a performative player in an environment, as well as an 
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environment. It is important to do so because I think that the field of performance 
studies benefits from any excursion into the material and conceptual realm of 
environmental communication. It is not, however, without a certain limitation in my 
treatment of the problem. Tim Ingold has written that nature comes about as a 
cultural construct because humans “can describe their environment and report on 
their actions within it, as though they had themselves steeped outside it, posing as 
mere spectators. But in doing so the environment reverts to nature” (52). Rather 
than being “of” an environment, humanity utilizes its reflexivity to “produce” a 
nature that they are then capable of being “in” (or in-habiting). Thus while I commit 
something of a cardinal sin of nature/culture division by suggesting that the 
“nature” of Vintondale has AMD&ART thrust into it, my hope is that readers will 
understand my focus on performative ontologies as a way of recasting  AMD&ART as 
our environment. We are too heavily invested as intra-active participants to deny 
our own agency.  
The task of accepting our agency means that we must become comfortable 
with the idea that some constitutive actions taken by our forebears are not able to 
be undone: the AMD problem is perpetual, meaning that AMD&ART can never be 
dismantled. It has now become a part of the Allegheny Mountains, whether it is an 
ideal situation or not. These “hybrid” environments of nature and culture are all 
around us, perhaps to the extent that they are all that is around us. “Changing our 
surroundings is in large part what it means to be human,” writes naturalist Tom 
Wessels, “but as a species, through the last couple of centuries we have dramatically 
increased both the area and the frequency of our disturbance regime. To give 
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ecosystems the time to adjust, our landscape alterations need to be cautious and 
thoughtful” (18).  
My thought on how to proceed from this point is that we need a newer, older 
vision of our place in the world. It is a newer vision because we must move past our 
current fascination with nature as a stagnant thing to be “preserved” in the face of a 
dominator culture. While the creatures and places of the world undoubtedly do 
need protection, to do so because of their value to us—either monetarily or 
emotionally—is motivated by an end-use agenda. Beyond this point, this type of 
conservatorship of the natural world diminishes the agency of the world-at-large, 
and elides the strange truth of human existence: the human is not so much human, 
as it is an elaborate collection of “its.” The “its”—biological its (symbiotic and hostile 
organisms), chemical its (elements and processes), cultural its (material culture as 
well as immaterial)—are external to the individual and yet produce and are manifest 
in the individual. To speak of “preserving” the natural world is to ignore the fact that 
we are the natural world.  It is not new technology that will save us, but rather new, 
old philosophies. In this sense, I suggest my vision of our place in the world is older. 
The patterns of deep-engagement with place, attentiveness to specificity, and a 
worldview that springs from the particularities of a context shared by people, 
animals, plants and inert matter is a very old worldview: it borders on animism. 
Indeed, as W.J.T. Mitchell notes, “we want works of art to have ‘lives of their own,’ 
but we also want to contain and regulate that life, to avoid taking it literally, and to 
be sure that our own art objects are purified of the taint of superstition, animism, 
vitalism, anthropomorphism, and other premodern attitudes” (What Do Pictures 
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Want? 149). My efforts with this document have been to unleash those lives, and to 
unsettle what might even be thought a life. Inert matter—“dead” matter—has a 
historicity, the capacity for agency, the ability to change over time; in short, a sort of 
life. AMD&ART is an art environ that is life, at work.  
As Mitchell points out, this reemergence of an animist, vitalist tendency has 
its roots in the Romantic era. I am forced to acknowledge here at the conclusion of 
this document that I haven’t quite been able to shake the impulse toward a 
Romanticized nature, in the sense that Romanticism looks to nature for succor. It 
very well may be the animating force that drove me toward examining the topic of 
nature (and art) from the first, and consequently informs all of my subsequent 
theorizing. For example, it might be said that a type of Romanticism prompts the 
work of defamiliarizing an artwork such as AMD&ART, as I hope to make it a place 
wherein the viewer can belong rather than simply observe.  My desire to elevate our 
regard for singularities of all sorts—plants, animals, people, animate and inanimate 
objects alike—is similarly a Romantic gesture. It is the search for companionship—
and a momentary escape into wonder—in the face of a crushing and routinely 
demoralizing world order. I am guilty of this escapist daydream, as I think are many 
people whose proclivities stray toward the aesthetic dream of the agricultural, the 
untrod path, mountaintop or seaside or patch of scrubby suburban woodlot. 
Romanticism has great power as a motivating force because it works upon us 
beyond the realm of reason and rational thought. It is the province of faith.  
This is not to say, however, that my flair for the Romantic has remained 
untempered in writing this document. On the contrary, I am now more aware than 
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ever that Romanticism depends, to a great extent, on the maintenance of the 
boundaries of nature and culture. As I strove to undo the traditional nature/culture 
divide with my research, I became finally convinced that the division is untenable. 
Searching for a conceptual framework that allows “nature” and “culture” to be 
reimagined as shorthand titles for ways of considering one unified Being (rather 
than autonomous spheres) does not preclude me from hoping for a kind of escape. 
Indeed, I find that my research enables a certain kind of axiological regard for the 
everyday that makes the “escape” to a grand, Romantic nature unnecessary. If 
nothing else, the ability to find the “natural world” in an herb garden or roadside 
ditch undoes some of the isolating effects of our grander visions of nature as glacier-
strewn peaks or dense stands of primeval timber. While these areas—National 
Parks, restricted areas, UNESCO World Heritage Sites—are important for the 
preservation of both fragile habitats and fragile sites of imaginative possibility, they 
cannot be the working definition of the wild or the natural. They are simply one 
facet of a complex fusion of nature and culture.  
I wrote, in the introduction to this study, that I intended to proceed with a 
course of examination that is characterized by an interdisciplinary approach, rather 
than trandisciplinary. Interdisciplinary scholarship takes as its primary goal, I 
claimed, the integration of existing bodies of literature into an interrogative tool 
that produces new knowledge. To this end, I have synthesized the literature 
surrounding land art, Systems Art, systems theory, network theory, the readymade, 
companion species, Being-Singular Plural, Intra-action, hyperbolic ethics (and other, 
more nuanced and minor theories) and used it to produce a new interpretation of 
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AMD&ART. Emergent from these widely-arrayed disciplines is a perspective that fits 
more neatly within the discipline of Performance Studies than in any of the 
aforementioned modes of inquiry. Performativity is not simply a tool for examining 
why the potentially arbitrary modes of culture develop consistency and are clarified 
over time. Or more to the point, it is that tool, while simultaneously being expanded 
beyond the realm of culture into the realm of nature. The tools and concepts of the 
sciences have produced worlds of scientific knowledge; the tools of the 
(post)humanities can produce worlds of (post)humanistic knowledge. It is in this 
direction that I foresee Performance Studies moving in the future.  
I am left with a series of questions, however, that while pressing, are beyond 
the scope of this study. A number of the questions spring from the repercussions of 
conceptualizing the world as many actants. Ethical questions are among the 
thorniest in this brave new world. I have suggested that, along with Wendell Berry 
and Gary Snyder, a return to the question of propriety may be necessary, if we are to 
seriously consider the world as a series of partners with more equal footing. The 
conventional standards of behavior suggested to us via the concept of propriety, 
however, are hardly worth taking up. We have been variously afraid to engage the 
world as actants, and eager to capitalize on it as raw materials. What are needed are 
new standards of behavior and moral guidelines that rely less on compunction and 
more on a communitarian flourishing. I have begun to outline those standards (and 
describe how AMD&ART embodies them), but their full articulation is a profound 
and far-reaching project.  
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Additionally, the goal of attending to the specific actants, in specific 
environments like Vintondale, makes extrapolating the lessons learned in this 
document more difficult. While local problems may call for local solutions, it is 
sometimes difficult to find local philosophies that can ground practical works or 
expand the reception of a particular aesthetic object. I have attempted to do just this 
with AMD&ART, and firmly believe that a similarly in-depth examination of other 
aesthetic objects would lead to a wide array of local histories, conceptual 
discoveries and enrichment opportunities. The rate at which this can happen (as the 
years it took to craft this document demonstrate) is glacial, however. It requires a 
sort of dedication to a not-always-interesting site, and the conceptual marathoning 
to continually find new ways to enliven the critical duties of scholarship. I hope that 
many of the lessons of my study will be transferable to other sites, contexts and 
scholarly discussions; I am well aware that many are not.  
 A related conundrum that arises at the conclusion of this study: if we are 
“more” ethical, or better community members, as our regard for other actants 
grows, how does a scholar know when to stop “meeting and greeting” and when to 
get to writing? It is difficult to avoid getting hung up on the details while trying to 
make larger points about the relationship between humankind and the rest of Being. 
If we are expected to account for so much—the effect of the weather on thought, for 
example—it becomes almost burdensome, a task to be finished so that the “real 
work” of broad theory can begin. I have attempted to balance these impulses to “get 
to know” the actants—stories about Vintondale’s coalmining past and accounts of 
growing up in the city, alongside lists of tree species and discussions of anaerobic 
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bacteria—with the necessary and enjoyable work of theorizing broadly about their 
relationships to each other, to aesthetics, and to the means whereby the world is 
performed into Being. Yet one could always do more: might not the lifecycle of the 
Brook Trout (Salvelinus fontenalis), integrated into the story of AMD&ART, make for 
a sympathetic character? To bring the fish into the fold might mean a discussion of 
the fishing industry (the economics of conservation), streambed ecology, and my 
own reminiscences of fishing with my father and grandfather. This is all a 
roundabout way of saying that any approach is partial, and local approaches—while 
seemingly so limited in scope as to be potentially exhaustive—are partial 
nonetheless.  
I am sometimes asked, by those who have been keeping abreast of my study’s 
progress, if I still like AMD&ART; if I’m not sick of talking about the site, or if I 
haven’t ceased to care about the place as I’ve grown so familiar with it. While my 
affections do show some signs of fatigue, one of the major thrusts of my study is 
precisely a rebuttal of this line of questioning: familiarity brings not wearisome 
consistency, but rather enables a nuanced awareness that makes even the seemingly 
mundane dynamic. To look upon AMD&ART as a series of ponds in a grassy meadow 
is to see its form; to understand AMD&ART as a complex community makes it 
infinitely richer. The last time I visited the site with my wife, I found a dead shrew 
on the path near the Litmus Garden, saw the Orange Jewelweed growing in shady 
spots, stood on the ruins of the Vinton Colliery and watched an elderly couple coast 
by on their bicycles along the Ghost Town Trail. To return tomorrow would bring a 
host of new experiences, finds and relationships. A layperson can sense that 
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AMD&ART is a constantly changing environment; this study has been an effort to 
articulate how profoundly that is the case. 
My study suggests a number of possible avenues of further inquiry. The most 
ambitious of these possibilities is the distancing of the perspective I have articulated 
from the notion of the “environment” as the term is commonly used.  Too much 
environmental art takes as its genesis the tendency to separate ourselves from the 
rest of nature, and either bemoan the passing of that (illusory) unspoiled nature, or 
seek to enable conditions under which this mythical terrain could be regained. 
Consequently, work, daily consumption, economic activity and social relationships 
have been cast as a separate (and often opposed) sphere. While I have, in this study, 
sought to blur these lines, I have done so from a perspective that deals expressly 
with those elements so often associated with the environment: trees, rocks, water, 
plants, and animals, not to mention a very pervasive and tempting strain of 
American Romanticism bequeathed to us by Thoreau, Whitman, Emerson and the 
like. In other words, the perspective that I have articulated could be applied to a 
factory, a town, a friendship or a bureaucracy, with compelling results. Accounting 
for the myriad relationships—especially their constitutive power and affective 
dimension—is one way of examining an artifact that needn’t depend upon the 
swelling sense of “environmentalism” that informs AMD&ART.  
 The other benefit of this sort of post-environmentalist ecological art might be 
the enabling of a counterpoint to the rosy temperament and sentimentality that 
haunts environmental art. The counterpoint of which I’m speaking is not, as we 
might assume at first, a maudlin, elegiac tone: these are one and the same impulse. 
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The rosy temperament is present in contemporary environmental art even when it 
is concerned with tragic occurrences like AMD or oil spill tragedies, because in 
mourning the despoliation of a landscape/environment, we assume that it must 
once have had great vitality, vigor, or self-determination that borders on a kind of 
“happy stasis.” Thus the elegiac variety of contemporary environmental art trades in 
the rosiness of a separate and pristine nature through mourning its loss.   
 The counterpoint of which I speak is rather the doing away with the 
rosy/elegiac tone in light of a realization: that the separate nature we are mourning 
or celebrating has never existed.  This is not to say that the environments have never 
existed, of course, but that our desire for them to return to their state as perfectly 
preserved and unspoiled places is preposterous. Places (and things) are, as this 
study demonstrates, given their very consistency and capacity to be, by virtue of 
myriad instrumentalizations (even instrumentalizations that do not depend upon 
consumption or utilization to any finite end: the process of singularities 
differentiating themselves). Nature has never been separate, nor distant, and it 
makes no sense to mourn its passing as such.  
 The research agenda of this document lends itself to examining the ecology of 
art objects that are not expressly environmentalist. Conceptual art, performance art, 
and pre-twentieth century art alike could benefit from their critics assuming a less 
art-historical lens, and a more broadly-wrought approach based in articulating the 
moments of their becoming present. This might strike readers as a call for 
historiographic research, and to some extent, it is. Foucault, in calling for a 
historiographic approach to scholarship writes, “what is found at the historical 
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beginning of things is not the inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of 
other things. It is disparity” (“Nietzsche” 79). Yet, as this paper clearly asserts, it is 
not as if disparity is in any way diminished in the present: it is the fundamental unit 
of the present’s unfolding. While we may try to stay au courant with the unfolding of 
the present, it is invariably a losing gambit, and a noble goal. In accounting for our 
fellows—human and non-human, living and non-living alike—we expand our 
affiliations, and further our acknowledgement of the nested realities that make up 
nature, culture, and natureculture.  
 Finally, it is my hope that the perspective I have articulated in this document 
might be useful for examing and generating new aesthetic expressions, both in the 
vein of AMD&ART, as well as in other mediums. Live performance has a history of 
interest in site specificity—the works of Allan Kaprow, Ana Mendieta, and Violet 
Juno come to mind—as well as an interest in other, nonhuman participants: Joseph 
Beuy’s Coyote: I Love America and America Loves Me being among the most 
noteworthy. My focus on the local, the intra-active and the generative might serve as 
a meaningful and intriguing launching point for live performance. If nothing else, it 
would offer artists a way to avoid the phenomenon of “live action plop-art,” wherein 
a piece is site-specific only because it occurs at one site. A related phenomenon is 
performance that is site-specific in the sense that it depends on the physical site as a 
sort of enabling prop. My study makes clear that it is possible to have great regard 
for other actants, their histories, their unfolding presents and relationships that are 
not simply features of a site. This would be a site-specificity that draws on 
ephemeral, relational qualities of place and makes possible the articulation of 
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personal relationships to spaces in all sorts of registers. The perspectives that I 
articulate can be thought of as operating along the lines of mythology: 
communicative relationships with nonhuman Others, emergent personal 
symbology, trials in unfamiliar lands aided by guides and gurus. As Joseph Campbell 
has written, “clearly, mythology is no toy for children” (19).  In any case, it makes 
concepts such as the “totem spirit” more accessible and meaningful to 
contemporary artists. As Mitchell writes, “totem” is an Ojibwa word usually 
translated as “’he is a relative of mine’ and associated with ideas of animal, 
vegetable, and sometimes mineral ‘tutelary spirits,’ and thus with destiny, identity, 
and community” (“Romanticism” 174). While perhaps the actants of which I am 
speaking are not necessarily spirits (although…), they are akin to a tutelary force, 
and are without a doubt involved with destiny, identity, and community. 
Performances of personal mythology, drawn from the intra-action that is the coming 
into Being of the world, might have the capacity to open up new and meaningful 
avenues not only for aesthetics, but also for personal growth. 
 I embarked upon this course of research out of a peculiar combination of 
homesickness and isolation: the pining for a mountain landscape I’ve long left 
behind, and the isolation of one so very deep in critical and continental philosophy 
that directly affecting the world around me seemed unlikely at best. Unwittingly, of 
course, I’ve managed to put together—by no small imaginative striving—an unlikely 
panacea for both problems. I now understand “home” to be, of course, a matter of 
relations temporal and physical, but one that can be actively managed just the same. 
As I try to make my home in a new and different environment, I look forward to 
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“meeting the neighbors”: those living and non-living singularities with whom I will 
spend my time. On the second count, I have discovered that perhaps the so-called 
“linguistic turn” is not the final whistle-stop of continental philosophy, and that the 
coming years—when “speculative realism,” “vibrant materialism,” and “object-
oriented ontology” finally draw to the fore—are to be an era of renewed hope in our 
affective abilities and potential. At the dawn of a dire age—on ecological, 
naturalcultural grounds—hope begins to spring anew.  
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